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PREFACE 
It is somewhat ironic to be writing a dissertation 
concerned with the problem of too much food. Economics, 
after all, is the science that deals with the allocation 
of "scarce" resources. For the time being, Malthusian 
prophecies of food scarcities are wrong, at least from 
the perspective of the North American wheat farmer, 
without whom Malthus might have been right. The 
question today is the same as it was in the time of the 
mercantilists; what can we do to sel 1 more goods 
abroad? 
I wish to thanK Dr. James Osborn and others in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics at OKlahoma State 
University for the invitation to become an apprentice in 
this exciting field of knowledge. The experience has 
been both stimulating and challenging and has provided 
the groundwork for what I expect wi 11 be a I ifelong 
pursuit. I am particularly grateful to the department 
for their financial support and office space. 
I would 1 ike to thanK the many professors who 
contributed to my experience and professional training. 
Special thanks are due my advisor, Dr. Daniel S. Tilley, 
whose enthusiasm and flair for ideas generated the 
essential in9r·edienb:. fc•r thi=· =-tud;>··. I have cc•me to 
appreciate his relaxed but persistent style, his openess 
to new ideas and his availability to discuss and offer 
advice. I would 1 iKe to thanK the other members of my 
committee, Dr·=·· Lee• BlaKle;>', Har·r>' l'"lapp, Ed Price .:o.nd 
David Henneberry, for their suggestions and comments on 
the research and for their excellent classroom trainin9. 
Other instructors whose classes have especially 
influenced me include Drs. Luther Tweeten, Daryl 1 Ray, 
Linda Willson and David Bivin. I also want to thanK my 
fellow students for maKin9 graduate school so enjoyable. 
Spec i a 1 thanKs to Ron Lord for reading this stud)' and 
h i s c omme n t s c•n i t . 
I want to thanK family and friends, especially my 
parents, Alfred and Eada Dennis, and grandparents, John 
and Else Sissener, for moral and financial support 
during my graduate education. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
In 1985 United States wheat growers suffered from 
unusually low real wheat prices and lower than usual share 
of world wheat exports. This decline is in part a result 
of increased world production and the emergence of new 
major producers. The competition for wheat exports has 
resulted in an increasingly complex marKet in which 
technological and economic efficiency alone do not 
guarantee market share. Non-price competition involves 
factors other than price per bushel such as government 
policies that impact trade in both the exporting and 
importing countries. In addition, macroeconomic conditions 
and currency rates play an important role in determining 
the volume of wheat exports and have affected wheat growers 
in the wheat producing states. 
OKlahoma is one of the major wheat producing states 
and is highly dependent on exports, especially of hard red 
winter wheat. Table I shows world wheat exports, U.S. 
wheat exports and U.S. wheat exports to Brazil. 
TABLE I 
WORLD WHEAT EXPORTS, U.S. WHEAT EXPORTS AND SALES TO BRAZIL 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Sources: a 
b 
World 
Wheat 
Exports 
a 
u.s. 
Wheat 
Exports 
b 
U.S. Wheat 
Exports 
to Braz i 1 
b 
U.S. Share 
of World 
Wheat 
Exports 
Brazil/s 
Share of 
U.S. Wheat 
Exports 
mill ions of metric tons percentage 
63 18 .50 29 2.8 
57 22 1.22 39 5.5 
52 19 1.29 37 6.7 
47 18 1.02 38 5.7 
52 14 .92 27 6.7 
54 17 .62 31 3.6 
52 16 .81 31 5.1 
67 21 .54 31 2.5 
69 37 1.54 54 4.1 
66 25 .90 38 3.6 
64 32 1.77 50 5.6 
67 28 1.55 42 5.6 
63 26 .71 41 2.8 
73 36 2.84 49 7.9 
72 35 1.53 49 4.3 
86 36 2.91 42 5.6 
94 44 3.99 47 6.8 
191 41 2.55 41 6.3 
99 38 2.63 38 6.8 
103 42 2.59 41 6.1 
196 25 2.94 24 8.2 
Agricultural Outlook, World Agricultural Situation 
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Table I shows that world exports and U.S. exports have 
increased since 1965 with the U.S. maintaining, and 
slightly increasing its large market share. 
five years of this period, U.S. share was 34 percent of 
total world wheat exports, while for the last five years it 
was 38 percent. However, in 1985 U.S. wheat sale·:. fell t•:• 
only 24 percent of world wheat sales, the lowest share 
during this period. Table I also shows that U.S. exports 
to Br·.::o.z i 1 increased dur· i ng this period fr·om 500,000 me tr· i c 
tons in 1965 to over two mil 1 ion metric tons in 1985. Over 
the same period, the percentage of total U.S. wheat sales 
percent to 8.2 percent. Table I also shows that the volume 
of United States wheat exports to Brazil have tended to 
fluctuate from one year to the next. Because of rapidly 
gr·ow i ng popu 1 at ion and economic grc•wth, Br·.::o.z i 1 v.J i 11 1 ike 1 y 
continue to be a major market for U.S. wheat exports in the 
fu tur·e. 
Table II shows average wheat prices paid by Brazil 
over this period. These prices would also be 
representative of world wheat prices in general. Table II 
shows that the real price of wheat peaked in 1974 at 303 
dol Jars per metric ton and that in 1985 the real price of 
wheat was one of the lowest during this period, 112 dollars 
per metric ton. This means that in 1985 U.S. wheat 
exporters had both unusually low wheat prices and an 
unusually low share of world wheat sales. 
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TABLE II 
A~JERAGE BRAZILIAN WHEAT It1PORT PRICES 
Year- Aver-age !,.)heat Impor-t Aver-age Wheat Import 
Price Paid by Brazil Price Paid by Brazil 
in Cur-r-ent dollar-s in 1980 dollars 
dollars per· metr· i c ton 
1965 72.43 174 
1966 70.47 164 
1967 73.33 165 
1968 69.49 150 
1969 57.44 118 
1970 53.04 103 
1971 62.45 116 
1972 67.85 121 
1973 113.92 192 
1974 195.23 303 
1975 157.71 224 
1976 147 .17 198 
1977 100.88 129 
1978 124.88 148 
1979 149.58 163 
1980 187.12 187 
1981 191L80 174 
1982 180.39 155 
1983 173.74 144 
1984 155. 11 124 
1985 147.02 112 
Source: Banco do Brazil 
The Role of Pol icy in the Wheat Market 
~1c•-:.t, if nc•t all, gr·ain impor·ting and E-::<por·ting 
countries can be characterized as having some form of 
governme-n ta 1 intervention in the pr·c•duc t ion, 
transportation, consumption and international trade of 
grain. This intervention may taKe the form of price 
setting, subsidies, credits, or trade restrictions. In 
many countries, the government may have a monopoly on all 
grain purchases and sales. There may be long term 
agreements with particular grain exporting countries or 
policies designed to reduce imports and enhance exports. 
All the-:.e for·ms c•f gover·nmental interuentic•n in grain 
marKets may be termed "policies". 
Pol icy maKers in grain exporting countries may not be 
able to fully identify e>~port policy variables on both the 
microecc•nomic and macr·c•economic le•Jels. Often pol ic;.-- is 
aimed at supply, but not demand, or is not tailored to 
-:.pecific impc•r·ting countr·ies .. The dc•mes.tic policies. of 
grain importing countries vary widely. Some have central 1;.--
planned economies with rigid long-term goals; in others, 
decisions are decentralized and marKet oriented. In the 
mar·Ket c•r·iented ecc•nomies, decisic•n·:. concer·ning impor·ts . . :..r·e 
made by private firms. Import policies may vary widely 
between countries and within the same country over time. 
Often the policies. of the expor·tin9 countr·y inter·.:c.ct ;..._,; th 
the peel icies. of the impc•r·ting countr·;•' to influence tr·:<.de. 
Most trade models for wheat have focused on the 
expor·ting cc•ur.try .:;..nd expc•r·t pcd ic;>' in the context c•f the-
world wheat market or particular regions of trade. Fewer 
trade models have focused on the interaction between the 
policies of a single grain importing country and the 
policies of the exporting countries. Such a model could 
help policy ma~~er·s tailor their grain pr·ogram-;. more •:los.el::,· 
tc• fit i nd i 'J i dua 1 trading par· t:-~»r·s. 
Braz i 1 is a major tr·ad i n•;;) partner of the U.S. and a 
major grain importer, especially of wheat. The- U.S. is 
Brazil's major source of wheat, and over time, Brazil has 
increased its imports of U.S. wheat. Brazi 1 has a large 
trade surplus with the U.S. The U.S. share of Brazil's 
t •. •.Jheat imports has fluctuated considerably from as low as 
percent in one year to as high as 66 percent <Table XVII). 
The uolatil ity of U.S. wheat exports to Brazil may be 
due to volatility in Brazil ian wheat production, to 
• ..J.:..ri~.bil it;...-· in IJJC•rld • .. •Jhe.:..t pr·oductic•n an•j to pol itic.:;..l 
factors such as embargoes, cartels and wheat agreements. 
The uariabil ity of U.S. wheat exports to Brazi 1 may also be 
due to price differences among the major wheat exporters as 
,..._,ell as. tc• a cc•mbin.:..tion of U.3. and Br·azi 1 ian pcd ic:~ .. 
variables such as export credit programs, price controls 
and agricultural credits. Brazil's macroeconomic variables 
·:.uch as levels of financial indebtedness., inter·est r·ates, 
inflation and foreign exchange reserves are other possible 
factors .• Questions for U.S. pol icy maKers are: 
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much of this variation may be attributed to policies in the 
U.S. and in Brazi 1 J and (2) hc·~·.J can this knowlt-dge 
influence future wheat trade. 
Object i •Jes 
The purpose of this study is to analyze wheat trade 
between the U.S. and Brazil, especially with respect to 
policie~. in the two nations, and to build a. model to 
explain the effects of pol icy variables and macroeconomic 
conditions. The study wi 11 examine price and non-price 
ccrmpetitic•n among VJhe-at e->";porter·s to Brazil. 
of the study is to explain U.S. share of Brazil's wheat 
impor·ts. Price policies ar·e pol icie~. that a.ffect the price 
paid for wheat by the importing country while non-price 
policies are policies that influence wheat sales other than 
through pr·ice. In addition, the study examines the 
inter·action Crf U.S. poliC:•' I,<Jith pcrlicieS r::rr· Co:rnditions in 
Brazi 1 a.nd the policies of other· ~vheat expor·tin·~ countr·ie~ .. 
By focusing on a single major wht-at importing country, the 
study high! ights certain trade relationships that are 
missing in models that attempt to model the whole world or 
groups of countries. Specifically, this study will: 
( 1 ) De -:.c r· i be Br az i I ··· ~. wh e .:r. t poI i c i e -:., U.S. vJh eat 
expor·t policies, and their· impact c•n Br·azi ]····=· 
wheat production, consume-r demand for wheat and 
relative share to wheat exporting countries; 
.-,, 
~· 
(2) Conceptualize wheat import demand in Brazil, 
including a I iterature review of previous models 
of Brazil ian wheat imports, models of other 
countries and models of other commodities. 
(3) Estimate the relationships suggested by the 
conceptual frameworK; and 
(4) Use the estimated relationships to analyze 
the imp.c<.ct' r;:.f pr;:.l icies . .c<.mcrng the CQU,ntrie':. t.oJhC• 
participate in Brazil's wheat marKet. 
Procedures tr:r be Used 
A model of Brazil's demand for wheat imports based on 
previous studies in the 1 iterature and on the background 
mater·i.od in Chapter· II ~vill be tested empir·ic.O\ll;.' l . o.Jith the 
data available using regression analysis. The model wi 11 
attempt to explain what factors determine market shares 
among the three major exporters. 
Organization r:rf the Study 
The remainder of the study is divided inter four 
chapters. Chapter II examines Brazil ian agricultural 
pol icy and macrr:reconr:rmic conditions, especially as they 
affect wheat production and consumption. Cha.p ter· I II 
examines the export policies of Brazil's three major wheat 
:.upp 1 i er·s: the United States, Canada and Argentina. I t 
examines policies such as credit, price and market develop-
ment, especially of the U.S. government. Chapter· P.) 
reviews previous studies of U.S. wheat export policies on 
countries such as Brazil. Chapter· t.) de-•,JeJops the mc•del to 
explain Brazil's demand for wheat imports and marKet share 
to the- whe-at exporters and gives the empirical results. 
The final chapter re-views the- significant findings of the 
study, draws conclusions and sugge-sts areas for future 
r-esear-ch. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND ON BRAZIL 
Br·az i 1 i :. a maj c•r· importer· c•f U.S. vJhea t. I n 1 '?85 , 
Brazil's wheat imports accounted for over 8 percent of 
total wheat exports of the United States (Table I). Br· 2t.Z i 1 
has dramatically increased its wheat production since 1'?67. 
At the same time, total wheat consumption increased from 
2.4 mi 11 ion metric tons in 1965 to a peal< of 6.8 mi 11 ion 
metric tons in 1980, increasing in each of those 16 years, 
as shown in Table III. One reason for this increase is 
that per capita wheat consumption increased steadily from 
28 Kilograms per capita per year in 1965 to 55 Kilograms 
per capita per year in 1'?80, almost a twofold increase, and 
then began to decline (Table Ill). Brazil has historically 
depended on imports for the bulK of its wheat supply. 
Although the percentage of total con:.urnption supplied b:;.·· 
impc•r·t:. is no1.._. 50 to 70 per·cent, on aver·a.ge, in the i-7'60·'-:., 
it was generally over 80 percent. Table III shows that 
wheat import:. increa:.ed fr·om 1.9 millic•n metr·ic tc•n:. in 
1965 to a peak of 4.6 mill ion metric tons in 1980. 
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TABLE III 
BRAZIL'S WHEAT CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS 
Year Brazilian Brazil ian Imports as Per Capita 
Wheat Wheat Percentage of t<Jhea t 
Consumption Imports Consumption Consumption 
a b a b 
1009 Metric Tons 'I I< i l ogr ams/ 
·'• 
year/capita 
1965 2376 1992 89 28.42 
1966 2447 2467 100 29.56 
1967 2665 2433 91 39.96 
1968 2866 2417 84 32.71 
1969 2908 2397 79 32.94 
1979 3039 1688 55 32.48 
1971 3297 1727 54 33.42 
1972 3578 2749 77 34.19 
1973 3746 2862 55 37.43 
1974 4289 2165 52 39.46 
1975 4422 3878 69 41 . 41 
1976 5052 3163 63 45.98 
1977 5694 2844 58 49.47 
1978 5694 4208 74 50.27 
1979 6872 3780 62 51.88 
1988 6882 4599 68 55.80 
1981 6098 4888 66 48.08 
1982 6935 4105 68 46.00 
1983 5987 4291 72 45.88 
1984 6327 4583 71 46.80 
1985 6288 3468 56 44.88 
Source: a Fecotrigo Institute of Brazil 
b Tomasini Institute of Brazil 
Description of Brazi 1 ian Agriculture 
L.Jheat productivib' in Br·azil i~. lc•w and var·ies 
1 .-. 
"-
considerably from >'ear· to year. Ecol og i cal conditions -::.uch 
as pests and diseases maKe wheat a difficult crop to 
produce. Soil conditions do not favor wheat, and flooding 
is a major problem that contributes to large variations in 
yield in spite of efforts to encourage production in drier 
areas. ~-luch of Br·az i 1·'-=· vJheat ·~rowing 1 and i ~-
characterized by extreme moisture in the rainy season and 
extreme aridity in the dry season. 
Wheat r·equ i r·es substant i ~.1 technological input·: .. :t.nd 
involves high risK. It is an off-season crop and is almost 
always double-cropped with soybeans where soybeans are the 
main in-season crop. Since there is some overlap in 
seasons, double-cropping reduces the productivity of both 
Some of the high variability in wheat production is 
explained by this factor since farmers often may choose to 
exclude ~~•heat .:..nd concentr-ate on SC•)'bean-:: .. Ther·efor·e, it 
would be reasonable to expect that wheat production is 
influenced by soybean prices. 
The unique aspects of Brazil's economy, political 
climate and agricultural policies warrant a detailed 
analysis of their impact on U.S. wheat imports. 
Hi~.tor·icall>', Brazil-'s. agricultur.:..l ecconom>' has t•een 
characterized by a series of booms in a single· agricultural 
cc•mmod i t }'. 
cocoa, rubber, coffee and soybeans. Recently, a boom was 
' 
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created when the government subsidized sugarcane production 
to promote alcohcol fuel as a subs.titute for oil imports. 
Typically, each boom has created a profit advantage for the 
subsidized crop. This is due to the specialized 
investments made for the favored crop by the government. 
These investments may be for equipment, infrastructure, 
research and producer marketing associations. These 
specialized investments tend to perpetuate the boom crop 
until the next boom crop becomes dominant. 
Table IV shows the changing mix of Brazil~s crop 
production since the early 1950~s. 
TABLE IV 
t1IX OF CROP PRODUCTION 
Crop 1952-1954 1966 1973 1977 
percentage of total crop value 
Wheat 3.3 2.5 3.5 2.8 
Rice 13.6 14.2 18.2 7.5 
Corn 12.6 13.3 11.9 10.8 
Manioc 6.4 7.7 8.8 11L7 
Oranges 1.3 2.8 3.0 3.5 
Bananas 2.3 3.7 2.2 2.6 
Soybeans .2 1.4 12.9 17.3 
Cocoa 2.5 1.6 2.3 4.2 
Coffee 27.5 18.6 9.3 13.1 
Sugarcane 6.2 18.8 7.4 8.5 
Cotton 18.9 8.4 9.0 5.3 
Source: The I..Jor 1 d Bank, "Brazil: A Review of 
Agricultural Policies" (1983) 
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T.:..bl e I 1v 1 shows that, compar·ed with other cr·ops, the 
value of wheat production was relatively constant. :;:; i nee 
the mid 1960~s, the trend has been towards export crop 
production relative to domestic food crop production. For 
example, while rice and corn became less important, 
soybeans, a major export crop, became more important. An 
exception is coffee which fell from 27.5 percent of total 
crop value in 1952-1954, to 13.1 percent in 1977. Table V 
shows the indices of real prices received by farmers from 
1966 to 1980 for wheat, coffee, sugar cane, manioc, rice, 
cocoa and corn. Of the major Brazil ian crops, wheat is the 
only crop for which real price received by the farmer fel 1 
from 1966 to 1980. 
Since 1973, the major economi•: cc•ncer·ns have been 
inflation, unemployment and balance of payments. The 
Brazi 1 ian Government has pursued the goal of lower food 
prices because of the perception that lower food prices 
I,<Jill lessen inflation. Thi=· goa.l ha=· r·e=.ulted in a polic:;.--
aimed at expanding food production. Subsidization of 
consumer prices is another method used to lower food 
prices. Expanding food production is also perceived to 
alleviate unemployment because farm workers maKe up a large 
percentage of the labor force in the Brazil ian economy. 
Import substitution has long been a major pol icy in Brazil 
The objective of import substitution has been to promote 
Brazil ian self-rei lance and to promote a balance-of-
payments surplus. An example of import substitution 
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occurred after the 1973 oil price increase. A major 
program was instituted to encourage sugarcane production on 
a massive scale. Sugar cane was used to produce more 
methyl alcohol as a fuel substitute for imported oil. Over 
half of the cars, trucKs, and buses in Brazil were modified 
tc• burn meth>··l alcohol instead of gasoline. 
Year 
1966 
1 $'67 
1968 
1969 
1979 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
TABLE V 
NATIONAL I ND 1 CES OF REAL PRICES RECE gJED BY 
FAR~1ERS, SELECTED CROPS 1966-1980 * 
Wheat Coffee Sugar Cane ~1an i oc Rice Cocoa 
100 100 109 190 109 1913 
94 86 88 125 1131 91 
90 1!32 95 123 94 136 
90 126 99 123 83 175 
87 187 103 143 74 117 
79 166 95 180 100 82 
74 182 93 181 107 106 
76 254 91:" . .J 189 98 198 
91 253 105 195 123 '1'"ot:" L...J .... .f 
104 275 129 232 154 165 
94 518 133 420 101 260 
87 649 127 542 85 507 
89 410 124 462 109 367 
78 35!3 123 350 124 308 
66 313 132 326 115 2?? 
--
Corn 
103 
182 
87 
99 
100 
104 
11 9 
140 
142 
149 
144 
113 
142 
152 
156 
* 
Annual averages deflated by General Price Index, 1966=100 
Source: Getul io Vargas Foundation 
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Other import substitution policies include exchange 
rate controls, export controls and price controls. 
Exchange rate controls restrict exports by overvaluing the 
exchange rate on Brazil's monetary unit, the cruzeiro. 
Export controls include export taxes, quotas and 
pr·ohibition~ .. Price su~ports on food items, such as wheat, 
tend to encourage food production for the domestic market 
to reduce food imports. Other policies that help 
compensate farmers include subsidized interest rates and 
tax advantages. Policies to expand the agricultural base 
such as road construction into the frontier and farmer 
relocation programs also are intended to increase food 
production. 
Subsidized credit and subsidized ferti 1 izer tend to 
incr·ea.se agricultural output. Other policies pr·omote 
imported .:c.gr·icultural inputs such a~. impr·c•• . Jed ·~enetic 
strains and farm equipment. Subsidization of manufactured 
exports promotes exports of processed agricultural 
pr·oduc ts. Subsidized credit is the primary pol icy 
i n-:.trument fc•r pr·omc•t i ng sectc•r·a.l •;Jrowth and r·edi ~.tr· i but i r"~ 
income among sectors. 
The oil price increase of 1973 was an exogenous shock 
to Brazil's economy that accelerated inflation and trade 
,je f i c i t -: .. In response, Brazil's government tightened 
import restrictions and increased subsidies on manufactured 
exports to improve the balance of payments. At the same 
time, price controls on consumer items were widened and 
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some agricultural exports were restricted to contain the 
rise of urban 1 iving costs. Furthermore, credit subsidies 
were increased to help compensate the agricultural sector, 
and minimum price supports appeared on certain crops. 
These measures resulted in greater government control over 
which crops were produced and in which areas of the country 
they were produced (mainly the south and southeast). As a 
result of some of these pol icy changes, exports shifted in 
favor of manufactured goods instead of the agricultural 
commodities that had been favored in the past. 
In the late 1970's, the emphasis shifted bacK to 
agricultural commodities because of (1) the fear of rising 
trade barriers against Brazil's manufactured exports, (2) 
Brazil's increasing debt burden, and (3) the 1978 and 1979 
crop failures. Increasing agricultural output was seen as 
the best hope for improving export earnings and to decrease 
domestic inflation in food prices. Increased agricultural 
output also would help pay off the foreign debt and would 
reduce oil imports by substituting alcohol from sugar cane 
grown in Brazil for imported oi 1. 
,I 
,, \ Another reason for the emphasis on agricultural production in the late 1970's was to create more 
employment. The Third National Development Plan 
(1980-1985) emphasized the creation of new employment in 
agriculture as a way to reduce both rural and urban 
poverty. Agriculture directly employs 30 percent of 
,~(. 1\- ! 
~·· 
1:3 
Br·azil'·:. labor force. The primary policy tool in this pl.:..n 
was to be through increased use of agricultural credits. 
In 1979 most price controls on agricultural products 
were removed, and minimum price supports were extended to 
incr·eas:.e incentives .. Also, lE.,:;jislation vJas intr·oduced, .and 
some enacted, to reform land taxes. The purpose of this 
legislation was to discourage the wasteful use of farm land 
by large land holders by basing the tax rate on 
agricultural productivity per hectare. 
Agricultural exports have grown an average of 17 
percent per year since 1965 and have accounted for two-
thirds to three-fourths of total exports since 1945. Most 
of the increase in agricultural output has come through 
increasing the land base rather than the yield per acre. 
However·, the marginal cost of incr·easin•:;j the agricultur-al 
base rises as the frontier is pushed forward, as distance 
to marKets and agricultural inputs increase and as mor·e 
infrastructure is required. 
The expansion of wheat area harvested in Brazi I has 
been dramatic. The average annual rate of expansion was 15 
percent fr·om 1S:'65 tc• 197'?, after t.1Jhich it declined <T.able 
t.)l ) • One reason for the expansion is that wheat is 
commonly rotated with soybeans during the off-season so it 
is a production complement. As the soybean acreage 
harvested rapidly increased, so did wheat acreage 
har-vested. Soybean production boomed as it became a 
principle export crop. During the 1960's and 1970's, 
1'7' 
soybean acreage increased an average of 31 percent per 
year. The wheat crop's dependence on changes in the 
soybean marKet resulted in great variations in area 
harvested and in yield. Another reason for the great 
variation in wheat yield is the unpredictable variation in 
rainfall that can cause flood damage. 
Table VI shows the fluctuations in Brazil's wheat 
acreage harvested and yield. The large fluctuation in 
yield and area harvested explains the large variation in 
dome-:.tic pr·c•duction and con-:.equently rna)' expl.:..in -:;.c•me of 
the large variation in wheat imports. Brazil's wheat crop 
may be considered a production complement to Brazil's 
soybean crop. Wheat and soybeans are rotated with each 
other at six month intervals. The soybean crop fixes 
nitrogen in the so i 1 , the wheat crop dep 1 e tes it. Soybeans 
are a principle export crop, wheat is not exported but is a 
staple domestic food commodity. Production decisions for 
wheat may depend on the price and area harvested of 
soybeans in the previous time period. 
Tables VI and VII compare the growth rate of wheat 
area harvested with soybean area harvested in Brazil from 
1'7'65 to 1'7'85. While wheat area harvested grew impressively 
from approximately .8 mill ion hectares in 1965 to over 2.6 
mill ion hectares in 1985, soybean area harvested grew much 
more rapidly. Table VII shows soybean area harvested, 
:)'ield and pr·•::.ductic•n from 1965 to 1985. 
har•Je:.ted v.Ja:. 1 e:.:. than •.~oJhea t a.rea har•.h:osted in 1965, . 4 
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mill i ern hectar-e:.. However·, b··,... 1973 it had sur-passed t.o.Jhea.t 
ar-ea harvested, and by 1985 it had grown to over 10.1 
million hectar·es, almo~.t four time~. the hectar-es planted in 
t,o.Jheat. 
TABLE IJI 
BRAZILIAN WHEAT AREA HAR~)ESTED, YIELD AND PRODUCT I ON 
Year I...Jheat Area Yi e1 d Production 
Harvested 
thousands of kg/hectare thousands of 
hectares hectares 
1965 767 769 585 
1966 717 860 615 
1967 831 760 629 
1968 979 889 856 
1969 1487 988 1374 
1973 1895 973 1844 
1971 2269 886 2911 
1972 2329 424 983 
1973 1820 1065 1938 
1974 2471 1157 2859 
1975 2931 619 1788 
1976 3548 999 3226 
1977 3153 655 2066 
1978 2891 956 2677 
1979 3831 763 2924 
1980 3122 865 2732 
1981 1923 1151 22139 
1982 2825 644 1823 
1983 1879 1190 2237 
1984 1742 1139 1983 
1985 2658 1598 4247 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Production Yearbook, years 
1965-19/8 ~ 
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Soybeans have a higher and more consistent yield than 
wheat <Tables VI and VII). This may indicate that they are 
more suited to Brazil's growing conditions. For these 
reasons, soybeans may currently be more important 
economically to Brazil's farmers than wheat. 
TABLE ~)J I 
BRAZILIAN SOYBEAN AREA HARVESTED, YIELD AND PRODUCT I ON 
Year Soybean Area Yield. fJ' Production 
Harvested oY-
')ilL ~ cJ/' 
1900 hectares Kg/hectare 1303 metric tons 
1965 432 1210 523 
1966 491 1219 595 
1967 612 1170 716 
1968 722 919 654 
1969 996 1170 1057 
1973 1319 1140 1509 
1971 1589 1396 2218 
1972 2274 1612 3666 
1973 3300 1526 5035 
1974 5143 1531 7876 
1975 5824 1699 9892 
1976 6416 1750 11227 
1977 7370 1779 12513 
1978 7778 1226 9535 
1979 7321 1360 9959 
1989 8774 1727 15156 
1981 8485 1765 14978 
1982 8202 1562 12819 
1983 8137 1?92 14582 
1984 9421 1659 15541 
1985 10153 1899 18278 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Production Yearbook, ~,..ear-s 
1965-1968 
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Brazil's Demand for Wheat 
Why does Brazil continue to import so much wheat given 
the dramatic growth in domestic wheat pr·oduc t ion? The 
ans•,Jer· lies in demec.nd. I...Jhile ~.oybean~- ar·e pr·imar·ily an 
export crop, wheat is a domestic food crop. Per capita 
consumptior. c•f t.vheat, a:. shown in Table III, hec.s incr-eased 
while that of other staple foods such as corn, rice and 
manioc has remained the same or decreased. Farm ~-ub-::.idie·:. 
and price ceilings on retail foc•d ha•,Je Kept food price-::. 
stable even though the demand for food has increased with 
increases in 1 iving standards and population. From 1965 to 
1985, output of food crops did not Keep up with demand. 
Table VIII shows per capita income and population in 
Brazil. During the period 1965 to 1985, population grew 
steadily frc•m 81 mi 11 ion to 136 mi 11 ion while per· capi t.:r. 
income grew fr·om 703 dollars per capita (in constant 1'7'80 
U.S. dol l ar s) to 1 90 0 dol 1 ar· s per cap i h. i n 1 985. Th i -::. 
represents an average annual compound rate of economic 
gr·owth of 7.47 per·cent. Table ~)III also sho~•JS national 
income in bill ions of cruzeiros, with no adjustment for 
inflation. Al•:•ng '-'Jith the high r·ate C•f economic •;tr·o•,Jth \<.Ia·:. 
the high rate of inflation of the cruzeiro. 
While per capita income incr·eased, r·etail food pr·ices 
,_,.Jere r·elativel;v stable. Thi-:. may be attributed, in par·t, 
to the pol i•:ies described ear·l ier. At the same timr::-, in 
trying to Keep up with demand, the government steadily 
i~~reased prices received by farmer~. Table IX shows the 
relative growth of producer prices and retail food prices 
in Brazil from 1966 to 1980. 
TABLE VI I I 
BRAZIL·' S POPLILAT I ON AND PER CAP IT A INCOME 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Braz i 1 ~ s 
Population 
in m i 11 ions 
81 . a 1 
82.93 
85.24 
87.62 
90.07 
95.52 
97.85 
99.92 
102.40 
104.94 
104.94 
107.54 
110.21 
112.94 
115.74 
121 • 29 
124.02 
126.81 
129.66 
132.58 
135.65 
Nation a 1 Per· Capita. 
Income Income 
* 
b i 1 l ions of 1983 u.s. 
Cruzeiros dollars 
42 733 
60 686 
81 668 
115 778 
153 836 
184 746 
245 828 
324 924 
454 1119 
665 1257 
944 1344 
1518 1488 
2323 1553 
3498 1641 
5845 1752 
12125 1897 
23346 1737 
48225 177'"' •• .:> 
129268 1787 
386968 1895 
1298248 1903 
* Per capita income was calculated by converting column 
two into 1980 U.S. dollars and dividing by column one 
Source: The International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, 1986 
.-.. -. 
.c. ..:a 
Year' 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1989 
TABLE IX 
REAL FOOD PRICE INDEX, 1966-1980 
Pl'oducer prices 
food crops 
199 
95 
88 
99 
101 
111 
114 
143 
139 
159 
188 
186 
175 
163 
178 
1966=100 
Retail food prices 
Sao Paulo 
199 
96 
94 
97 
95 
97 
199 
194 
194 
195 
199 
97 
99 
191 
92 
Sou!'ce: The World BanK, "Brazil: A Review of 
Agricultu!'al Policies" C1983) 
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Description of Brazil ian Pol icy Variables 
The Brazil ian economy can be characterized as being 
heavily influenced by government intervention. Edward 
Schuh (1983), former president of The World BanK, describes 
i t b;:.' wr i t i n g: 
Brazil represents the epitome of autarchic 
development, having pursued import-substituting 
industrialization policies with a particular 
vengeance for approximately 30 years. As a 
cc:on~.equence c•f those policies it h.:..s c•ne of the 
most closed, if not the most closed economy of 
the VJorld. 
Sc•me of the pol icie~. that are most r·eleuant to ,,,Jheat trade 
include agricultural credits, wheat subsidies to producers 
and consumers, fertilizer policies and tax policies. 
Agricultural Credit Program 
t1c·~.t of the agr·icultural credit, .;::.5 per·cent, i-= 
pr·o•.,. i ded by BanK of Braz i 1 • The thr·ee ca tegor· i es of cr·ed it 
are short term loans to cover production costs, long term 
investment loans and marKeting loans associated with the 
minimum price program. These categories represent 45, 29 
and 26 percent, respectively, of the total. 
Production loans are loans offered to farmers ahead of 
the planting season to help farmers acquire the necessary 
inputs such .:..-:. ferti 1 izer·, machiner·y, seed and fuel tc:• 
plant their crops. It is one way the government 
cc•mpen-: .. :.. te~. far·mer·-:. for the effect~. of price ce i 1 i r,.;.-;: .. 3.nd 
export controls as well as providing an incentive for 
increasing production. Production loans grew an average of 
18.5 per·cen t per· year from 1969 to 1979. Table X -::.hc•v.J-:. the 
growth of production loans from 1969 to 1979. As an 
indication of the size of the agricultural credit program, 
in 1975 the amount of agricultural credit exceeded the 
value of agricultural production. 
Year 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
TABLE X 
INDEX OF THE GROI..JTH OF PRODUCT! ON LOANS AND '·)ALUE 
OF AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT 1969-1979 
Production 
Loans 
199 
124 
143 
178 
245 
312 
445 
462 
459 
430 
532 
Value of Agricultural 
Output 
1969=199 
199 
199 
116 
126 
159 
183 
191 
213 
256 
250 
268 
Source: The World BanK, "Braz i 1 : A Review of Agricultural 
Policies" ( 1 983) 
Un t i 1 1979, the 1 '"n.Je 1 of production cr·ed it a farmer· 
could receive was 1 inKed to the minimum price support on 
the crop, P, and derived by the formula: 
C = AYBP 
where C =Credit amount 
A= Area planted 
Y =Average yield for crop and region 
B =Pol icy coefficient 
P =Minimum price for crop 
Beginning with the 1979/1980 crop year, the amount of 
production loans was entirely a function of average 
production cost for the crop and region. Usually the 
farmer· c.:..n bor·rc•tv up to 100 percent C•f expected product i •X• 
cost. The BanK of Brazil estimates that 31 percent of 
Brazil ian farmers received credit in 1979 as a growing 
number of farmers were being reached in outlying areas and 
the number of loan contracts was increased. These changes 
accounted for the large jump in production loans from 1978 
to 1979 as shown in Table XI. 
To give an idea of the amount of subsidization on the 
loans, the interest charged in 1979 was only 13 to 21 
percent. This interest rate compares with an inflation 
rate of 77 per·cen t for the same :o~ear·. For· the 1979/1'::;'8(1 
crop, the rate of subsidization was tied to the inflation 
rate for the first time. The formula used was: 
F = a x OPTN + i 
F =financial charge 
a= coefficient set annually by government as a 
pol iC>' variable 
ORTN = inflation index used by government 
i = nomin~.l inter·es.t r·ate 
The government used the coefficient~ as the pol icy 
tool for controlling the amount of credit subsidization. 
For example, in 1980, ~was fixed at .45 for agricultural 
credit. At the same time, the percentage of production 
costs financed was tied inversely to the income of the 
far·mer·, betv.Jeen 60 and 1013 percent, and fertilizer· cr·edit 
rates were increased from zero to the same rate as other 
production credits. Also, subsidies on investment credits 
were 1 imited to smaller machinery and equipment. 
Table XI shows the distribution of production credit 
by crop as well as the percentage of gross value of crop 
output in 1977. It is. interes.ting teo note that wheat 
received the largest infusion of subsidized credit relative 
teo va 1 ue •:Of output of a l 1 the cr·ops .• In part, this. ma;.' be 
due to the fact that wheat farms tend to be larger than, 
say, manioc or blacK bean farms. As mentioned previously, 
the amount of cr·edit C•ffered is par·tially deter·mined by the 
am•::ount of l~.nd planted. Also, ther·e is. an incentive teo 
over report the area planted in crops such as wheat and 
export crops which have more favorable credit terms and 
then divert the credit to other crops or to 
non-agricultural uses. Still, thes.e figures. point to the 
desire of Brazil's government to encourage domestic wheat 
TABLE XI 
DISTRIBUTION OF CROP PRODUCTION CREDITS 1975-1979 
Crop Percentage of production Percentage 
credit by crop of total 
crop value 
by crop 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1977 
Wheat 13 13 11 11 113 ~. 
" Rice 18 16 16 13 14 8 
Corn 11 11 8 9 10 1 a 
Manioc a 1 1 2 11 
BlacK b~.>ans 1 2 3 3 ..... .:> 6 
Soybeans 18 20 20 20 21 17 
Cocoa 1 1 1 ..... 1 4 .c. 
Coffee 10 11 13 12 13 13 
Sugarcane 11 19 9 9 7 9 
Cotton 5 7 8 6 6 5 
Other 12 8 19 14 13 14 __ .... ~--~-------,--,.~····· 
Source: The World BanK, "Brazil: A Reuit>w of 
Agricultural Policies" ( 1983) 
The growth of the crop production credit program has 
had far reaching consequences for Brazil's economy. The 
immense size of the subsidies has contributed to monetary 
expansion and inflation and pushed up interest rates. The 
World Bank suspects that much of the credit is diverted to 
other sectors of the economy or lent back to the government 
at higher interest rates <The World Bank, 1983). The crop 
production credit program has redistributed income within 
the agricultural sector since only a minority of farmers 
3(1 
receive the credits. Those who do not receive production 
cr·edit-:. get lower· prices. tor· their· cr·ops than the;>' ,,.,,ould it 
the production credit program did not exist. This is 
because they must compete with -farmers who are heavily 
subsidized by the credits and therefor·e can se 1 1 their 
products at a lower price. 
Finally, the crop production credit program has 
redistributed resources among the various crops in two 
First, the crops that receive more credit can bid 
resources away from crops with less credit. Second, a·:. the 
output of all crops increases as a result of increased 
credit, crops with high price elasticity of demand will 
maintain price at a higher level than more price inelastic 
crops. For example, wheat is relatively price elastic 
because of the government's purchasing monopoly which 
absorbs excess production. The export crops also have a 
relatively high price elasticity of demand. This is 
because Brazil is only one amen·~ man>' cc••.Jntr·ie·::. th.at e;<por·t 
agricultural products so excess production in Brazi 1 can be 
absorbed by the world marKet. As production increases, 
the -::.e c r· op p r i c e -=· ~·.J i 1 1 fa 1 1 1 e ss than the p r· i c e -::. c•f c r cop-:. 
that are relatively price inelastic. 
Another effect of subsidized credit is increased land 
pr·ices. Land prices increase for the following reasons: 
(1) To qualify for credit, a farmer must own land; 
more eowned 1 and qua 1 if i es the f.armer· for· mor·e 
credit. This leads teo landowners buying 
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more land than they can productively farm or 
bU>'ing land with marginal farming potential in 
order to qualify for the production credits. In 
:.orne cases, this has 1 ed to farm 1 and price~. ~vh i ch 
are above their normal economic rent value. 
(2) Land is a relatively supply inelastic input. One 
effect of the subsidized credit program is to 
increase the demand for factor inputs. Therefore, 
as the demand for inputs increases, the 
pric~ of land rises relatively faster than the 
price of other inputs. 
The Minimum Price Program 
The minimum price program was designed to increase 
production by reducing risK and the uncertainties of price 
,.,.. ar i ab i 1 i t y. It covers 42 commodities but not wheat, 
sugar, coffee or cocoa. 
Wheat Subsidy Program 
The Braz i 1 ian government buys a 11 domest i ca 11 y· 
produced ~vheat and all imported wheat. The importing 
agency is the Junta Deliberative do Trigo <Wheat Board) 
which is located in the BanK of Brazil. There are no 
private wheat companies so the government has monopoly 
control over prices and regularly decides prices to 
producers and consumers. 
.-, ..... 
. .:1£. 
Producers usually receive a price higher than the 
international price. The producer subsidy is defined as 
the difference between the price received by producers and 
the international del i•,1ered wheat pr·ice, inci1Jding cc•-:.t .:..nd 
freight <CIF>, times the amount domestically produced. 
After buying the wheat from the producers, the 
government sells the wheat at a government set price to 
private!:;.- 01,.vned mi lis. The mills pr·c":e-:.-:. the wheat .:..nd 
se I 1 i t to r· e t a i I e r .. ::.. The m i l I p r i c e i -:. the p r· i c e !="O<. i d bv 
r·etai ler·-:. tc• the mi 11. The governmer1t al-:.c• -:.ets the m.:..r·gin 
that the mills charge to process the wheat, usual!:;.- 15 
percent of the price to the retailers. Thus, the 
government completely controls the price paid by retailers. 
The mill pr·ice tends to be lower· than the inter-national 
price. The consumer subsidy is defined as the difference 
between the international cost and freight, CIF, price and 
the amount paid to mill operators by retailers, times the 
amount processed by the mi lis. Since the government buys 
and sells all domestic and imported wheat, these subsidies 
are clearly defined. 
The effect of the consumer subsidy has been to 
increase quantity demanded which has led to greater wheat 
imports. One of the stated objectives of the consumer 
subsidy is to reduce inflation since wheat products maKe up 
13 per·cent of food cc•-:.ts and 5.5 per·cent c•f •;;te-ner·al 1 i•..Jing 
C C•S t S. It also is intended to help people on low incomes~ 
to r·edi-:.tr·ibute I.J.Je.:<.l th a.nd tc• pr·omc•te pol i ti•:.O<.I ·::.t.~.t'i I it;.--. 
The producer subsidy is intended to protect wheat 
farmers from fluctuations in the world price of wheat. 
It also is intended to protect wheat farmers from low 
consumer wheat prices and subsidies on other domestic crops 
and to promote domestic production in or·der· to decrease 
'-"'heat impor·t': .. 
Table XII shows Brazil·'s. dome':.tic wheat pr·ice per· ton 
including transportation and storage (column 1>, the 
average CIF import price per ton including port and 
transport costs to the mill (column 2), and the government 
set price to the mills (column 3). During the study period 
1965 to 1985, the producer price exceeded the average 
import price in every year except 1973 and 1974. In the:.e 
two years international prices were unusually high because 
of a wheat shortage caused by large Soviet blocK imports. 
In ever:;,t other year the Brazilian gc•vernrnent sub·:.idized 
their wheat producers. The producer price was over twice 
the average import price in 1983 and 1985 because of low 
world prices in those years. 
Table XII shows that the real price of wheat paid by 
Brazilia.n con-s.umers, as indicated by the mill pr·ice, 
declined steadily from 1965 to 1980 (column 3). Consumers 
paid a premium for wheat until 1973, paying a price higher 
than the average import price. 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
a 
b 
The 
TABLE XII 
BRAZIL'S DOMESTIC WHEAT PRICE, A~JERAGE C IF It1PORT 
PRICE AND t1ILL DELIVERED PRICE 1965-1985 a 
Braz i 1 ian Average t1 j 1 1 
Producer Import Price r·atios 
Price Price b 
(1) ( 2) ( 3) (1)/(2) (1)./(3) 
1988 dollars/metric ton 
285 174 284 1.64 1.40 
251 164 198 1.53 1.27 
223 166 192 1.34 1.16 
227 150 166 1. 51 1.37 
213 118 150 1.80 1.42 
196 163 168 1.84 1.13 
176 116 164 1.52 1.07 
167 121 154 1.38 1.68 
185 192 155 .96 1.19 
271 383 132 .89 2. 05 
249 224 101 1.11 2.47 
224 198 96 1.13 2.33 
233 128 108 1.82 2.16 
228 148 93 1.49 2.37 
187 163 64 1.15 2.92 
225 187 42 1. 26 5.36 
263 174 97 1. 51 2.71 
1 91 155 113 1 ~.--. • .::..J 1.69 
303 144 87 2.10 3.48 
245 124 92 1.98 2.66 
276 112 95 2.46 2.91 
original data vJas given in 1977 Cruzeiros and 
converted into 1980 u.s. dollars. 
Price set to m i 11 s by the government. The government 
( 2)./( 3) 
n<= 
.ow 
.83 
.86 
.96 
.79 
.68 
.71 
.79 
1.24 
2.30 
2.22 
2.66 
1.19 
1.59 
2.55 
4.45 
1.79 
1. 37 
1.66 
1. 35 
1.18 
credited 
an additional 15 percent of this value to the mills, ~.o the 
true cost to the mills ~~~as 15 per·cen t less than this value. 
Sources: 1 ' 2 Banco do Brasi 1 
3 The J,.Jorld BanK 
·":~C" 
·-··-· 
Table XII shows that the ratio of average import price 
to the mill pr·ice (column 7) wa-:. le-:.s than one until 1'7'73. 
After 1973 the ratio stayed above one indicating a consumer 
subsidy. The consumer subsidy peaKed in 1980 with a ratio 
of 4.45. The consumer subsidy has declined since then 
because (1) Brazil has implemented austerity measures to 
control its foreign debt; <2> wc•rld V.Jheat prices ha•Je been 
lot.·.J; and (3) the pr·oducer· price wa-:. -:.till being heaviJ::.·· 
subsidized leaving less funds to subsidize consumers. 
Column 4 shows the ratio of the producer price to the 
average import price. It shows the ratio was above one, 
indicating a pr·oducer ·:.ubsid>'~ in et.Jer>' year e:x:•:ept 1'7'73 
and 1974. Since 1975 both producers and consumers have 
been subsidized. Column 5 shows the ratio of the producer 
price to the consumer price and is a positive indicator of 
the total subsidy to both producers and consumers. This 
ratio has consistently been greater than one, with a low of 
1.07 in 1971 and a high of 5.36 in 1980. 
Comparing columns two and three in Table XII, there is 
some evidence that when average import prices decreased, 
consumers paid more, but when average import prices 
increased, consumers paid less. From 1969 to 1970 the 
average import price Df wheat fell from 118 constant U.S. 
dollars per metric tons to 103 dollars per metric ton, but 
the mill price rose from 150 to 168 dollars. S i m i 1 .::o.r· 1 / , 
fr·c•m 1'7'76 to 1977 the at}er·age i mpor· t pr· ice fe 1 1 fr·c•m 19S 
dollars to 128 dollars, but the mill price rose from 96 
dollars to 108 dollars. On the other hand, when average 
import prices rose from 121 dol Jars in 1972 to 303 dol Jars 
in 1974, the mill price fell from 154 dollars to 132 
dollar-s. It seems. paradox i ca 1 that ~'Jhen inter-nation a 1 
prices .:..r·e lc•w consumer-s pay mor-e, but l.lo)hen inter·national 
prices ar-e high, consumers pay less. A possible 
explanation is that consumers help subsidize pr-oducers when 
•_._•or·ld wheat pr·ices ar·e low. t .• Jhen •Aiorld •Aiheat prices ar·e 
high, producers help subsidize consumers. 
If wheat can be imported cheaply, the government uses 
funds saved in consumer subsidies to raise the producer 
s.ubs i d>··. Studies have suggested, for example, that P.L. 
480 wheat imports had a positive impact on Brazil's 
domestic wheat prc•duction <Hall, 1980). Re•Jenues. s.aved bv 
importing cheap wheat wer-e used to subsidize producers. 
One reason why a country, especially a developing 
country, would encourage the domestic production of a 
commodity that could be impcor·ted mor-e cheaply is. bec.3.u-:.e of 
a policy known as "import substitution". This. is a 
development strategy used by many developing countries 
<Pearce, 1983). The theory behind import substitution is 
that .=.. de• . !eloping industr>', in this ca-:.e v,•heat pr·oduction, 
needs governmental protection in order to grow and 
eventually be competitive with the more mature industry in 
the developed countries. This may lead to subsidies and 
tr-ade barrier-s to help the domestically produced product. 
The aim of import substitution is to replace imports and 
.-,..., 
..:1,. 
foster domestic production and hope that eventually the 
protected industry wil 1 be able to survive without 
government support. Pearce points out that other import 
substitution policies for manufactured goods tend to 
accelerate rural-urban migration. In order to redress this 
problem the Brazi 1 ian government may have included 
agricultural products in its import substitution policies. 
In r·ecent year·~., the Br·.:..z i 1 ian gc••Jer·nme-nt has. tried to 
r·educe the consumer :;.ubsidy for· ~"1heat. Fc·r· e::-~ample, in 
1983 the consumer subsidy was scheduled to be completely 
r·emoved, but this action t ... 1as po·::.tponed for· pcolitical 
reasons until 1985 and agair1 pc·~-tponed. Table XIII ·:.hm· .. ls;. 
the price of wheat flour and wheat substitutes in Brazil on 
November 4, 1983. 
TABLE XII I 
RETAIL PRICES OF I..JHEAT AND I..JHEAT 
SUBSTITUTES ON NOVEMBER 4, 1983 
Cornmod i ty 
Wheat flour 
Corn flour 
Potatoes, I..Jh i te 
Rice, long grain 
Beans, carioquinda 
Cruzeiros/Kg. 
2513.00 
370.90 
439.99 
440.00 
500.130 
Source: United States Department of 
Agriculture, Foreign 
Agricultural Service, Attache 
Report No. BR 3368 
In spite of the ~eduction of the subsidy, wheat 
consumption did not fall. This may be because substitute 
p~oducts a~e still mo~e expensive than wheat. One ~esult 
of the consume~ subsidy has been an inc~ease in per capita 
consumption of wheat and a reduction in per capita 
consumption of wheat substitutes such as black beans, 
manioc and rice. 
Fertilizer Policies 
Since 1965, fertilizer consumption has grown 20 
percent per year. This ~apid growth in fertilizer 
con-:.umption i-:. due, in par·t, to the- fact that commodit>' 
prices received by Brazil ian farmers have increased faster 
than pr·ices paid for fertilizer. 
The pr·ice of fertilizer is set at the r·etail level b;>·· 
the government. Much of the uolatil ity of international 
fer·til izer- prices is abs.orbed bY the r·etailer-'s pr·ofit 
margin. At the same time, the farmer pays, on average, 
more than the world pr-ice and, in this way, helps to 
subsidize the domestic fertilizer industr-y. F c•r· e ::-::amp 1 •: , .:c. 
Brazil ian farmer· typically t.vill pay f~om 50 per-cent to 100 
per-cent more than an American far-mer for a given 
fer·ti 1 izer·. As v..1orld fer·ti 1 izer pr·ices. decline, this 
differ·ential incr·ea:.es, and as vJorld pr-ict-:. incre~.st-, thE-
differential decreases. Thus, the Brazil ian government 
keep-s. dome-s.t i c prices r·e 1 at i ve 1 >' stabl t-. 
·~·-· 
·=· 7 
Table :XII....-1 compar-es pr-ice:. p.:.. i d fcrr· fer- t i 1 i zer·s in 
B.r- az i 1 r· e 1 at i v e t C• ~<Jc•r- 1 d p r· i c e -: .. It ·:.how:. the r·aticr-:. 
between pr-ices paid by Br-azil ian farmers and import prices 
for various types of fertilizers during 1978. This gives 
an idea of the relatively higher costs of domestic • 
fer· t i 1 i z e r- s. i n Br az i 1 • 
TABLE XI~) 
DOMESTIC COST TO BRAZILIAN FARt1ERS OF FERTILIZERS AND 
FERTILIZER INPUTS RELATFJE TO It1PORT PRICES, 1978 
A. FertilizE<rs 
Super-phosphat~ Simple 
Superphosphate Triple 
Mono-Ammonium Phosphate 
Di-Ammonium Phosphate 
LirE< a 
B. Fertilizer Inputs 
Phosphoric Acid 
Phosphoric Roc I< 
Ammon i urn 
Domestic/Imported 
Price Ratio 
.89 
1.64 
1. 47 
1. 31 
1.15 
1.65 
1.22 
1. 74 
Source: Adapted from Institute de PE<squisas 
Tecnologicas do Sao Paulo, Centro de 
Estudo de Fertilizantes, "Perfil tecnico 
Economico do Setor de Fertilizantes," 
Sao Paulo, 1979, p.ll4. 
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To compensate farmers for higher-than-world prices, 
the Bank of Brazi 1 offers zero interest, six-month, 
fer·tilizer lc•an-:: .• Given the high rate c•f inflation in 
Br·azil, the actual cos.t of fertilizer· t•:• the f.:..rmer is, on 
average, 20 percent less than without the loan since the 
farmers would be repaying the loans with inflated currency. 
In effect, the government subsidizes both the fertilizer 
industry and the farmer at the same time. 
Tax Policies 
T•iJC• major ta:>(e-:;., the r•Jr·.:..l land tax and the income t.;..x 
are relevant pol icy variables affecting Brazil ian 
agriculture. The rural land tax was. designed to pr·omote 
the efficient use of agricultural land. As modified in 
1979, it exempts smaller farms while taxing at progressive 
rates as farm size increases. This tax partially offsets 
the effects. c•f other pcd i c i es. such a-::. the pr·•:.duct ion cr·e·ji t 
program which, because the credits are based on acreage 
planted, disproportionately benefit large landholders. 
The rural land tax can be increased or decreased 
according to the degree of land uti 1 ization and the 
efficiency of utilization as measured by yield per hectare. 
The maximum tax rate is 14 percent of the value of the 
1 and. One purpose of the tax is to discourage speculative 
land buying and thus promote the productive use of farm 
1 and. Since the amount of agricultural credit depends on 
the number of acres planted in a particular crop, and since 
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the cr-edit inter-est r·ate is sc• heavil)··· sub-:.idized, a lc•t eof 
.:<.gr·icultur-al l.:o.nd in Br·azil i·:. u-:.ed inefficient])' in c•r·der· 
to claim a lar-ger- cr-eop ar-ea. Another- effect of the cr-edit 
pr-eogr-am has been to encour-age land speculation, with the 
cr-edits being used to buy mor-e and mor-e land. 
far·mer·:. V.Jh•:• a 1 r·eady c•wn 1 ar-ge far-ms. Thus, the r-•Jr·a 1 1 and 
tax is seen as both a way to pr-omote the efficient use of 
far-m land and as a way to par-tially r-edr-ess the unequal 
advantages that the agr-icultur-al cr-edit pr-ogr-ams have given 
to lar-ge landholder-s. 
The income tax is highly favor-able teo agr-icultur-al 
ear-nings char-ging only a flat r-ate eof six per-cent, compar-ed 
with 30 per-cent in other- :.ector·:. of the econeom>··. In 
addition, ther-e ar-e so many exemptions that most far-mers 
pay no income tax at all <The World BanK, 1983). 
Macr-oeconomic Var-iables 
Much eof Br-azil's development has r-esulted fr-eom capital 
bor-r-owed in inter-national money marKets. The lar-ger- the 
debt the mor·e it i:. influenced by inter·natic•nal inter·e-:.t 
rates and therefor-e by the macroeconomic policies eof other 
countr-ies. Table XV shows the size of Br-azil's foreign 
debt from 1972 through 1983. 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1988 
1981 
1982 
1983 
TABLE XV 
BRAZILJS FOREIGN DEBT 
Foreign Debt 
mill ions of 1988 
U.S. dollars 
$ 8,848 
18,983 
13,750 
17,368 
23,828 
29,723 
48,242 
47,522 
51,458 
67,341 
83,205 
91 '162 
Sources: Statistical Abstracts 
of Latin America and 
Economist; Quarterly 
Economics Review of 
Brazil 
Table XV shows that Braz i 1 bor·rot.l.!ed heav i 1 y in the 
1970's and early 1980's. No doubt the rapid economic 
growth of 7.5 percent per year justified borrowing, 
especially during this period of rapid industrialization. 
As shot.om in Table XVI I, the borrowing was also ju':.t if i ed 
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because of the increase in exports, especially manufactured 
exports. These exports would help repay the foreign debt. 
The reason for the concern over Brazil's increasing debt, 
4 '::• ~· 
as well as that of other developing countries, was the 
unfor·es.een s.hoc~~s. that cu:curr·ed in the VJC•r·l d ecc•nomy in the 
late 1970's and early 1980's. In 1979 the price of oil 
increased sharply. This resulted in more of Brazil's 
export earnings used to import oil and less available for 
debt repayment. At the same time, the demand for Brazil's 
manufactured exports declined as the world economy went 
into recession. According to the International Monetary 
Fund <IMF>, trade among all countries in the world peaKed 
i n 1 980 at 1 • 8 t r· i 1 1 i c•n U. :3. de.] 1 ar s.. t.Jor 1 d t r· ~.de f e 1 1 to 
apprc•ximatel>' 1.6 trillion dollars b;....- 1983, .:;.. decline of 
nearly 12 percent <World Watch Institute, p.18). World 
economic growth dec 1 i ned from 3. 5 percent per· ye .:..r· be h·Jeen 
1973 and 1979, to only 1.7 percent between 1979 and 1983. 
This decline led to the decline in demand for Brazil's 
exports and hence in its ability to repay its foreign debt. 
At the ·:.ame time, real interes.t r·ates incr·eas.ed dur·ing the 
1970's and 1980's. This made debt repayment more 
difficult. 
Table ~:(l)J shCtl~o.•s. the Cr·uze i ro/dctl 1 ar exchange r·.::..te, 
i nfl at ion as. measured by the Brazilian cons.umer price i n•je:=< 
.:..nd national income expr·ess.ed in Cruzeir·c•s .. The high r·<:d€' 
of inflation shown in Table XVI may be attributed to 
Brazil's expansionary monetary pol icy. 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Source: 
TABLE )NI 
BRAZIL·' S EXCHANGE RATE, CONSUMER 
PRICE INDEX AND NATIONAL INCot1E 
Cruzeiro/ Consumer 
Dollar Price 
Exchange Index 
Rate 1980=100 
1. 90 1.4 
2.22 2.0 
2.66 2.7 
3.40 3.2 
4.07 4.0 
4.59 4.9 
5.29 5.9 
5.93 6.8 
6.13 7.7 
6.79 9.8 
8.13 12.7 
10.67 18.0 
14. 14 25.8 
18.07 35.8 
26.95 54.7 
52.71 100.0 
93.12 205.6 
179.51 407.0 
577.04 984.9 
1848.03 2922.5 
6200.00 9556.0 
Nation a 1 
Income in 
Bill ions of 
Cruzeiros 
42 
60 
81 
115 
153 
184 
245 
324 
454 
665 
944 
1518 
2323 
3498 
5845 
12125 
23346 
48225 
120268 
386968 
1298248 
International Financial Stati~.tics 
The International t1onetar:t Fund 
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U.S. -Brazil Agricultural Trade 
Table X'v'I I show-:. the •v•al ue c•f tot.:.. I tr·ade and 
agricultur·al trade between Brazil and the United State-:. 
from 1965 to 1985. Most of Brazil's agricultural exports 
to the United States consisted of coffee, cocoa and sugar; 
most United States agricultural exports to Brazi 1 consisted 
of v..•heat and corn. Table XVII shows tha.t the t.!alue of 
Br·.azilian agricultur.:..l expor·ts to the United :=:tate-:. in 1·:,;·:=:5 
•Alas about five times the value of agricultura.l impor·t·:. fr·om 
the United States, 2.3 bil I ion dollars versus .47 bill ion 
dollars. At the same time, Brazil's total exports to the 
United States were approximately two and a half times its 
total imports from the United States, 7.5 bill ion dollars 
ver·-=.us 3.1 bi 11 ion dollar·-: .• 
Brazil's exports to the United States changed 
fundame-ntally fr·c•m be-ing pr·imar·i ly agr·icul tur·B.l in 1965, tc' 
being l.;..r·gely non-agr·icultur·al by 1985. t·,lhile Br·.:..zil ian 
agricultural exports to the U.S. constitute-d over three 
fourths of total exports in the lc..te 1960's, they d.ccounted 
for less than one third in the mid 1980's as Brazi 1 became 
industrialized and expanded its exports to include 
manufactured goods. 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1979 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1989 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
TABLE )(tJI I 
VALUE OF TRADE, U.S.-BRAZIL, TOTAL 
AND AGRICULTURAL 1965-1985 
Brazil ian Exports to the 
United State:. 
Total Agr i c u 1 - A/T b 
tura 1 
m i 11 i on s of U.S. 
dollars a 
'I ,, 
545 
693 
559 
671 
615 
679 
762 
932 
1 '171 
1,672 
1,448 
1 '722 
2,231 
2,789 
3,079 
3,686 
4,333 
4' 171 
4,943 
7,298 
7,545 
413 
484 
461 
564 
499 
536 
582 
669 
711 
1 '931 
772 
966 
1 ,385 
1 ,537 
1 ,503 
2,019 
1 1995 
1,495 
1,655 
2' 111 
2,333 
76 
80 
82 
84 
81 
80 
76 
71 
61 
62 
53 
56 
62 
55 
49 
55 
44 
36 
33 
29 
31 
United States Exports 
to Braz i 1 
Total Agricul- A/T b 
tura 1 
mill ions of U.S. 
doll ar·s a 
328 
565 
546 
705 
667 
838 
963 
1,235 
1 '993 
3,067 
3,034 
2,780 
2,412 
2,953 
3,407 
4,306 
3,753 
3,389 
2,528 
2,599 
3,970 
59 
101 
110 
88 
69 
68 
90 
68 
271 
240 
323 
255 
111 
534 
536 
680 
710 
526 
47$' 
508 
470 
'I 
_, 
18 
18 
20 
12 
10 
8 
9 
5 
14 
8 
11 
9 
5 
18 
16 
16 
19 
16 
1 s· 
20 
15 
a Dollars are unadjusted for inflation 
b A/T =percent agricultural exports of total exports 
Source: Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States 
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Table XVII shows that while Brazil ian exports to the 
U.S. shifted from being predominantly agricultural to being 
predominant!;•' nc•n-agricultur·al, U.S. e~<p•::<r·ts to Br·azil 
became more agriculturally based. U.S. agricultural 
exports to Brazil gr·ew after· 1977 to at least 15 per·cent of 
total U.S. ~xports to Brazil. Table XXVII also shows that 
from 1968 to 1980, the United States had a balance of trade 
·:.ur·p 1 us:. V.J i th Br.:..z i 1 , but ·:. i nee then, there has:. been a 
V.Jidening deficit. This re\,<er·sal in the balance of tr·a.de 
·:.ince 19813 i-:. due, in par·t, to Brazil'·s lar·ge for·ei•;~n debt 
which has caused a shortage of hard currency needed to buy 
foreign products. Braz i 1 had .an agr i cu 1 tur·a.l tr·a.de -:.ur·p 1 u-:. 
with the United States during the entire period. 
Table XVIII shows the r·elative impor·tance ~vheat h.:..s:. in 
United States exports to Braz i 1 . On average, wheat 
accounted for approximately 72 percent of the value of al 1 
United States agricultural exports to Brazil from 1965 to 
1985 and 83 percent since 1981. Wheat averaged 
approximately 10 percent of total U.S. exports to Brazil 
fr·om 1965 tc• 1'7'85. After· 1980, t•Jhen the tc•tal •Ja.lue of 
U.S. export-:. to Br·azi 1 declined, the r·elative •.).:<.lue of 
wheat exports increased to approximately 15 percent. 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1'"'7? 7.-
1973 
1974 
1975 
197t• 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1986 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
TABLE XVI I I 
VALUE OF UNITED STATES I..JHEAT EXPORTS TO BRAZIL F:ELATg)E 
TO OTHER AGRICULTURAL AND TOTAL EXPORTS 
Value of U.S. Exports to 
Br·azil 
Total Agricultural L~hea t 
a a b 
in mill ions of U.S. dollars* 
328 59 34 
565 1 o 1 88 
546 119 78 
705 88 75 
667 69 49 
838 68 33 
963 90 58 
1,235 68 33 
1,993 271 298 
3,067 246 214 
3,034 323 261 
2,786 255 233 
2,412 111 65 
2,953 534 359 
3,497 536 234 
4,396 686 321 
3,753 719 629 
3,389 526 461 
2,528 479 423 
2,599 598 398 
3,070 470 341 
Percentage of U.S. 
Exports to Brazil 
Consisting of Wheat 
Total Agricultural 
percentage 
10.4 57.6 
17.9 87.1 
14.3 70.9 
19.6 85.2 
7.3 71.0 
3.9 48.5 
6.0 64.4 
2.7 48.5 
10.9 76.7 
7.B 89.2 
8.6 80.8 
8.4 91.4 
2.7 58.6 
1,.., ~. L..£ 6' ') i tL 
6.9 43.7 
7.5 47.2 
16.8 88.6 
13.6 87 .e. 
16.7 88.3 
15.3 7Ct "'=' • u,._. 
11.1 72.5 
* Dollars are unadjusted for inflation 
Sources: a Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States 
b Banco do Brasil 
4 .-. . ;:.
The United States is B~azil~s la~gest supplier of 
wheat. Table XIX shows total Brazil ian wheat imports as 
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....... ell as U.S. commercial and non-commercial exports for 1965 
through 1985. Table XIX also shows the relative share of 
Brazil~s wheat imports held by the United States. Although 
Brazi 1 ha-:. become le-:.s. dependent on imports as a per·centec.ge 
of total wheat consumption, the absolute amount of wheat 
imports substantially increased from 1965 to 1985. Table 
XIX shows that the U.S. share of Brazil~s wheat imports 
increased from an average of 41.7 pe~cent for the fi~st 10 
years of the study period, to 54.7 percent for the last 11 
yea~s. However, this share has f 1 uc tua ted from 1 es.s than 
one-third to over two-thirds of total Brazil ian wheat 
impo~ts. 
Table XIX s.hows that the period in which the U.S. had 
the largest marKet share occurred in the early 1980's, 
possibly because of the U.S. grain embargo on the Soviet 
Union which resulted in Argentina shifting much of its 
exports from Brazil to the Soviet· Union. 
The volatility of U.S. wheat exports to Brazil may be 
due to the interrelationship of pol icy variables in Brazil, 
the United States, Argentina and Canada. Some examples ar·e 
export credit programs, long term grain agreements., price 
policies and agricultural credits. Other possible factors 
are Braz i 1 ian macroeconomic variables such as. 1 eve 1 s of 
financial indebtedness, interest rates and inflation. In 
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addition, the price of U.S. wheat and the prices of 
Canadian and Argentine wheat may be important factors. 
TABLE XIX 
U.S. SHARE OF BRAZIL'S WHEAT IMPORTS 
Year Total Commercial P.L. 480 U.S. Share 
Brazil ian U.S. Wheat Wheat to of Braz i 1 ·· s 
t..Jheat Sales to Braz i 1 Wheat 
Imports Braz i 1 Imports 
------ 1900 Metric Tons ------ % 
1965 1992 279 250 27 
1966 2467 785 422 49 
1967 2433 650 498 47 
1968 2417 470 448 38 
1969 2307 435 450 38 
1979 1689 518 109 37 
1971 1727 530 287 47 
1972 2749 1189 0 43 
1973 21M2 1136 0 55 
1974 2165 785 9 36 
1975 3070 1989 9 64 
1976 3163 1238 0 39 
1977 2844 1673 9 59 
1978 4299 2254 9 54 
1979 3780 1255 0 33 
1980 4599 2799 a 61 
1981 4000 2650 0 66 
1982 4195 2720 a 66 
1983 4291 2376 8 55 
1984 4503 2541 0 56 
1985 3468 1683 0 49 
Source: Tomasini, CNPT/EMBRAPA 
Income Elasticities of Brazil ian 
Table XX shows the income elasticities for wheat and 
other staple foods in Brazil. 
TABLE X>< 
INCOME ELASTICITIES OF VARIOUS FOOD 
C0t1t10DITI ES 
Commodity Elasticity 
I,.Jheat 0.33 
Cor-n 0.25 
Other- Gr-ains * 0.50 
Rice IL15 
Beans (pulses) 
** 
-0.20 
Soybeans 1. 40 
Other o i 1 seeds -0.30 
Beef 0.60 
Poultry 0. 80 
Por-k 0.40 
t1 i 1 k (fresh) 0.40 
Eggs 3.50 
Apples 0.80 
Oranges 3. 20 
Bananas -0.10 
t1an i oc -0.30 
Sugar *** 0.20 
Tomatoes 3.60 
Onions 0.60 
* Barley, oats, rye, sorghum 
**Mostly black beans 
***For human consumption only 
Sour-ce: USDA, Economic Research 
Ser-vice. Brazil -An 
Export MarKet Profile 
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Table XX shows that wheat has a relatively low but 
positive income elasticity of .30. This means that a one 
e~ • 
. _14 
percent increase in income will incr·ea-:.e wheat con·:.umpti•:•n 
b>' • 3 percent. Soybeans have a higher income elasticity of 
1.40. A few of the commodities, such as black beans, 
bananas and manioc have a negative income elasticity; as 
incomes increase, less of these commodities are consumed. 
Summary 
This chapter has described Brazil's agricultural 
sector in general and its wheat production sector in 
par·t i cul ar·. Policy variable-:. in Br·azil that influence 
wheat production and consumer demand were identified. 
Still to be considered are U.S. pol icy variables and those 
of the c omp e t i n g •JJh eat ex p or· t i n g •: ou n t r· i e -:;. , Ar· ge n t i n a and 
Canada. A major area of further study wi 11 be credit 
policie-:. and non-pr·ice competiti•:Jn: fc•r example, interest 
rate competition among wheat exporters. Chapter III 
examines the export policies of the United States, Canada 
and Ar·gentina. 
CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND ON EXPORT POL! CI ES OF 
THE U.S., CANADA AND ARGENTINA 
Brazil#s three major wheat suppliers are the United 
State:., C.:..nada and Ar·gentin.:.., in or·der c•f total metric tc•ns 
shipped between 1965 and 1985. There were also minor and 
:.pc•r·adi c tAJheat shipments from other· :.ources. ·:.uch .:.,:. Fr~.nce. 
Each supplier has unique supply characteristics and pol icy 
makeups that reflect the various economic, geographic and 
political idiosyncracies. Price differentials and mad:et 
shares of the three suppliers vary marKedly from one year 
to the next. These fluctuations are a result of the 
volatility of grain markets in general, with the random 
variable of weather conditions in different parts of the 
world affecting particular marKets. 
LiKe weather conditions, political variables are also 
of a r·andom natur·e. For· e>~ample, in 1980 the United ::Hat.:-:. 
imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union. As a result, 
Argentina became a major wheat supplier to the Soviet Union 
that year and hence sold less to Brazil. This. r·e:.ulted in 
the U.S. and Canada selling more v,•h.:-at to Br·.:..zi 1 in 1'7'80. 
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Furthermore, Brazil's domestic wheat supply is highly 
volatile. This volatility may influence total wheat 
imports as well as marKet share among the exporting 
cc•un tr· i e~ .• Brazil's wheat production and pol icy variables 
may have different effects on each of the wheat supplying 
countries. Also the impact of policies of the wheat 
supplying countries, such as price, may vary between 
Price elasticity of Brazil ian demand may vary 
between wheat supplying countries. This means that one 
supplier may be able to use price more effectively than 
another to increase marKet share while another country may 
be able to use non-price policies more effectively. 
Table XXI shows Br·azi l's wheat imports fr·om 1965 t.::. 
1985 and marKet share of the various wheat exporters. 
During that period, Brazil significantly increased its 
''Jh eat imp c•r t s f r· c•m 1 . 9 m i 1 1 i on met r i c ton~- to 3. 5 m i 1 1 i c•n 
metric tons, with a record of 4.6 mill ion metric tons 
imported in 1980. 
The principle commercial wheat supplier to Brazil 
until 1'7'70 was Argentina. During the 1960's a number of 
different countries sold sporadic but significant amounts 
of wheat to Brazil's wheat market. Some of these countries 
included Italy, Spain, France, the U.S.S.R., Australia and 
Hungary. At that time the United States was supplying 
large amounts of wheat to Brazil under the Public Law 480 
program CP.L. 480). This is a concessional sales program 
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that provides wheat to countries with low standards of 
1 iving at low cost to the receiving country. 
TABLE XXI 
BRAZ I L1 AN I.~ HEAT IMPORTS BY t~AJOR EXPORTERS 
Yea!' Tot a 1 u.s. PL48a Canada Al'gentina Othel' 
impol'ts in thousands of metl'ic torrs 
1965 1 '902 270 25a a 1 ,292 90 
1966 2,467 785 422 a 1 '36a 2aa 
1967 2,433 65a 498 a 65a 635 
1968 2,417 479 448 a 1 'a64 435 
1969 2,387 435 458 a 1 '008 422 
1978 1 ,680 518 100 390 762 a 
1971 1 '727 539 287 430 350 1613 
1972 2,749 1 '189 3 300 1 '230 63 
1973 2,362 1 '136 0 400 526 a 
1974 2' 165 785 0 1 '303 80 3 
1975 3' 070 1 '980 3 800 243 50 
1976 3' 163 1 ,238 3 81a 1,055 60 
1977 2,844 1 ,673 0 655 355 161 
1978 4,239 2,254 3 1 ,221 441 284 
1979 3,78a 1 ,255 a 553 1 '972 B 
1980 4,599 2,799 3 1 '830 3 0 
1981 4,003 2,653 a 935 2a5 133 
1982 4,1 as 2, 723 e 1 ,253 0 135 
1983 4,291 2,376 a 1 '533 415 0 
1984 4,503 2,541 e 1 '5a0 462 0 
1985 3,468 1 ,683 a 1, ee0 685 1a0 
Sou!'ce: Tomasini Agency, CNPT/EMBRAPA 
Table XXI shows that the years 1970 and 1971 marKed a 
maJor change in the Brazil ian wheat marKet that continues 
to the present time. Canada began supplying wheat to 
Brazil for the first time in 1970 and has remained a major 
supplier to the present time. Also in 1970, other 
importers dropped out of the market or became insignificant 
suppliers. That market situation has also continued to the 
present. In 1971 Argentina ceased to be the principle 
commercial supplier; that role shifted to the United States 
.and cc•ntinues to the pr·e~.ent time. Al~.c· in 1'7'71, the 
United States ended concessionary wheat shipments under the 
P.L. 480 program. Table XXI suggests that U.S. dominance 
in Brazil/s wheat market in the 1970's and 1980's may have 
been facilitated by the P.L. 480 program. 
sales to Br·azil increased fr·om 270 tho•Jsand metr·ic tons in 
1965 to a peak of 2.8 mi 11 ion metric tons by 1980. 
Table XXI also reveals some of the effects of wheat 
agreements and embargoes. In 1979, the U.S. signed a major 
new wheat agreement with the Soviet Union. This agreement 
re~.ul ted in the di ver·si on c•f some U.S. ,,,Jheat fr·om Br·.::o.z i 1 to 
the Soviet Union. This created an opportunity for 
Argentina tc• se 11 more wheat that ;•'ear· to Br·az i 1 . Fr·mn 
1978 to 1979, sales of U.S. wheat to Brazil fell from 2.25 
m i 1 1 i c•n met r· i c t c•n -:. t c• 1 . 25 m i 1 1 ion met r· i c tons, t'Jh i 1 e 
Argentine ~-ales increased fr·om .44 million metr·ic tc•ns to 
1.97 mil 1 ion metric tons. Hc•~vever·, in 1'7'80, the U.::;;, 
abrogated the Soviet agreement with an embargo. Argentina 
~-ctl d .:<.11 i ts IJ.Jhea t that >'ea.r· to the Sc•v i e t Union and none 
to Braz i 1 . From 1979 to 1980, sales of U.S. wheat to 
Br·az i l i ncr-e~.sed fr·om 1. 25 mill i •::.n metr-ic tc•ns tc• 2. 80 
mill ion metr-ic tons, while Ar-gentine sales fell fr-om 1.97 
C'..., 
._1 { 
mill ion metr-ic tons to 0. This condition continued in 1981 
and 1982 t~o.• i th Ar-gentine •A•hea t ·:.ale-:. to Br-.az i l in tho-:.e 
year-s only .2 mill ion metr-ic tons and 0 metr-ic tons, 
r-espect i •Je l >'. 
In 1970, Br-azil began to buy wheat fr-om Canada under-
multi-year- agr-eements. Ar-gentina has also signed long ter-m 
wheat agr-eements with Br-azil. Br-azi 1 has not negotiated 
long-ter-m pur-chase agr-eements with the United States. 
Table XXII shows mar-ket shar-e in the Br-azil ian wheat mar-ket 
among the United States, Canada and Ar-gentina. 
T~.ble X><III -:.hov..ts pr-ice-:. paid b>' Br-azil in cur-r·ent 
dollar-s per metric ton for imported wheat from 1965 to 
1985. There were no pr-ices for- Canada from 1965 to 1969 
because there wer-e no Canadian sales in those year-s. 
Agr-eements do not account for- all of the var-iation in 
pr-ices among competitors. Other- var-iables such as lacK of 
stor-age capacity in Ar-gentina, timing of sales, per-ceived 
quality of wheat, speed of deliver-y and shipping schedules 
ar-e examples of other- factor-s that can r-esult in pr-ice 
differentials. 
Year 
TABLE XXI I 
t1ARKET SHARE IN BRAZIL·' S IAIHEAT MARKET BY 
THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND ARGENTINA 
Braz i 1 's u.s. Canadian Argentine Share of Braz i 1 's 
total t,.,thea t l,.,lhea t Wheat Wheat MarKet b" l 
l,Jhea t Ei<por t s Exports Exports Country 
Imports to Braz i 1 to Braz i 1 to Braz i 1 u.s. Can Ar·g 
imports in thousands of metric tons 'I Jo 'I 
" 
'I 
... 
1965 1 1992 529 9 1 ,292 27 a 68 
1966 2,467 1 ,207 9 1 '969 49 0 43 
1967 2,433 1 '148 a 658 47 a 27 
1968 2,417 918 a 1,064 38 0 44 
1969 2,397 885 0 1,aea 38 a 43 
1970 1 '68a 618 300 762 37 18 45 
1971 1 '727 817 480 350 47 23 20 
1972 2,749 1 '189 300 1 ,200 43 11 44 
1973 2,362 1 1136 488 526 55 19 26 
1974 2' 165 785 1 '380 80 36 60 4 
1975 3,070 1 1980 800 248 64 26 8 
1976 3' 163 1,238 810 1,955 39 26 33 
1977 2,844 1 ,673 655 355 59 23 12 
1978 4,200 2,254 1 '221 441 54 29 11 
1979 3,780 1 ,255 553 1 '972 33 15 52 
1989 4,599 2,799 1 '800 e 61 39 0 
1981 4,1338 2,6513 935 205 66 23 5 
1982 4' 105 2, 728 1 ,250 0 66 30 3 
1983 4,291 2,376 1 1588 415 55 35 10 
1984 4,503 2,541 1 1580 462 56 33 10 
1985 3,468 1 ,683 1 '13130 685 48 29 20 
Source: Tomasini Agency, CNPT/EMBRAPA 
C'.-. 
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TABLE XXI I I 
WHEAT PRICES PAID BY BRAZIL TO MAJOR EXPORTERS * 
Year u.s. Canada Argentina Over a 11 
dollars per metric ton** 
1965 72.55 np *** 72.51 72.43 
1966 71.18 np 69.88 79.47 
1967 73.49 np 74.07 73.33 
1968 71.33 np 69.25 69.49 
1969 55.59 np 58.31 57.44 
1970 52.29 59.39 51.79 53.94 
1971 61.77 66.92 61.31 62.45 
1972 72.27 66.42 66.78 67.85 
1973 134.88 85.76 92.81 113.92 
1974 197.74 194.42 167.71 195.23 
1975 157.79 151.35 155.37 157.71 
1976 145.86 157.59 135.62 147.17 
1977 198.24 192.82 93.57 109.88 
1978 121.14 133.61 123.02 124.88 
197r;• 153.06 191.88 138.94 149.58 
1988 177.37 282.67 174.97 187.12 
1981 187.09 214.37 173.58 190.80 
1982 178.82 205.18 188.88 1813.39 
1983 161.59 196.83 np 173.74 
1984 155.56 167.53 138.25 155.11 
1985 153.81 147.72 129.39 147.02 
Source: Banco Do Brasil, S.A., Cacex 
* calculated by dividing FOB amount paid to exporter by 
number of tons purchased. 
** dollars are not adjusted for inflation 
*** np means no price for year in which no sales occurred 
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U.S. Export Policies 
In general, U.S. export policies, or promotional 
strategies, can be categorized into three groups: price, 
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·non-price and credit. The price strategies tend to 
dominate the non-price because of the homogeneity of bulK 
grain products. More refined products such as bread, pasta 
and cereal can benefit from non-price promotional 
strategies. 
Non-price strategies may attempt to change tastes and 
preferences in the importing country in such a way as to 
shift the demand for all wheat products or for a particular 
Kind of wheat product. This may result from advertising 
wheat products or from worKing with wheat processors and 
outlets. For example, demonstrating to retail outlets the 
improvement in bread texture when hard red winter wheat is 
mixed with soft white wheat could result in a shift in 
demand for hard red winter wheat. 
Credit has become increasingly important in recent 
years. Two effects of credit are (1) to postpone payment 
for wheat shipments by countries with hard currency 
shortages. allowing them to impc•r·t mor·e in the current ;.-ear 
and (2) to lower the real price of the wheat by subsidizing 
the i nteres.t rate. The "bu>' down" is the difference 
between the marKet interest rate and the exporting 
government's interest rate. 
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Price Policies 
Price policies are designed to. influence export 
prices. One example is the International Wheat Agreement 
signed by wheat exporters in an attempt to Keep prices 
high. Another is Commodity Credit Corporation <CCC) export 
payments and export pa>'men ts- in-Kind which reduce the price 
U.S. exporters charge. A past program was the Public Law 
320 program, phased out in 1975, that used funds from 
agricultural import duties to reduce export prices. 
An indirect price pol icy is the domestic loan rate, 
the amount U.S. farmers pay on loans secured by their 
commodities. Others are deficiency payments that encour·age 
farmers to produce and maritime legislation that influences 
) 
shipping rates. 
Non-Price Policies 
Non-price policies are policies designed to open 
markets to U.S. commodities by promoting U.S. exports and 
by removing trade barriers. They can be categorized into 
< 1) export marKet deve 1 opmen t, ( 2) pol i c i es to i mpr•::.ve 
marKet access and (3) barter. 
Export MarKet Development 
The main government pol icy instrument for developing 
export markets is the Foreign Agricultural Service Industry 
Foreign MarKet Development Program, also Known as the 
Cooperator Program <Hartei 1983). The "cooperators" are 
producer organizations such as the American Wheat 
Association or American Hereford Association that worK with 
the Foreign Agricultural Service in planning, evaluating 
and financing the programs. The purpose of the programs is 
to promote U.S. farm exports. An economist with the USDA, 
Paul Harte, identified seven non-price pr-omotional 
strategies. They are: 
1. Trade teams 
2. Adver·ti-:.ing 
3. Point of sale promotions 
4. Trade servicing 
5. Commodity pull techniques 
6. Trade -:.hows, fairs, and exhibit-:. 
7. Publicity and public relations 
Trade Teams. Trade teams, or trade missions, 
represent a fir·m, indu-:.try or· group of industrie-: .. Their 
effectiveness 1 ies in maKing personal contacts abroad and 
getting first hand knowledge of sales opportunities. 
Advertising. Advertising is used in foreign news-
papers, magazines and television and is tailored to the 
particular country. It may be the most effective way of 
reaching masses of consumers and influencing tastes and 
pr·ef er· en c e-: .. 
Point of Sale Promotions. Promoters advertise the 
product at the point of sale using representatives to give 
out samples, to show how to use the product, and to dis-
tribute pamphlets. In the case of wheat, a group of spec-
ial ists might visit a mill or bakery to demonstrate the 
advantages of a particular process of milling. They may 
demonstrate wheat preparation or the uses of a particular 
variety of wheat. They may ihtroduce new wheat products or 
help the mill or bakery promote wheat products. 
Trade Servicing. Trade servicing includes support 
services to the importer of the product. Three categories 
of trade servicing are the following: 
(1) Supplying the importer with information about 
product availability and prices. The use of regular 
publications and phone calls may create good will and 
customer loyalty. 
(2) Technical information about processing the product 
and quality control. This information may make the 
importer more quality conscious and thereby help 
American exporters. 
(3) Marketing assistance to create greater demand for 
the product such as T.V. and radio commercials. 
Commodity Pull Techniques. Commodity pull tech-
niques are used mainly by trade associations to increase 
sales of a commodity by changing tastes and preferences in 
overseas markets. The methods may involve cooking demon-
strations, consumer research, recipe promotions, and mar-
Keting advice to local business. Fc·r· ex amp 1 e, the United 
States Feed Grains Council has promoted consumption of 
1 i vestocK prc•duc t:. which, in turn, i ncrea:.ed demand fc•r· 
feed gr.ains. 
Trade Fairs, Shows, and Exhibits. International 
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trade fairs are open to the general public and feature the 
commodities and products of many countries. In the c.:o.·:.e of 
wheat, there may be machinery displayed for mil 1 operators 
and baKeries or exhibits of wheat products. 
are sponsored by the Foreign Agricultural Service in 21 
countries and allow U.S. exporters to meet directly with 
business people in the host country. The shows focus on 
individual countries and on facilitating interpersonal 
exchanges. 
Publicity and Public Relations. Publicity .:o.nd public 
relations techni~ues may be used to improve visibility and 
acceptance of certain commodities. In some cases, there 
may be social or religious barriers that discourage the use 
•:•f a C C•mmcod i t Y • Discovering how to overcome the barriers 
is essential for a commodity's acceptance. For· e:>::amp 1 e ~ in 
Japan, the number "four" is considered unlucky, so American 
golf balls pacKaged four to a bnx were repacKaged in boxes 
of three to maKe them more acceptable in the Japanese 
marKet. Wheat is a good example of a commodity that has 
grown in acceptance and replaced other staples such as rice 
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and beans through the use of publicity and public 
r· e 1 at i on-: .• In many parts of the world~ wheat is a 
r·elatively· ne•~-• food commodit>' 1..o..1hich has gained accept.:..nce 
only in the last 20 or 30 years. 
The Cooperator Program that coordinates export marKet 
development is relatively new. Table XXIV shows the annual 
expenditures on the Cooperator program. The program grew 
in each year between 1979 and 1984 and almost doubled from 
16.7 million dolar-:. in 1979 tc• 31.7 million dcdlar-:. in 
1984. 
TABLE XXIV 
FAS ANNUAL EXPENDITURES ON 
THE COOPERATOR PROGRAt1 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Sour·ce: 
Expenditures in 
m i 11 ions of 
U, S. do 11 ar s 
16.7 
18.8 
20.2 
20.6 
23.4 
31.7 
Foreign Agricultural 
Service, USDA 
Policies to Improve MarKet Access 
Most of the policies designed to improve marKet access 
consist of agreements to reduce restrictive trade practices 
and are covered under the General Agreement on Trade an3 
Tariffs <GATT). These agreements cover unfair import 
policies such as quotas and import taxes. Other· agreement·:. 
reduce unfair export practices such as subsidized exports. 
In additic•n, ther·e ar·e bilater·al tra.de a·~r·eements that t.•.Jor·k: 
to the mutual advantage of both countries and specify 
maximum and minimum purchases. In the ca-:.e c•f Br·a.z i 1 , 
import taxes, tariffs and quotas have traditionally been a 
problem for U.S. exporters. 
Bar· ter 
The United States Department of Agriculture can 
sometimes export grain in exchange for a commodity or 
product when the other country is cash deficient or when a 
barter agreement would be mutually preferable to either 
cash or credit. This arrangement can sometimes be used to 
overcome trade barriers such as taxes and quotas in one 
cc•untr·;>' c•r· both. 
Cr·edi t Pc•l i c i e-:. 
Credit may be as important as price in international 
grain marKeting. Many countries do not have sufficient 
hard currency to import the desired amount of wheat, or 
they may prefer to use wheat credits in order to use the 
hard currency for other imports. Credit may also be 
offered at less than world interest rates or "blended" with 
zero interest loans that are guaranteed by the exporting 
country's government. Credit is blended by offering a 
fixed amount of zero interest government guaranteed credit 
for each unit of commercial credit that is approved to the 
importing country. This produces a pacKage of blended 
credit that has a lower interest rate than the normal 
c omme r c i a 1 i n t ere~. t rate . 
TABLE XXV 
EXPORT-It1PORT BANK AND C0t1t10DITY CREDIT 
CORPORATION AGRICULTURAL EXPORT CREDIT 
Year 
1971-1972 (Average) 
1976-1980 (Average) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
EximbanK CCC (1) 
in thousands of dollars 
81,800 
77,600 
48,009 
60,400 
91,700 
1,067,300 
1,328,400 
1 '862 '2130 
1,386,500 
4,439,9130 
1 Includes GSt1-1B1, GSt1-102, GSt1-5 and Blended Credit 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service, Agricultural 
Export Programs and Pol icy, S. Elaine 
Grigsby and Cathy L. Jabara 
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Table XXV shows the amount of export credit supplied 
by the Export-Import Bank as well as the Commodity Credit 
Corporation, the two U.S. government lending agencies for 
overseas grain buyers. Table XXV shows that most of the 
cr·edit came from the Commodit~.,.. Credit Corpor·ation <CCC) 
which grew from approximately one bill ion dollars in 
1971-1972, to approximately four and a half bill ion dollars 
in 1983. The CCC export credits in Table XXV were 
allocated under four export credit programs during this 
period. These programs are GSM-101, GSM-182, GSM-5 and 
Blended Credit. 
U.S government export credit programs are handled bv 
the Commodit~ ... · Credit Corpor·ation, a branch c•f the U.S. 
Department c•f Agriculture. The pr·c•gr·am:. fall into two 
categories: commercial sales and concessional sales. 
Commer·cial sale:. fall into three categorie:.: 
(1) Short-term credit at below market rates to 
importers of U.S. commodities. 
(2) U.S. government guarantees of loans that U.S. 
banks make to overseas importers. 
(3) Blended credit. This is a combination of (1) 
and (2) above with the difference that the 
portion that the government lends the importer 
is interest free instead of below market. The 
actual interest rate depends on the ratio of 
government interest free credit to banK marKet 
r-ate cr-edit. 
Concessional sales fall into two categor-ies: 
(1) Long ter-m below mar-Ket r-ate cr-edit going to 
countr-ies with seuer-e food shor-tages. 
(2) Long ter-m below mar-Ket r-ate cr-edit whose 
r-epayment is channeled thr-ough development 
pr-oJects in the same countr-y. 
Review of the Cr-edit Pr-ogr-ams 
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GSM-102 is a loan guar-antee pr·ogr-am s.tar-ted in 1981 as. 
the Expor-t Cr-edit Guar-antee Pr-ogr-am. Its pur-pose is to 
pr-omote U.S. agr-icultur-al expor-ts .• One effect of GSM-102 
is the r-eduction of r-isK for- U.S. banKs and expor-ter-s by 
r-epaying the banK or- expor-ter- if the impor-ting countr-y 
defaults on any loan. The banKs can set a lower- inter-est 
r-ate and also lend mor-e cr-edit than they would if they had 
to assume the r-isK of loan default. GSM-102 also has the 
effect of ex tending the r-epayment per-i c•d fr-c•m s i K months 
(the usual ter-m for- commer-cial cr-edit) to up tc• thr·ee 
year-s. The actual guar-antee of the pr-ogr-am is for- 98 
per-cent of the loan pr-inciple and up to eight per-centage 
points of inter-est. The gouer-nment would r-epay the banK 
pr-inciple and inter-est up to eight per-cent in case of 
non-payment by the impor-ting countr-y. The banK vJould still 
be 1 iable for- loan inter-est aboue eight per-cent. This 
70 
means that when interest rates are above 8 %, banks are at 
more risK than when interest rates are low. 
The credit buy down rate is the difference between a 
world basis rate such as the London Inter Bank Offered Rate 
<LIBOR) and the lower actual rate offered a wheat importing 
country as a result of an export credit program. Harte, 
<1985), compared the GSM-102 rates to the prime rate over a 
19 mc•nth period a!:. ·:.hown in Table XXVI. Du r· i n g t h i =· 
period, the average interest charged Brazil for wheat 
import credit was 13.90 percent. This compares with an 
average prime rate of 14.75 percent, so the interest 
charged Brazi 1 was .85 percent less than the prime rate. 
Since the rate charged by commercial banks is normally 
about two percent above the prime rate, the average buy 
down was about 2.85 percent in this period. 
The buy down effect is offset to some extent bv the 
amount charged the exporter by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation. The CCC charges a guarantee fee based on the 
repayment period of the loan and the risK of the loan. 
Accc•rdi ng to ~(c•hlme::.'er of Car·gi 11 <Kohlmeyer·, 1982), the 
guarantee fee can add 3 to 5 cents to the price of each 
bu!:.hel c•f gr·ain. 
GS!vl-1 01 t.•,ta!:. the predece:.:.or· of the GS!1-102 pr·ogr·.:o.m. 
GSM-101 was Known as the Non-Commercial RisK Assurance 
Program. This program operated from 1956 to 1980, was 
smaller than GSM-102, and guaranteed loans against 
pcol itical r·i:.l<:. c•nl;.'. 
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TABLE X)<'JI 
GSM-1 02 RATE AND PRIME RATE BY t10NTH 
t1onth GSM-1B2 tlleighted Pr· i me 
A!Jerage Interest Rate 
Charged Braz i 1 b 
a 
8/81 20.00 20.50 
9/81 18.48 29.00 
10/81 17. 17 18.75 
11/81 15.75 17.00 
12/81 15.46 15.75 
l/82 16.25 15.75 
2/82 17.69 16.12 
3/82 16.71 16.59 
4/82 15.37 16.50 
5/82 15.37 16.59 
8/82 12. 19 14.50 
9/82 12.87 13.50 
10/82 10.81 12.75 
11/82 10.62 11.75 
12/82 19.30 11.25 
1/83 10.76 11.25 
2/83 9.37 10.75 
3/83 9.99 10.50 
4/83 10.99 19.59 
A!Jerage 
t1onthly 13.90 14.75 
Rate 
a Fisc a 1 Division, Agricultural So i 1 
Conservation Ser-vice, USDA 
b Economic Indicators, Council of 
Ecorrom i c Advisors, September 1984 
GSM-5, also Known as the Export Credit Sales Program, 
provides direct government credit to buyers of U.S. 
agricultural commodities. The rate of interest is 
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subsidized at 1.5 percent above the current Treasury Bill 
rate and for up to 36 months. The program started in 1956 
as GSM-1. Between 1981 and 1983, all GSM-5 credit was 
"blended" with GSt-1-102 guarantees and nc• intere-:.t ~·.Jas 
charged on the GSM-5 portion. 
Blended Credit Program. The blended credit program started 
in 1982 as a response to the trade practices of other grain 
exporting countries, especially the European Economic 
Communi b' <EEC). The pr·ogram combines i nteres:.t-free credit 
from the GSt ... t-5 pr·c·gr·am l.\1 i th pa;··men t •;;I•Jar·an tee-:. fr·c•m 
GSM-102. A typical blend is four parts GSM-102 to one part 
GSM-5, that is 4:1. The ratio may change for different 
countries. Table XXVII shows an example of blended credit 
offered to Brazil during September, October and November of 
1983. It shows that one part of GSM-5 interest free credit 
was blended with four parts of GSM-102 credit whose 
repayment was guaranteed by the U.S. government. 
In one study <Harte, 1985), the buy down effects of 
the GSM-102 program and the blended credit programs were 
e-:.tima.ted. In this study, the yearly installment payments 
t.•Jere est irn.ated on a h;vpothet i cal thr·ee-;.··ear· ·$30 ,000,000 
lc•an. Cc•mpared ~o.Jith a commer·cial lc•.:o.n, GSt ... t-102 leot.<.lered the-
repayment installments by 4.46 percent while the blended 
credit program lowered the repayment installments by 8.39 
percent. 
TABLE XXVI I 
BLENDED CREDIT QUANTITIES OFFERED TO BRAZIL * 
September- 1983 
De t obe r 1 983 
No,Jember 1983 
GSt1-102 
--------- u.s. 
·:$ 8,951,216 
12' 125' 894 
53,601,296 
GSM-5 
dollars---------
$ 2,012,804 
3,031,451 
13,400,324 
* 3-year loans with equal principal repayments and 
dec! ining inter·est payments consi~.ting of 29 
percent GSM-5 interest free credit and 80 
percent GSM-102 guarantees. 
Public Law 480. P.L. 480 is also Known as the Food for 
Peace Program. Titles II and IV deal with commodity 
donations and international extension programs where 
government credit is not a factor. Titles I and III cover 
concessional sales and food for development programs. 
Title I, cc•nce-:.-:.ic•nal sales, i-:. a -:.ub-:.idized cr·edi t 
program for foreign buyers of U.S. agricultural commodities 
with long term repayment periods of up to 40 years. 
Agreements may specify repayment in U.S. dollars or, less 
cmnmc•n 1 >··, in the 1 oca 1 curr·ency. P. L. 480 has been 
criticized for competing with commercial programs. 
Table XXVIII shows the total amount of Commodity 
Credit Corporation loans and credit guarantees ~s wel 1 as 
P.L. 480 concessional amounts offered Brazi 1 from 1965 to 
1985. 
TABLE XX\...' I I I 
U.S. EXPORTS TO BRAZIL UNDER CCC CREDIT SALES AND 
P. L. 480 t~HEAT ASSISTANCE PROGRAt1S FY 1965-1985 
Year Value of CCC Quantity of 
Credit Sales P.L. 480 
a b 
thousands of thousands of 
u.s. dollars metric tons 
1965 0 250 
1966 e 422 
1967 0 493 
1968 15,793 448 
1969 e 453 
1970 e 100 
1971 B 287 
1972 0 e 
1973 e B 
1974 9 0 
1975 0 e 
1976 0 0 
1977 B e 
1978 0 3 
1979 47,344 a 
1980 32,926 3 
1981 197,935 e 
1982 283,244 B 
1983 336,315 B 
1984 356,369 0 
1985 443,435 B 
Sources: a Foreign Agricultural 
Service memorandum, 
November 1986 
b Tomasini, CNPT/Et1BRAPA 
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The Ti tie III, Food for Development program is simi Jar 
to Title I except that the importing country may u~~ 
proceeds of P.L. 480 food donations to pay for development 
...,C" 
.... _1 
projects to improve agricultural production, marKeting and 
rur.:..l 1 i fe. LiKe Tit 1 e I, r·epa>'men t i -:;. c•f ten ex tended up 
to 40 years at low interest rates or forgiven altogether. 
In general, export credit programs of the U.S. and 
its competitors have increased steadi 1 >' as credit become·:. 
increasingly important in expanding wheat marKets and in 
maintaining marKet share. The cost to the importing 
country may be an increase in debt burden and to the 
exporting country, uncertainty about repayment. As of June 
30, 1984, credit rescheduling to Brazil for the GSM-102 
program totaled $218,975,833. 
Canadian and Argentine Wheat 
Exports and Policies 
The United States is Brazil's primary source of wheat 
while Canada and Argentina provide the balance. The EEC is 
not a wheat supplier to Brazil because its wheat is mostly 
soft wheat as is Brazil's. Brazil ian wheat mills prefer 
hard red wheat that can be mixed with soft domestic wheats 
to produce a superior blend for producing bread and other 
baKery products. Australia is not a source because it is 
geographically further from Brazil's ports than even Canada 
and the United States. 
Argent in.:.. 
Ar·•;;,entina·'-:;. pr·coximity to Br·azil i-:. offset by .:o. tAtea~:: 
infr·astructure .:o.nd poor· por·t facilities. Also, Br·a.zil 
prefers the larger U.S. and Canadian ships because they are 
faster and easier to unload. Rail transportation frc•m 
Argentina has to pass through Brazil's major wheat 
producing areas, so Argentina competes with Brazil's own 
wheat growers for available rail 1 ines. This causes a 
political embarassment since Brazil's own wheat growers 
feel they should get preference over Argentine growers. 
Even though Argentina shares a border with Brazil and is 
geographically much closer than the U.S. or Canada, the 
transportation costs are as high or higher. Also, 
Argentina cannot compete with the U.S. and Canada in 
providing loans to Brazil for buying wheat. 
reasons, the main attraction of Argentine wheat may be 
price and availability. 
Table XXIX shows freight charges to Rotterdam, 
Holland, a major destination point for international wheat 
-:.h i pme n t -:: .. It shows the respective shipping costs for 
Argentina, Canada and the United States between 1965 and 
1985. The average shipping rates to Rotterdam, for the 
1965 to 1985 period, were approximately twice as high from 
Argentina compared with Canada or the United States. Table 
XXIX shows that these averages were 16.38, 7.58 and ~.~0 
dollars, respectively. Argentina has a similar shipping 
cost disadvantage in other marKets, such as Japan. For 
this reason, Argentina has favored Brazil for its wheat 
exports. 
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TABLE XXIX 
MARITIME FREIGHT RATES FOR WHEAT TO ROTTERDAM 
Year From Argentina From Canada From the 
River Plate St. Lawrence u.s. 
Ports 
* 
U.S. dollars per metric ton 
1964/65 10.94 4.59 5.68 
1965/66 12.23 4.34 4.89 
1966/67 1iL62 3.53 3.57 
1967/68 10.10 4.90 4.34 
1968/69 7.32 5.35 3.35 
1969/79 9.77 5.17 5.84 
1970/71 19.95 4.84 5.27 
1971/72 6.05 2.55 2.74 
1972/73 12.46 6.26 6.77 
1973/74 26.81 12.92 14.90 
1974/75 19.64 6.66 7.46 
1975/76 14.98 4.74 5.39 
1976/77 16.66 5.22 5.99 
1977/78 16.16 5.64 6.38 
1978/79 29.26 9.14 9.93 
1979/80 29.77 15.63 16.85 
1989/81 32.44 16.59 18.52 
1981/82 28.44 11 .50 11 .52 
1982/83 17.42 9.94 19.23 
1983/84 14.88 9.67 11.75 
1984/85 18.59 19.71 12.62 
Average 16.38 7.58 8.20 
* 
Atlantic or Gulf Ports, vJhichever 1.-11as lowest 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization <FAO), 
"Trade Yearbook", ( p. 23) . 
Argentina would prefer to sell wheat to Brazil since 
Brazil i-:. the close-:.t maJor wheat bu>'er· tc• Ar·gentina. 
Exporting to more distant wheat importing countries 
....,.-. 
... ·=-
i n ~.! o 1 v e s greater· c c·~· t , i n ~-u r· .an c e and f r· e i gh t ( C IF) char· ge ~- . 
For these reasons, Argentina has, to some extent, been 
l•::oc~~ed into:• ~-elling ,,..,heat t•::o Br·azil, it·:. pr·in•:iple buyer·, 
because freight charges are lowest to Brazil. Br.az i 1 , c•n 
the other hand, is not locKed into buying wheat from 
Argentina because freight charges from the U.S. and Canada 
are no higher than from Argentina. 
Table XXX shows wheat area harvested, yield and 
production in Argentina from 1965 to 1985. I t ~-h m•,•·=· t h eo. t 
Argentine wheat production reached a peak of 14.5 mil 1 ion 
metric tons in 1982. Un 1 ike Braz i 1 , the •JJhea t har·• . !e~.t c..r·e.:o. 
remained relatively constant during this period, increasing 
from 4.6 mill ion hectares to 5.3 mill ion hectares. Yields 
are higher and more stable than in Brazil. 
Table XXXI shows Argentine wheat exports including 
exports to Braz i 1. Table Xi<XI shm'-'S that, in contr·.a~.t to:• 
Argentine production which was relatively stable, Argentine 
exports fluctuated considerably between years. Argentina 
exported approximately one mill ion metric tons in 1971, 
while in 1983 it exported approximately 10 mill ion metric 
ton~-. Comparing Argentine wheat exports with production, 
from tables XXX and XXXI, shows that Argentina exports a 
substantial portion of its wheat. Table XXXI also shows 
that Brazil bought a large share of Argentine wheat exports 
between 1965 and 1985. This was especially true in the 
years prior to 1973. In 1972 Brazil bought approximately 
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67 percent of all Argentine wheat exports. However, in the 
years since 1980, Brazil has bought 6 percent or less of 
all Argentine wheat exports. 
TABLE XXX 
ARGENTINE I..JHEAT AREA HARVESTED, YIELD AND PRODUCTION 
Year Wheat Area Yield Production 
Harvested 
1000 hectares Kg/hectare 1000 metric 
tons 
1965 4691 1320 6079 
1966 5214 1209 6247 
1967 5812 1269 7320 
1968 5837 989 5749 
1969 5191 1359 7029 
1970 3332 1280 4250 
1971 4315 1316 5680 
1972 4965 1591 79130 
1973 3981 1633 6530 
1974 4233 1410 5970 
1975 5271 1626 8573 
1976 6386 1723 11000 
1977 3910 1355 5300 
1978 4685 1729 8100 
1979 4564 1799 7800 
1980 5023 1549 7780 
1981 5790 1364 nee 
1982 7200 2014 14500 
1983 6880 1788 12300 
1984 5901 2237 13200 
1985 5296 1605 85013 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of th€' United 
Nations, FAO Production YearbooK, years 
1965-1968 
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TABLE ::<XXI 
ARGENTINE WHEAT EXPORTS 
Y£-ar Arg£-n tine Arg£-n tine Argentine Column 
t,.Jheat IJJheat Wheat Three as 
Exports Exports Exports Per·cen tage 
Value Quantity to Braz i 1 of Column 
a a b Two 
ten thousands of thousands of metric 'I 
·'• 
dollars tons 
1965 37,363 6,676 1,292 19 
1966 28' 134 5., 378 1 '363 21 
1967 12,229 2,364 653 31 
1968 14,316 2,439 1 '064 44 
1969 14,392 2,462 1 ,300 41 
1973 13,234 2,415 762 32 
1971 5,868 987 350 35 
1972 11 '758 1 '784 1 '200 67 
1973 24,600 3' 167 526 17 
1974 31 '811 1 ,834 80 4 
1975 32,382 1 ,920 240 13 
1976 44,562 3,264 1,355 32 
1977 57,528 5,970 355 6 
1978 19,420 1 ,835 441 24 
1979 61,856 4,364 1 ,972 45 
1980 82,453 4,538 a 0 
1981 73 '140 3,788 205 5 
1982 68,250 3,837 0 0 
1983 148,084 10,232 415 4 
1984 98,570 7,406 462 6 
1985 9,618 685 7 ( 
Sources: a Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAD Trade Yearbook, years 1965-1968 
b Embrapa 
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Canada 
AI 1 Canadian wheat is handled through the Canadian 
Wheat Board. This contrasts with U.S. wheat which is sold 
through private firms. The Canadians have traditionally 
signed long term agreements to sell between 1.0 and 1.5 
mill ion metric tons annually to Brazi 1. Sinco:> Canadian 
sales are set within maximum and minimum ranges by the long 
term agreements, they tend to be more stable than U.S. 
s .:.. 1 e -: .• Geographically, Canada and the United States have 
equal distances to ship wheat destined for Brazil because 
the St. Lawrence Seaway is the closest point for both 
countries to Brazil ian ports. 
Table XXXII shows Canadian wheat area harvested, yield 
and production from 1965 to 1985. c~n~dian production is 
highly responsive to falling wheat prices. 
fr·mn 1969 to 1970 production v-ias r·educed by a. h.:..l f .:..·:: .. :.. 
result of low world wheat prices in 1969 and 1970. Table 
XXXIII shows Canadian wheat exports and Canadian wheat 
exports to Brazil between 1965 and 1985. Table XXXIII 
shows that, from 19.:::.5 to 1985, Brazi 1 accc•unted for an 
increasing percentage of Canadian wheat exports. 
1974, Brazil bought 3 percent or less of all Canadian wheat 
exports, but since 1974 it has bought between four and 12 
percent of all Canadian wheat exports. 
TABLE XXXI I 
CANADIAN IAIHEAT AREA HARVESTED, Yl ELD AND PRODUCT I ON 
Yl?ar Whl?at Arl?a Yil?ld Production 
Harv~?sted 
1000 hl?ctares Kg/hHtare 1000 metric tons 
1965 11453 1540 17674 
1966 12016 1876 22516 
1967 12189 1320 16137 
1968 11907 1490 17686 
1969 10104 1840 18623 
1970 5052 1796 9823 
1971 7854 1835 14412 
1972 8640 1680 14514 
1973 10028 1798 17112 
1974 8934 1488 13295 
1975 9487 1809 17878 
1976 11252 2096 23587 
1977 10114 1964 19862 
1978 10584 1998 21146 
1979 10509 1690 17746 
1989 11098 1738 19292 
1981 12427 1996 24802 
1982 12591 2194 27620 
1983 13697 1935 26505 
1984 13158 1611 21199 
1985 13688 1746 23900 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
Unitl?d Nations, FAD Production YearbooK, 
years 1965-1968 
TABLE XXXI II 
CANADIAN !,~HEAT EXPORTS 
Year Canadian Canadian Canadian Column 
Wheat Wheat Wheat Three as a 
Exports Exports Exports Percentage 
',)alue Quantity to Brazil of Column 
a a b TVJO 
tens. of thousands thous.ands of metric ., .~·. 
of dollars tons 
1965 84' 121 12 '729 0 a 
1966 196,150 15,640 a a 
1967 74,385 10,303 0 3 
1968 68,923 9,954 6 0 
1969 52,239 7,339 a 9 
1979 71 '605 11,494 336 3 
1971 87,754 13,616 490 3 
1972 97' 182 14,463 300 2 
1973 126,535 12,891 400 3 
1974 215,153 10,690 1 '306 12 
1975 296,179 11,648 893 7 
1976 187,538 11 '338 810 7 
1977 182,794 14,934 655 4 
1978 183,961 15,329 1 '221 8 
1979 198' 167 12,471 553 4 
1980 317,499 17,376 1 '809 10 
1981 328,329 16,212 935 6 
1982 356,827 19,643 1 '250 6 
1983 385,431 22,228 1 '500 .., l 
1984 375,356 21,623 1 '590 7 
1985 16,983 1 , eee 6 
Sources: a Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Trade Yearbook, year-:. 1965-1968 
b Embrapa 
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Canadian Credit Programs 
Canada has recently begun to offer more credit to 
Brazil after supplying relatively small amounts of credit 
in the early and mid-1970's. Under Canada's three-year 
E:4 
credit program, credit is guaranteed at one quarter percent 
belc•w the prime r·ate with a 10 percent dov.m payment 
required. In Qne e~.timate <Harte, 1985), the bu::..··-dQvm r·.:..te 
effect of this program is approximately 3.37 percent, 
rQughly the same as the GSM-102 credit guarantee prQgram. 
McCalla estimated the price elasticity for wheat sales 
to middle incQme lesser develQped CQuntries at about -.2. 
For every 10 percent decrease in wheat price Qr decrease in 
]Qan repayment, the increase in wheat sales is about 2 
percent. Table XXXIV shows the estimated buy down effects 
of the variQus credit guarantee programs and the change in 
sales resulting during a recent period. If i"lc C.:..l l .;.. ·' s 
estimate Qf price elasticity is correct, the various credit 
prQgrams dQ nQt have a large impact Qn wheat sales. For 
example, the GSM-102 and Canadian Credit pr·Q·~r.:..ms WQ•Jld 
result in less than a Qne percent increase in wheat sales, 
while the blended credit program would result in less than 
a twQ percent increase in wheat sales. Ho~·.Jever·, other· 
studies have found gr•ater price elasticities fQr 
international wheat sales. This study finds that U.S. 
wheat sales to Brazil have a price elasticity Qf -1.87 
(T.:..ble ><LII), Given this elasticity and Harte's (19i::3) buy 
dQWn effect of 8.39 percent for the blended credit program, 
U.S. wheat sales to Brazil would increase 15.7 cents for 
each dollar of additional blended credit offered to Brazil. 
TABLE XXXIV 
WHEAT EXPORT PROMOTION CAUSED BY REPAYMENT BUY-DOl~N 
Pr-ogr·am 
GSt1-102 
Est i rna ted 
Buy-do•'m 
Effect 
Estimated Change in 
Sales Based on Pr-ice 
Elasticity of -.2 
per·centage 
Blended Cr-edit * 
Canadian Cr-edit 
4.46 
8.39 
3.37 
.89 ** 
1.68 
.67 
Sour-ce: Har-te, Richar-d Paul. "USDA Commer-cial Expor-t 
Cr-edit- A Mar-Ket Study of Br-azil", master-'s 
thesis, Univer-sity of Missour-i-Columbia, August 
1985. 
* Blended Cr-edit inc 1 udes GSM-1 82 and GSt1-5 
**The change in sales is found by multiplying the buy-down 
by the elasticity. For- example, -4.46~~ x -.2 = .8';·~~ 
Summary 
This chapter has treated the Brazil ian wheat market as 
a closed market with four major suppliers, including 
Brazi 1/s own domestic production. The market has a single 
bu;.··er·, the Br·azi I i.;:..n ·~overnment. The model implies. -~n 
c.] igopc.] istic mar·ket. Of course, there are more suppliers 
in the world than Argentina, Canada and the U.S. There are 
many other wheat buyers in the world besides Brazil. In 
fact, the free-on-board CF08) price is set exogenously on 
the world market. The CIF price, which includes FOB plus 
freight, varies according to distance to market and 
differences in infrastructure and shipping characteristics. 
Br.az i 1 is a pr· ice tal<er for i mpor· ted l!Jhea t from the U.S. 
and Canada because its influence on world wheat prices is 
minimal. With respect to Argentina, Brazil may, to some 
extent, be a monopsonistic buyer. If -s:.o, thi·:. is due tc• 
its geographical proximity compared to other countries that 
buy wheat from Argentina. This geographical proximity 
implies lower· CIF r·ates and gives Br·azil a bU>'ing .;:..d\Jantage 
over other countries that buy Argentine wheat. Ch.c<.pter· 4 
will develc•p a cc•nceptual model fc•r- the Br·azil i.:..n ~·,the.at 
mar-ket based on the assumptions developed in this and the 
pr-eceding chapter-s. 
CHAPTER P.-1 
RE1·.) I EI...J OF LITERATURE 
On~ obj~ctiue of this research is to ~xamine pol ici~s 
that affect wheat import demand in Brazil, including U.S. 
wheat export policies. Several studies hav~ ~xamin~d th~ 
effects of wheat export subsidy programs on wheat import 
demand. Grigsby (1984) measured th~ effect of the P.L. 480 
program on wheat import demand in Colombia. Her study 
disputes th~ traditional characterization of P.L. 480 as a 
food aid or commodity subsidy program. Rather, ·:.he 
hypothesizes that P.L. 480 is a "market export program that 
results in expanded market demand." 
In her demand equation for imported wheat in Colombia, 
Grigsby hypothesized that import demand, CM, is positively 
related to th~ quantity of P.L. 480 CTitl~ 1) cr~dit, TIM. 
Import demand is positively related to the domestic wheat 
price in Ccolombia, DP, per capita income, Y, and Ccdombia.·'s. 
trade balance, TRABAL. Wheat import demand is negatively 
related to the domestic wheat supply in the previous y~ar, 
Equation C1) shows Grigsby's wh~at import demand 
equation for Colombia with hypothesized signs under the 
independent variables. 
CM = TIM, DP, Y, TRABAL, DQt-1 
(+) (+) (+) (+) (-) 
In addition, Grigsby specified an equation forTi tle 
impc•rt demand, der-ived in par·t, fr-om commer·cial impc•r·t 
demand, Equation (1). She hypothesized that Title I wheat 
imports, TIM, are positively related to commercial import 
demand, CM, and domestic wheat price, DP. She h>'PC•the:. i zed 
that credit from Title I would have an income effect that 
would fur-ther increase demand for- more Title I demand. 
This income effect is represented by two variables, trade 
purchasing power, TPP, which represents an increase in 
for·eign exchange liquidity, and domestic pur·ch.o;.sing por,,.rer·, 
DPP. DPP is non-trade credit which can only be used in 
Colombia itself and which results in below-market prices 
for wheat, in increased demand for wheat imports and in a 
disincentive to domestic production. Grigsby hypothesized 
that demand f·x· Title I is negati•...'el>' related to dome:.tic 
wheat supply in the previous year, DQt-1, and the financial 
costs of Title I, PTIF. 
TIM = CM, DP, TPP, DPP, DQt-1, PTIF ( 2) 
(+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (-) 
Grigsby also hypothesized an equation for domestic 
wheat supply in Colombia, DQ, Equation (3). She 
h;..-pothe:.ized that domestic pr·oductic•n, DQ, is pc•sitivel>·· 
related to the previous year's price, DPt-1' and quantity, 
Dome:.tic ·:.upply i·:. ne•;l·O<.ti•._.tel:~- r·eler.ted tc• input 
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costs, WPIAG <wholesale price index for agriculture), and 
the prices of the substitute crops, bar 1 e>' and rice, in the 
previous year, PPBt-1 and PPRit_ 1 , Domestic production is 
also hypothesized to be negatively related to commercial 
imports, CM, and Title I imports, TIM. 
DQ = DPt-1' DQt-1, WPIAG, PPBt_ 1 , PPRit-l, CM, TIM C3> 
(+) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
In addition to the import demand equations, Grigsby 
used a separate equation to explain domestic demand for 
wheat in Colombia, DD, Equation <4>. She hypothesized that 
the sign of domestic wheat price, DP, could be positive or 
negative, depending on whether the change in price 
represented a shift in demand, (+), or a shift along the 
demand curve, (-), She hypothesized that demand for wheat 
was positively related to the price of rice, WPRI, a wheat 
substitute, and the income variables, per capita income, Y, 
and the income effect of Title I credit, TIY. 
DD = DP, WPRI, Y, TIY 
( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) 
Gr i g<E.b>· u:.ed two identities to comp 1 e te the mode 1 , 
Equations (5) and (6). Imports, ~-1, ar·e identical to 
commercial imports, CM, plus Title I imports, TIM. 
(4) 
Domestic demand, DD, is identical to domestic supply, DQ, 
p 1 us import'=·, M. 
M = TIM + CM (5) 
DD = DQ + M (6) 
Grigsby's mod~l conclud~d that "Ti tl~ I cr~di t and 
f•:•r·~ign ~xchang~ ~·J~r·e mor·e influential in ~::<panding impor·t 
and dom~stic d~mand than was domestic incom~." 
found a "pric~ disinc~ntive eff~ct" on dom~stic supply of 
IJ.Jh ~at and an i ncr e as~ i n c omme r· c i a 1 i mp c•r t -::. r· e ·:.u 1 t i n g f r Qm 
Titl~ I. There ~o.Ja-s. little evid~nce c•f -::.ub-::.titution of 
T i t 1 e I f or c omm e r c i a 1 i m p C• r· t -:: .. She cc•nclude·:. th."'.t, "title 
I is not a food aid program. It is a mark~t ~xport program 
that provid~d trade purchasing power and financial aid." 
A simi Jar study was done for Brazi 1 by Hal 1 (1980) 
with different conclusions on the effects of trade credits. 
Hall found that, in Brazil, P.L. 480 had a positive impact 
on domestic wheat prices. Revenues gained from wheat 
imports were used to support domestic grain producers. Her 
conclusions also differed from Grigsbys' becaus~ she found 
that, in Br·azi 1, P.L. 480 impc•r·t-::. had a nega.tive impact on 
commer·c i a 1 i mpor· ts. 
Hall·'-:. mc•de-1 is:. ba·:.ed on the pricing pcdicf of CITF:H··l, 
Brazil's MarKeting Department for National Wheat. Since 
1952, CITRIN has bought and sold all domestic wheat and is 
the sole importer and supplier to Brazil ian mills. 
According to Hall, CITF:IN sells wheat to the mills at a 
uniform pric~ that is low enough to be affordabl~ for the 
average urban consumer. This price tends to b~ higher than 
'7'1 
the p r i c e p ~- i d for· i mp c•r ted '"'he.:.. t , bu t l•::.t.'-Je r than the p r· i c e 
paid to Brazil ian producers. The revenues gained from 
selling imported wheat to the mills is used for subsidizing 
domestic producers. 
per unit price paid by CITRIN for imported wheat, the 
greater the subsidy to producers in the following time 
period. Alternatively, the lower the imported wheat price 
per unit, the lower the price to consumers that will 
maintain the same amount of subsidy to domestic producers. 
Hall also hypothesizes that the producer and consumer 
price:. ar·e the r·esult of "political b~.lancing c•f pr·oducer· 
and consumer interests". For this reason, consumer and 
producer wheat prices are, "not completely determinate, but 
wi 11 vary from year to year." 
Hall used a simultaneous equation econometric model 
which included supply and demand relationships for wheat, 
corn, rice and soybeans. The objective of Hall's model was 
to measure the impact of P.L. 480 wheat imports on Brazil's 
grain sector, which includes wheat, corn, rice and 
soybeans. The study period of Hal 1 's study was 1'7'52 to 
1975 which includes the years of P.L. 480 wheat shipments 
tc• Br·azil. 
In her· mode 1 , Ha 11 u:.ed an equation fc•r· .:.,r·e.a harve·:.ted 
to simulate domestic supply for each of the four grains. 
Area harvested in year t was hypothesized to be a function 
of are.:.. har·vested in year t-1, in hect.:..r·e·:., At-l, the 
producer price of the respective grain and prices of 
.;;· ·::· 
.· ~ 
substitute or complementary grains in the previous year, 
p t-1 • Hall al-:.c• incl•Jded the pr·ice of fer·tilizer·, FP, to 
represent input prices in general, the consumer price 
index, CPI, to r·epre:.ent the impact •:of "money illu:.ion", 
and a time trend variable, TR. The superscript, .i 
I 
refer·s 
to the grain, wheat, corn, rice or soybeans with i=1 ,2,3 or 
4; J refers to complementary or substitute grains, J=l ,2,3 
c•r 4 . 
A i t = f i 0:: A i t -1 ' pi t -1 ' pJ t -1 ' FP t -1 ' CP I t -1 ' TR) ( 7) 
Quantity supplied, in Hall·'s model, i·:s e::<plained I.'Ji th 
.:o_n identity equation in VJhich quantity SUpplied, OSi, i:. 
identical 
roc·i 
l>f._o t 
to area harvested, A, times yield per hectare, Y. 
Per capita demand for grain i, PCQDi, is hypothesized to be 
a function of own price, pi, substitute grain prices, p.j 
' 
per capita income, PCI and inflation, CPl. 
PCODi t = fi(pit, pJt, PCI, CPit> ( '?) 
•A•here 
PC(!Di t = G"!D i e'r--..~t ( 1 13) 
where N is Brazil's population. Brazil's quantity demanded 
of gr·.:o. in is identically equal to domestic quantity 
,-,.-. 
7 .,:. 
supplied, QSi, plus quantity imported of grain i, Mi minus. 
exports. of grain 
( 11 ) 
In her model, Hall used nominal price data; she argues 
"~ 
that, "the absence of money illusion is only a postulate 
and not .:;.. necessary description of r·ea 1 i ty, the .absence of 
money illusion is too strong a proposition to be Known a 
priori and imposed on the data." Hall used the variable, 
CPI, to explain the "money illusion" effect of inflation on 
grain quantity supplied and demanded. 
Wheat, according to Hall, is the only grain whose 
support price differs from the marKet price. This is 
because the other three grains are covered by minimum 
support prices which are rarely reached. The wheat support 
price, in contrast, is based on "cc•s.t of pr·coduc t ion p Jus .. a 
profit margin considered sufficient to encourage the 
desired annual production increase." 
In addition to the five demand and supply equations 
for the four grains, Hall used two additional equations 
that pertain only to wheat. One equation explains 
•:eornmercial '··'·'heat imrrorts., 1'-'tw. T._ th 1 · th .... t P ,,e o er exp atns . e w.,ea. 
-:.upport price to Brazilian producers. The amo1.1nt of ~_,.Jhe.at 
impc•rt demand, t'lW, is .. :;.. function of domestic '·'·!heed s.upply, 
QSW and the amount of P.L. 480 wheat, P.L. 480w. I t i ·:: 
also a function of foreign exchange reserves, FXR, the mill 
v ..•hea t pr· i .:e, pm 
' 
the consumer price index, CPI, and a trend 
var· i .:..bl e, TR. 
(12) 
The wheat support price, pw, is hypothesized to be a 
function c•f commercial t,.,,heat impor·ts, M'"', the quantity of 
P.L. 4f:O v ..•he.:..t supplied, P.L 4f:OW, the inter·national pr·ice 
of vJheat, the consumer price index, CPI, and a trend 
variable, TR. 
(13) 
In explaining the reasons for Equation <12), Hal 1 
argue-:. that impor·t demand in Br·azil i-:. influertced mor·e b;>' 
foreign exchange reserves than by income levels or 
international wheat prices. She also assumes that imports 
and domestic production are perfect substitutes. For this 
reason, QS is hypothesized to have a (-) coefficient. The 
higher the mill price, pm, the more revenues the government 
receives from the wheat it sells to the mills, or 
.alternative!;.,.., the le-:.s it p.:..>'·::. in sub-:.idie-:. t.o.Jht-n pm < IP. 
Therefor·e, the mi 11 pr· ice i ;. expected tc• be .:., pc•·:.i t i •,.te 
de term i nan t of commer··: i a 1 imports. The qu.:..n tit::-' c•f P. L. 
4f:0 is hypothesized to have a negative effect on commercial 
imports because it is a substitute for commercial imports. 
Hall hypothesized that the Brazi 1 ian producer wheat 
price, Equation (13), is determined in year t+l by revenues 
'?5 
ear·ned in year t, beca•Jse, "it is unliKely that the 
domestic supply schedule is known with great enough 
accuracy to enable the government to set a price support in 
time t." For the years covered in Hall's study, 1952 to 
1975, revenues from wheat sales to Brazil ian mills were 
positive in most years because the mill price exceeded the 
international price until 1973 ''Jhen r·evenue-:. beca.me 
negative. Revenues were positively related to the quantity 
of commercial wheat imports and P.L. 480 wheat imports and 
negatively related to international wheat prices. The 
gr·e.:.. ter· the a.moun t of P. L. 480 in tot.~.l import-:., the 1 o~·-•er· 
the total cost of imports and the greater the revenues. 
Hall found that v..•heat production in Brazil is 
positively correlated with the producer wheat price. She 
also found that soybean production is negatively correlated 
with the current producer price of wheat. Ha 11 a 1 sc• fc•und 
that per capita wheat consumption was positively related to 
per capita income, negatively related to own price and 
positively related to the price of rice, a consumption 
substitute for wheat. Cr:ornme r c i a 1 imp c•r t demand f err· ,,,Jh eat 
was negatively related to domestic production and P.L. 480 
imports and positively related to foreign exchange reserves 
and the domestic mill price. 
Hall's domestic wheat support price did not have the 
expected coefficients for· cc•mmercial imports and 
international wheat prices. Greater imports and lower 
international wheat prices should have raised more revenues 
by selling more wheat to consumers at a higher margin, 
thereby raising the producer support price. 
coefficients did not agree with this hypothesis. This 
seems to contradict her explanation of how the producer 
support price is determined. 
Using the reduced form, Hall estimated the impact of 
the P.L. 489 program on wheat consumption in Brazil. She 
foDnd that approximately 19 percent of the P.L. 489 amounts 
represented increased demand for wheat, while the other 81 
percent represented a displacement of commercial imports. 
Unlike the Grigsby study, P.L. 480 did not displace 
domestic production. On the contrary it encouraged 
domestic wheat production through its positive impact on 
the domestic producer price. Hall found that each 
additional 1000 tons of P.L. 480 wheat impor·t:. had the 
effect of raising domestic wheat prices by 13 cruzeiros in 
the following time period. 
The results of the Grigsby and Hal 1 studies show that 
wheat e;<port pol icie:. differ· between countries. In the 
case of Brazi 1, P.L. 480 imports were used in a beneficial 
way with regards to domestic production, while in the case 
of Colombia, P.L. 480 imports displaced Colombia's domestic 
wheat production. 
The current study differs from the Hal 1 and Grigsby 
studies because it examines the effects of commercial 
credit programs instead of P.L. 480. The Brazil ian data 
are more recent than the data used in the Hal 1 study. The 
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Hall study examined Brazil ian wheat imports from 1952 to 
1975; the current study covers 1965 to 1985. The year 
1973 represented a large change in Brazil ian wheat pricing 
pol icy because, prior to 1973, imported wheat prices had 
been less than the mill price <consumers had not been 
subsidized). In every year after 1972 consumers were 
subsidized <the import price of wheat exceeded the mi 11 
price). This alters a major assumption of the Hall model 
which assumed that revenues gained from selling wheat to 
consumers were used to support the producer price. Because 
of the change in Brazil ian wheat pricing, the assumptions 
of the current model are different. The mill price, for 
example, is now assumed to depend on consumer subsidies. 
Consumer subsidies depend on Brazi 1 ian national income and 
producer prices. The more producers are subsidized, the 
less is available for consumers. The Hall model explains 
the producer support price, but not the mill price. 
Other agricultural changes since the Hall study have 
changed the assumptions of the model. For example, soybean 
production quicKly surpassed wheat production after the 
Hall study. As a result, it may now be the case that wheat 
production responds more to the price of soybeans than to 
its own price since the two crops are double-cropped but 
soybeans are now the principal crop. After 1971 Brazil no 
longer received wheat under the P.L. 480 program. That 
program was replaced with commercial credit programs that 
have different terms but may have some of the same economic 
consequences. The current study examines the difference 
between commercial credit and P.L. 4813 on 8r·azil ... s. ~.<Jheat 
marKet. 
The current study also examines marKet share among 
8razil ... s principal suppliers. The Hall and Grigsby 
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studies did not model the impact of P.L. 4813 wheat imports 
on marKet share among the wheat supplying countries. Nor 
did they examine price elasticity differ·ences among the 
wheat supplying countries. 
CHAPTER tJ 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF BRAZILIAN WHEAT IMPORTS 
The ecc•nomic characteristics of Br·azil~s wheat marKet 
were developed in previous chapters. Chapter Two examined 
8r·azil~s demand for and domestic supply of VJheat. Chapter· 
Three examined Brazil's three international suppliers and 
some po 1 icy considerations. Chapter Four r·eu i ewed two 
related studies. This chapter will develop a conceptual 
economic mode 1 to describe more cone i se 1>' Braz i 1 ~ :. wheat 
marKet and estimate some of the numerical relationships. 
The model will maKe some simplifying assumptions. 
Import prices are assumed exogenously determined in the 
world marKet for the three exporting countries. Price is 
determined endogenously, in the model, for Brazil ian 
domestic wheat producers and Brazil ian consumers. MarKet 
shares of competing supp 1 i ers .are determined endogenous 1 y. 
Domestic production is determined endogenous.] y t.o..~h i 1 e 
production in the three exporting countries is exogenously 
determined. Demand is endogenously determined. 
from other suppliers are not large and are assumed to be 
exogenous. 
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Conceptual Model 
The objectives of the model are: (1) to explain 
Brazil's demand for wheat, <2> to explain Brazil's domestic 
wheat production, (3) to explain marKet share among the 
three major wheat exporting countries, (4) to explain the 
r·etail pr·ice c•f ~'-'heat in Br·azil, ~.nd (5) to explain the 
producer price of wheat in Brazil. These five variables 
are endogenous in the model. 
In concept•Jal izing an econc•mic mc•del for· a grc•up C•f 
people, such as a country, the quantity variables are 
expressed on a per capita basis. Otherwise, changes in the 
number of people could affect the outcome of the model. 
For· example, if wheat consumption in Br·azil incr·eaE.eE. over· 
a 20-year period, much of that increase is attributable to 
an increase in population. A regression model of the 
effect of retail price on wheat consumption, for example, 
is simplified if wheat consumption is on a per capita 
basis. Whether the quantity variables are on a per capita 
basis or an aggregate bas1s, they should be consistently 
one or the other. 
SupplY 
Brazil produces part of the wheat it consumes. The 
remainder is supplied by the U.S., Canada, Argentina and 
other wheat exporting countries. Canada has long term 
sales agreements with Brazil, so the U.S. and Argentina are 
residual suppliers whose joint share is determined by 
1 01 
fluctuations in Brazil's production. Brazil does not 
expc•rt or· :.tor·e :.ignificant amc•unt·:. of 'A'heat, nor· doe:. it 
import large quantities from countries other than Canada 
Argentina and the United States. For these reasons, the 
t.::.tal supply of wheat to Br·azil in )·'e.ar· t is the summation 
of Brazil's production in year t, BPt, Canadian imports, 
Cit, Argentine import:., Ait, U.S. impc•r·t:., Uit and the 
impor·ts from •::.ther· suppl ier·s, Olt· U.S. impc•r·t':: .. :..r·~? equal 
to commercial sales plus shipments of P.L. 480 wheat, 
PL480t· Thu:., the quantity :.upplied in year t, Gf3t, i:. an 
identity equation in which each term of the equation is on 
a per capita basis as shown in Equation (1). 
Per capita quantity of wheat demanded, QDt, is assumed 
to be identical tc• per capita quanti b' c•f ,,.  .1he.:..t :.uppl ied .:..'::. 
·:.r-,ov.m in Equation (2). Equatic•ns (1) .;:..nd (2) can be 
rewritten as Equation (3). 
QDt = (2) 
oDt = ( 3) 
Brazil ian Production 
Br.azilian wheat pr·•:•duction in year· t, BPt, i'::. thc•ught 
to be a function of the price of soybeans in the previous 
,-. 
Year·, p·=· 
. t -1 . Soybeans are a principle cash and export crop 
planted six months prior to th~? wheat crop and grown on the 
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same land as wheat. The two crops are considered 
production complements because they are rotated in 
alternative seasons. The soybean crop helps to fix 
nitrc•gen in the ·:.cril, .... Jhile the •.!Jheat cr·crp deplete-:. 
nitrogen. It is expected that Brazil ian wheat production 
is positively related to the price of soybeans lagged one 
year·. 
Demand 
+-r' p•S .) 
' t -1 .. (4) 
Per· capita demand for· ~oJheat in Brazil in ~·'ear· t, QDt, 
is thought to be negatively related to the consumer price 
of wheat, pet (i.e. price set b>·· government to the mill-:.) 
in year t. Also, wheat demand is either positively or 
ne9ative])-' related tc• per capita income, It, depending on 
whether wheat is a normal or inferior good. 
QD t = f ( pc t ' I t ) (5) 
Demand for Imports 
G!ua.ntib' impcrr·ted frc•m the thr·ee ma.jc•r· -:.upplier··:. i-:. 
modeled with an equation for U.S. imports and an equation 
for Argentine imports • Canadian imports are represented bv 
. :an identity equation in ~.·,•hich Equation (3) i·:. re~, . .r-itten 
with Canadian imports on the left side. Canadian imports 
equal quantity demanded minus Brazil ian production minus 
wheat imports of the U.S., Argentina and other countries, 
[-,I t, Equat i c•n 
It is hypothesized that demand for U.S. and Argentine 
wheat depends on the price of U.S. wheat, pUSt, the price 
of Argentine wheat, pARt, per capita income in Brazil, It 
and the real exchange rate, cruzeiros per U.S. Dollar, 
It is expected that the own price elasticities, the 
change in imports due to a change in own country wheat 
price, are negative. It is expected that cross price 
elasticities, the change in impor·ts due to a change in 
cc•mpeting country VJheat price, is positive. It is expected 
that wheat consumption in Brazil has a positive per capita 
income elasticit)', The r·eal exchange r~.te, •:ruzeir·o:. per· 
dollar, is expected to have a negative coefficient because 
the greater this exchange rate, the weaker the Brazil ian 
curr·ency. 
Lilt = f(pUS 
' t' pARt, I t ' XRCd ··, . . t .. ( 7) 
Ait = f(pUS 
' t ' 
pAR 
t ' I t ' 
x··Rcd .) 
. ' t .. ( ::::) 
Wheat Support Price to Brazil ian Farmers 
The- Brazilian IJ.JhE>at ·:.uppc•rt pr·ice, P*, is set in ye.;:..r· 
t in advance of the planting and harvesting season. It is 
hypothe:.izo:od th~.t the Br·azili.;:..n Go\.!er·nment -:.et:. the pr·ice 
in response to the price of soybeans in the previous year, 
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pSO expenditures on wheat imp•orts in t -1 ' the previous year, 
El.,lt-l' the amo:ount of Commo:•dity Cr·edit Cor·por·.:..tion ~·.Jhe.:..t 
alloc.:..ti·~n·:. to Br·azil in the pr·evious year, Ct_ 1 , and a 
trend variable, TR. 
It is expected that the price of soybeans in the 
previous year is positively associated with the wheat prio:e 
support because the Br·azilian Gover·nment tries. to be 
even-handed in its crop price supports. If the soybe.:..n 
support price is increased then so is the wheat support 
price. Expenditures on wheat imports the previous year 
areexpected to be positively associated with the wheat 
price support. This variable reflects both the world wheat 
price and the quantity imported. The pol io:y of the 
Brazi I ian Government has been to set the wheat support 
prio:e above the world price. As the world price increases, 
so does the wheat support price. Also, as part of its 
impo:or·t s.utos.titution policy, the Br·azilian Gcovernment i·:. 
more 1 iKely to institute higher support prices when the 
quantity of wheat imports rises. Commc•d i t >' Cr· e d i t 
Corporation subsidized credit and credit guarantees are 
expected to be pos.iti• .. Jely .;..s.s.c•ciated •.JJith theJBr·.:..zil ian 
wheat support price. It has been hypothesized in the 
1 i ter·atur·e (Hall, 1980) that the P.L. 480 progr·am h.:..d a 
positive effect on the Brazil ian producer wheat price. The 
CCC program could have the same effect because the credit 
• .. •.muld be indir·ectly used by the Br.:o.zilian Go1..oernment to 
support domestic wheat 
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Final]) ... , Br-azilian , .... Jheat suppc•r-t pr·ices ar·e 
expected to follow a downwar-d tr-end over time. 
p+ so 
.. t = f ( F''"' t - 1 ' Ekl t - 1 ' C t - 1 ' T R ) 
Cons.umer Pr-ice 
The mi 11 price of wheat, pet, reflects the price 
consumers pay for wheat and is set by the Brazil ian 
Gc••-..'er·nmen t. It is hypothesized that the factors that help 
decide where the government sets this price are the wheat 
support price, F'*t, and per capita income, It· 
The mil 1 price is hypothesized to be positively 
related to the wheat support price. 
related to per capita income because the mill price depends 
on consumer subsidies. Consumer subsidies are hypothesized 
to be greater in prosperous times when Brazil ian national 
income i·:. high. I....Jhen national incomt? is high, the 
government is hypothesized to havt? more rt-venues to support 
vJheat pr·ices. National incmnt- is. e::-::pres.s.ed on.:.. per· c.::..pit.:.. 
ba.s.is. 
( 11)) 
Hypothesized Signs of Model Coefficients 
Table XXXV presents the conceptual model based on 
equations four through ten with the hypothesized signs of 
the coefficients. The t-ndogenous variablt-s of Equations 
four through 10 are on the left side of the table and 
TABLE XXXV 
STRUCTUR.~Ld~OR.~ PARAMETERS AND HYPGTHESIZED COEFFICIHlT SIGNS 
Equation Number Endogenous Variables Predetermined Variables 
and Description 
Cit BPt QD t Uit A It P* t PC PAR t t 
Pus 
t It 
Pso 
t-1 TR EWt-1 ct-1 
XRcd 
t Oit 
1 Identity Cit -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 
2 Brazilian Production BPt -1 + 
3 Quantity Demanded QD t -1 - + 
4 U.S. Imports Uit -1 + - + + 
5 Argentine Imports Ait -1 - + + + 
6 Producer Price P* t -1 + - + + 
7 Retail Price PC + t -1 
Variable Definitions: 
XRcd 
QD, Qs 
Exchange rate, cruzeiros per dollar 
Brazilian wheat quantity demanded and supplied EW Brazil's real expenditures on wheat imports 
p* PC 
BP Brazilian wheat production/capita 
' 
Real Producer and consumer wheat prices in Brazil c CCC credit allocation amounts to Brazil 
PAR .pus 
I Real income per capita in Brazil 
' 
Real Prices of Argentine and U.S. wheat TR Time trend 
Pso 
AI, CI, UI, OI Wheat imports per capita from Argentina, 
Real Producer price of soybeans Canada, the U.S. and other countries 
........ 
C) 
01 
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represent Canadian wheat imports, Brazil ian wheat 
production, wheat quantity demanded, U.S. wheat imports, 
Argentine wheat imports, the Brazil ian wheat producer price 
and the Brazil ian wheat price tq consumers, respectively. 
The regressors for each of the equations are shown along 
the top r·ow. 
(determined b>' the model) and some are predetermined. 
The first equation in Table XXXV, Canadian imports, is 
an identity equation because Canadian imports are defined 
as in Equation (6). The coefficient matrix shows the 
hypothesized signs of the coefficients of the variables. A 
pc·~· it i •,Je •::.r· negative "1" indica. tes a knc•wn identity 
relationship or the dependent variable in a particular 
equation. The model in Table X)()(t.) i~. blocK r·ecur·::.i•v"e 
because two of the equations, U.S. imports and Argentine 
imports, are simultaneously determined. The retai 1 price 
depends on the producer price. Quantity demanded depends 
on the r· eta i 1 p r i c e • 
Argentine imports. 
Canadian imports depend on U.S. and 
Estimation Results 
The hypothesized model from Table XXXV was estimated 
with three-stage least-squares. Three-stage least-squares 
is a method that produces efficient and consistent 
parameter estimates by accounting for correlation of error 
terms across equations (Pind;.-ck, p. 337). Or·d i nar>' 
least-squares would have resulted in biased and 
TABLE XXXVI 
STRUCTUR.\L F0:<.11 P.\FAMETER ESTIMP.TES AND STA~DA~D ERRORS 
Equation Number 
and Description 
Endogenous Variables 
Identity crt 
2 Brazilian Production BPt 
3 Quantity Demanded 
4 U.S. Imports 
5 Argentine Imports 
6 Producer Price 
7 Retail Price 
Variable Definitions: 
QDt 
urt 
Alt 
P* 
t 
PC 
t 
crt 
-1 
BPt 
-1 
-1 
D Q t 
-1 
urt Art 
-1 -1 
-1 
-1 
D S Q , Q Brazilian wheat quantity demanded and supplied 
* c P , P Real Producer and consumer wheat prices in Brazil 
AR US P , P Real Prices of Argentine and U.S. wheat 
Pso Real Producer price of soybeans 
Predetermined Variables 
P* 
t 
PC PAR 
t t 
Pus 
t It 
so 
p t-1 TR EWt-l ct-1 XRcd t ort 
-1 
-.33 
( .05) 
.14 -1 
(. 10) 
.12 
( .04) 
.004 
( .08) 
Intd 
XRc 
EW 
BP 
c 
I 
TR 
-.01 
(.004) 
-.12 .013 
( .04) ( .002) 
-.03 -.004 
( • 07) ( • 003) 
-.09 
(. 009) 
.15 
( .04) 
1.17 
( .46) 
Intercept 
-9.49 12.12 49.91 
(3.05) (4.96) (12.87) 
-.07 
( .05) 
.05 
( .09) 
-1 
Exchange rate. cruzeiros per dollar 
Brazil's real expenditures on wheat imports 
Brazilian wheat production/capita 
CCC credit allocation amounts to Brazil 
Real income per capita in Brazil 
Time trend 
AI, CI, UI, OI Wheat imports per capita from Argentina, 
Canada, the U.S. and other countries 
Int 
6.1 
(3. 7) 
97 
( 11) 
-.4 
(6.4) 
12 
(11) 
18883 
(5997) 
212 
(21) 
1---' 
0 
00 
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inconsistent estimates. The structural coefficients were 
estimated using Proc Sysl in (systems of 1 inear equations) 
in SAS <SAS In:.ti tute, 1984). T.able X:>C;(t.)l shot.<J·:. estim~.tes 
of the structural parameters and standard errors (beneath 
the par· arne ter s) . 
In gener·.al, all the coefficient estimate-:. in TablE-
XX)(',) I , except Argent i n e sa 1 e s, had stat i s t i ca. 1 1 y 
·:.ignifica.nt t-values Cat the p = .05 lE-J..!el) for· mo':.t •::.r· all 
the coefficients. None of the t-values for Argentine sales 
werE- statistically significant at the p = .05 level. 
Validation of Model with Root Mean Square 
Error and Theil ... s Inequality Coefficient 
The t-•Jal ues derived from Table )()(Xt)I .ar·e •.Jseful in 
validating the individual E-quations of thO? model. Howe•...'er·, 
the t-values don ... t measure the overall performance of the 
system of equations. The root-mean-square simulation error 
<rms) is .:;,. measure of how '··'.!ell the simulated endogenous 
variables tracK the historical data series (PindycK, 
p.362). The root-mean-square error is defined in equation 
( 11) • 
1,o • .1her·e ....... --. 
-t 
....... a~ 
I t 
T 
E 
= 
= 
= 
= 
simulated value of Yt 
act u a 1 lJ a 1 u e 
number of periods in simulation 
expectations operator 
The rms error is a measure of the deviation of the 
( 11 ) 
11 0 
simulated variables from the actual variables. Theil's 
inequal i h' cc•efficient, U, i~. a methc•d of -:.c.~.l ing the r·m~. 
to fall between 0 and 1. A value of 0 indicates a perfect 
fit in which all predicted values are equal to their actual 
value. U is defined in Equation (12). 
r·ms error 
u = (12) 
When U = o, yst = yat for all t which indicates a 
perfect fit. If U = 1 the model is the • .. •.Jor·:.t possible 
predictor of the endogenous variables. I f U > tt i t can be 
decomposed into three proportions of inequality, the bias, 
uM, the var· i ance, uS, and the covariance, uC (The i 1 , 1 '7"61 , 
pp. 30-37). These three sources of the simulation error 
add up to one. 
ut··l + us + uc = ( 1 ::::) 
ut'·l i -:. a me a -=·u r e of ~.;...--=. t em at i c b i a-=·. A •J .:..1 u e c•f ut-1 
above .1 or .2 would indicate a serious problem of 
sy~.tema tic b i .:._~. in the mode 1 • uS i nd i c.:.. te·:. the ab i 1 i tv of 
the model to r·epl icate the degr·ee of v.:o.riabil ity in the 
endogenous variable. A small uS indicates that the model 
acura.tel ;-·· r·epl i cates the amount of • ...oar· i abi 1 it:>' of the 
actual data. uC is a mea~.ur·e •:of r·.:..ndc•m er·r·or. The ideal 
prop•:ortion of er·r·or, v..•hen U>O, v.Jould be uM=uS=o and uC=l. 
Table XXXVII shows the Theil forecast error 
-::.t.:..t i st i cs. In general, the model provided a good fit with 
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aU value of .11 or le-s:.:. in all the equatir::·n·:. e>;cept for 
Argentine import:.. There was no systematic bias in any of 
thE< equat i eon-:. 1.-'.Ji th U~'be fc•r .:o.ll equ.:o.t ion-:.. The •.J.:o.r· i ance of 
the model replicated the variance of the endogenous 
variable:. well with uS less than or equal to .05 except for 
Argentine imports and Brazil ian production. Thus meost of 
the error between predicted and actual endogenous values 
,_,_,as fr·om random fac tor·s. 
TABLE XX)(VI I 
THEIL FORECAST ERROR STATISTICS * 
Equation R2 RMS u us uc 
Error 
Pcbrzpro .56 4.21 . 11 0 .0 • 18 .82 
Quandern .84 3.39 .04 0.0 .05 .95 
Pcusirnp .87 2.134 .07 0.0 .134 .96 
Pcar-girnp .43 2.89 .21 0.0 . 14 .86 
Prodpr . 71 17.28 .134 0.9 .02 .98 
Conspr .93 113.85 .34 3.3 . 32 .98 
* 
Statistics tJ.Jt-re der i tJed 1,\J i th Proc Sirnnl in-Th~?i 1 
Procedure in SAS, 1-.Jer·sion 5 
Reduced Feorm Equations 
reduced form model. The reduced form equatieons sheow each 
of the endogenous variables expressed in terms of 
Endogenous 
Variables 
Cit 
QDt 
Ult 
AI t 
P*t 
pCt 
BPt 
Inter 
cept 
-478 
-461 
-4.9 
16 
15801 
2474 
5.45 
-.163 
a 
. 161 
.ae2 
a 
a 
a 
TABLE XXX'JI I I 
REDUCED FORt1 ESTit1ATES 
p? 
.. -
a 
-.146 
-.026 
a 
a 
a 
Exogenous Variables 
.309 
.318 
.014 
-.aa4 
a 
-.a9 
a 
Pso t-1 
-.191 
-.032 
a 
a 
1.a4 
.149 
.159 
TR 
.245 
.245 
e 
a 
-7.96 
-1 .14 
a 
-.34 -1 .27 
-.34 -1.27 
a a 
a 0 
11 41.24 
1.6 5.91 
a a 
Variable Definitions: 
QD, QS 
P*, pC 
pAR, pUS 
pSO 
XRcd 
AI, CI, 
BP 
c 
I 
EI,.J 
TR 
UI 
Brazil ian wheat quantity demanded and supplied 
Real Producer and consumer wheat prices in Brazil 
Real Prices of Argentine and U.S. wheat 
Real Producer price of soybeans 
Exchange rate cruzeiros per dollar 
Argentine, Canadian, U.S. imports per capita 
Br·azilian •..11heat production per capita 
CCC credit allocation amounts to Brazil 
Income per capita in Brazil 
Brazil's real expenditures on wheat imports 
Time trend 
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vRcd 
.'\ t 
.0298 
a 
-.a31 
.aaa9 
a 
a 
a 
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exogenously determined variables only. The system of 
equations has been solved to remove endogenous variables on 
the right side of equations. The coefficients on the 
derived reduced form parame ter·s rna>' be thought of as impact 
multipl ie~s because they measure the change in each of the 
endogenous variables from a change in each of the 
predetermined variables. The reduced form estimates are 
derived from estimates of the three stage least squares 
coefficients. 
Elasticity Results 
The elasticities were estimated from the coefficients 
of the structural and reduced form equations. Elasticity 
is defined as the percentage change in the dependent 
va~iable caused by a one percent change in the independent 
variable. Equation 14 shows the elasticity formula. E is 
ela:.ticit>-, dY is change of the dependent variable, d)< is. 
change of the independent variable, Xm is the mean of the 
independent variable and ym is the mean of the dependent 
variable. 
E = ~-': dY = dY 
/': dX dX 
'2im 
ym 
( 14) 
Table XXXIX shows the mean values of the seven jointly 
dependent variables and nine predetermined variables used 
in calculating the structural form and reduced form 
equations. The elasticity estimates will be derived from 
these mean values. 
TABLE XXXIX 
t1EAN ~JALUES OF t10DEL VARIABLES 
Variabll? 
Quantity demanded 
Brazil ian production 
U.S. imports 
Argentine imports 
Canadian imports 
Producer wheat price 
Mill whl?at price 
Price of Argentine wheat 
Price of U.S. wheat 
Price of Canadian wheat 
Per capita incc•me 
Expenditures on wheat 
imports lagged one year 
Allocations on the CCC 
program lagged one year 
Exchange rate cruzeiros 
per dollar 
Index of Producer prices 
of soybeans in Brazil 
lagged one year 
Trend 
t11?an Value 
41.51 
16.80 
12.62 
6.68 
6.01 
228.79 
127. 10 
149.93 
151.72 
167.49 
1298.89 
4.38 
.44 
62.77 
75.85 
1975 
Units 
Kg./capita/year 
1980 U.S. doll ars/t1T 
1980 U.S. dollars 
1980 dollars/capita 
Inflation adjusted 
Index 1)'80=199 
Years 1965 to 1985 
Equation 14 can be rewritten using the coefficients 
from the structur·.~l and r·educed for·m r·egr·e:.:.ic•n: .. The:.e 
coefficients represent the change of the dependent 
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variable, dY, from a change in the independent variable dX. 
Letting these coefficients be represented by Bi: 
Bi = dY 
d)( 
a.nd 
=coefficient number (15) 
11 5 
E = ~-~ d"'( = B i . c;,m 0::16) 
., 
... ·. dv r-. ym 
Table XL shows the structural form elasticities, 
calculated using the mean values from Table XXXIX and the 
structural form coefficients from Table XXXVII. 
Elasticities are estimated for domestic wheat demand as 
well as for the four supply equations and two endogenously 
determined prices. The results show that Brazil ian 
consumers have a price elasticity of demand of -1.01. This 
means that a one percent incr·ea.se (decr·ease) in pr·ice 
results in approximately a one percent decrease (increase) 
in quantity demanded. Wheat is neither price elastic nor 
inelastic for Brazil ian consumers. 
The results also show that Brazil ian wheat producers 
respond positively to previous year prices of soybeans with 
a cross price elasticity of .68. This means that for every 
cone percent pr· ice i ncrea-:.e (decr·ease) in -:.c.ybe.:c.n-:. the 
previous year~ Brazil ian wheat farmers produce, on average, 
.68 percent more wheat. 
Table XL ·:.hovJ-:. e 1 a-:.t i cities fc•r· U. :::; . vJhea t ·:.a 1 e-:. teo 
Bra.z i 1 . U.S. wheat sales have a negative own price 
elasticity of -1 .54. This means that as the price of U.S. 
wheat increases (decreases), the quantity of U.S. wheat 
sales to Brazi 1 will decrease (increase). The cross price 
elasticity of U.S. wheat sales to Brazil from changes in 
Argentine wheat prices was positive, 1 .43. This means that 
a-:. Ar·gent i ne •A•heat pr· ice-:. to Breo.z i 1 i ncre.:..-:.e Cdecre.:c.-:.e) by· 
TABLE XL 
ELASTICITY ESTit1ATES FROM STRUCTURAL ~10DEL COEFFICIENTS 
Endogenous Exogenous ')ar i abl es 
'·Jar i abl es 
PAR pUS pSO 
t-1 EWt-1 Ct-1 X Red p* 
)(m 153 162 1299 76 4.4 .44 63 229 
ym 
BP 16.80 .68 
QD 41 . 51 -.31 
UI 12.62 1.43 -1.54 1.34 -.35 
AI 6.68 .39 -. 72 -.78 .47 
CI 6.01 
P* 229 .39 .23 .10 
pC 127 -.92 .25 
Variable Definitions: 
xm, ym 
QD, QS 
+ p··' pC 
pAR 
' 
pUS 
pSO 
XRcd 
AI , CI l 
BP 
c 
I 
EIA 
UI 
Mean values of independent and dependent variables 
Brazil ian wheat quantity demanded and supplied 
Real Producer and consumer wheat prices in Brazil 
Real Prices of Argentine and U.S. wheat 
Real Producer price of soybeans 
Exchange rate cruzeiros per dollar 
Argentine, Canadian, U.S. imports per capita 
Brazil ian wheat production per capita 
CCC credit allocation amounts to Brazil 
Income per capita in Br·azil 
Brazil's real expenditures on wheat imports 
11 .:::. 
pC 
1':.7 
'-• 
-1 . B 1 
11 7 
one per·cen t, U.S. t.o.Jhea t s.a 1 es to Br·.az i 1 l·'·' i 11 i ncr·ea.-::.e 
(decrease) by 1.43 percent. 
Table XL shows that U.S. wheat sales to Brazil are 
positively income elastic and have an income elasticity of 
1.34. This means that as Brazil ian per capita income 
increases (decreases) by one percent, U.S. wheat sales to 
Br·.azil t.o.Jill increase (decrea-::.e) b>' 1.34 percent. 
The Brazilian Government-set retail wheat price 
depends on the producer wheat price and per capita income. 
The ret.ail pr·ice had .a prc•ducer· pr·ice elasticit>' of .252 
and an income elasticiy of -.921. This means that as the 
producer wheat price increased by one percent, the retail 
wheat price increased .252 percent, on average. As per 
capita income increased by one percent, the retail wheat 
pr· ice dec 1 i ned by • 921 percent. Finally, the results show 
that the producer wheat price is related positively to the 
producer price of soybeans in the previous year, 
expenditures on wheat imports in the previous year and by 
the amount of CCC credit in the previous year. These 
elasticities are .39, .23 .and .10, respect i • ..Jel y. 
Table XLI shows elasticities derived from the reduced 
form coefficients in Table XXXIX. They differ from the 
elasticities in Table XL because they measure the impact of 
predetermined variables given that the interaction within 
the structural equations taKe place. Canadian imports show 
a positive price elasticity of 4.64 for U.S. wheat prices 
TABLE XLI 
. ELASTICITY ESTit·lATES FROM REDUCED. MODEL COEFFICIENTS 
Endoge:nous Exogenous Variables 
Variables 
PAR pUS pSO Et~t-1 Ct-1 xRcd p* t-1 
xm 158 162 1299 76 4.4 .44 63 229 
ym 
CI 6.131 4.64 1.94 -2.41 -.25 -.09 .31 
BP 16.813 .72 
QD 41.51 .56 -.136 -.04 -.01 
UI 12.62 1. 91 -1.87 1.44 -.15 
AI 6.68 .04 -.63 -.78 .1308 
P* 229 .34 .21 .08 
pC 127 -.92 .139 . 06 .132 
Variable Definitions: 
xm, ym 
QD 
' 
QS 
P* 
' 
pC 
pAR 
' 
pUS 
pSO 
XRcd 
AI, CI, 
BP 
c 
I 
Et~ 
UI 
Mean values of independent and dependent variables 
Brazil ian wheat quantity demanded and supplied 
Real Producer and consumer wheat prices in Brazil 
Real Prices of Argentine and U.S. wheat 
Real Producer price of soybeans 
Exchange rate cruzeiros per dollar 
Argentine, Canadian, U.S. imports per capita 
Brazilian ~~~heat production per capita 
CCC credit allocation amounts to Brazil 
Income per capita in Brazil 
Brazil's real expenditures on wheat imports 
11:3 
pC 
F'7 ~· 
1 1 ·:;· 
and a positive elasticity of 1.94 for per capita income in 
Br .;..z i 1 • 
An estimate of the elasticity of the producer price of 
soybeans in Brazil on Canadian wheat imports was derived 
from the reduced form. This was possible because the model 
specified Brazi 1 ian wheat production as part of the 
identity determining Canadian wheat imports. This 
elasticity was -2.41. 
Al s:.c• Br·az i 1 i ,:..n expendi tur·es. on ~·Jhe.::..t irrq:•c•rts. in t-1 
and CCC loans to Brazil had negative elasticities for 
Canadian imports. The cruzeiro/U.S. dollar exchange rate 
had a pos.i t i ve impor·t el as.t i city for· Canadi .:;..n ···'·•he,:..t, .31, 
but a negative elasticity for U.S. wheat. This means that 
Brazil buys more wheat from Canada and less from the U.S. 
when the cruzeiro per dollar exchange rate is high. 
The reduced form also reveals that consumers in Brazil 
pay higher prices for wheat when, in the previous year, the 
producer price of soybeans is high, when expenditures on 
wheat imports is high and when CCC allocations are high. 
These elasticities wer·e .09, .06 and .02, r·espe•:tively. 
Elasticity estimates from the reduced form differed from 
thos.e fr·om the ·::.tructur.:al fc•rm in e-::.timating the 1ncome 
effect on per capita wheat consumption. In-::.tead c•f an 
income effe•:t of -.31 .;as in the structur·al estima.te, the 
reduced form estimate was .56. This means that as per 
capita income increases, per capita wheat consumption in 
Br·azil incr·eas.es:. r·.:..ther· th.c<.n decr·eases. This:. i·:. bec.:..us.e 
the reduced form includes the effect of income on the 
consumer· pr·ice a-:. i-:. explaino?d in mor·o? det.:..il in Chaptt.>r· 
l) I . 
Data D i sc•J-:.s ion 
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The data used in the model were yearly observations, 
1965 tc• 1985. All the data •J-:.ed in the model can be foun•j 
in the appendix of this dissertation. Much of the data was 
rect.>ived by written requo?st from several Brazi 1 ian 
agricultural research agencies. The rest was obtained from 
the OKlahoma State University 1 ibrary from rt.>ference 
materials such as yearbooks of The World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund. In many cases, more than one 
source of data was found for a time series. In these 
cases, all of the time series were included in the 
appendix. In choosing which time series source to use in 
the model, the one which produced the best fit was 
generally chosen. For example, it vJa-:. found th.c..t the best 
series for the price paid for U.S. wheat by Brazil was from 
a USDA publication and was on a fiscal rather than calendar 
year basis (October one to September 30, instead of January 
one to December 31). This particular series produced mort.> 
statistically significant results, maybe because of the 
lagged nature of the data. In some cases, the series were 
incomplete and tv..•c• c•r· mc•re -:.er·ie-:. hc..d to be -:.pl iced 
together although most of the data used in the model was 
from one complete source. Quarterly data would have been 
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preferable if it had been available. It would have allowed 
for a larger number of observations and therefore more 
statistically significant results. In many cases, the data 
used in a regression or in a table was modified from the 
original data. For example, some nominal prices were 
converted to current prices and some aggregate data was 
converted to per capita data. 
v.JE'r·e notE'd. 
In these cases, the changes 
CHAPTER lJI 
SUt-1MARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Model Conclusions 
The purpose of this research has been to examine 
policies. that affect Br·azil·'s vJheat imp•::.rts. and th.:r.t .:o.ffect 
marKet share among the three major exporting countries who 
cc•mpe te in the Br·az i l ian wheat mar·Ke t. The mc•de 1 
conceptualized and estimated the inter-related events and 
policies. that determine demand and supply in tho:- Brazil i.:o.n 
wheat mar·Ket. 
The principal factors determining Brazil/s import 
demand are Brazil/s demand for and domestic production of 
• .oJhea t. Domestic demand is determined by per capita income 
and prices paid by consumers for wheat products. The 
consumer prico:- of wheat is an o:-ndogenous pol icy variable. 
From Tablo:- XLII, per capita demand for wheat products was 
found to be relatively income inelastic with an income 
elasticity of 1:' I ·-•0. This means that a one percent increase 
in per capita income would result in .56 perco:-nt more wheat 
product consumed. Another study estimated this elasticity 
at .30 and found many other Brazil ian food commoditio:-s to 
be in the .56 range <Table XX, p.51). 
1 . ., --:::· .__ 
Consumers were more sensitive to changes in the retail 
price of wheat than they were to changes in per capita 
income. Table XLI shows that wheat quantity demanded has a 
price elasticity of -1.01. This means that, on average, a 
one percent increase in the mill price of wheat would 
result in a one percent decrease in wheat product sales. 
The reduced form of the econometric model was useful 
in measuring the direct impact of the predetermined 
variables on the corresponding dependent variables. This 
was especially true in the case of demand for wheat in 
Brazil. The demand for wheat in Brazil has two components; 
.;..n "incc•me" effect and a "pr·ice" effect. The incc•me effect 
is the change in per capita wheat consumption in Brazil 
attributable to a change in per capita income. The price 
effect is the change in per capita wheat consumption 
attributable to a change in the consumer price of wheat. 
Using the reduced form gives a more accurate estimate of 
the effect of income on consumer behavior by including the 
income effect on price. In the mode 1 , J.AJhea t qu.:;..n tit;.' 
demanded was determined by the mill price of wheat and by 
per capita income. However, the mill wheat price was also 
determined by per capita income. This is because the mill 
wheat price is a pol icy variable set by the Brazil ian 
Government. When per capita income is high, the government 
i ncr·e.:;..ses the l.•,•hea t subsidy to consumers J.AJh i ch 1 ewers the 
mill price of wheat. This may be because tax rev,nues are 
higher when per capita income is high and allows the 
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government to spend more on consumer subsidies. Equations 
( 5) and < 6) show th.a t per cap i t.a income de ter·m i ne-:. qu.an tit>' 
demanded directly through the income effect .and indirectly 
through its effect on the mill wheat price. 
pCt = fCP* I ) t ' t 0 
Estimating equations (5) and (6) with the structural 
f6rm resulted in the following equations. 
pCt = 212 + .13 P*t -.09 It 
( 5) 
( 1 0) 
( 1?) 
<18) 
Equation (17) shows a negative coefficient of -.01 on 
per capita income. This would suggest that wheat is an 
inferior good because, as income rises, less wheat would be 
consumed. The struc tura 1 form income e 1 ast i city •::tf wheat 
consumption is -.31. The advantage of using the reduced 
form is that the mill wheat price is removed as a regressor 
on per capita wheat consumption since it is an endogenous 
variable. This allows an estimation of the direct impact 
of income on ~vhe-3-t consumption. In the r·educed model the 
income coeffient is .018 and the incc•me elasticity is .56. 
In this case, wheat would be considered a normal good 
because mc•re wheat wou 1 d be consumed as income i ncrea-:.e-: .. 
Equation < 19) shows I.IJhea t demand in the reduced form. 
QDt = -461 +.B18It -.932PSOt-l +.245TR -.34EWt-l -1.27Ct-l <19) 
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Intuitively it makes more sense that wheat should be 
considered a normal good. This is especially true in 
Brazil where average per capita income during the 21 year 
study period was only 1299 U.S. dollars in constant 1980 
terms. Since wheat is considered a staple commodity, more 
of it would be expected to be consumed as income rises. 
Consumers would not be expected to easily substitute other 
staples for wheat since they are more expensive <Table 
XIII, P. 38). 
The study found that domestic wheat production is 
determined by the price of soybeans lagged one year. 
Soybeans are a principle cash and export crop. Wheat is 
double cropped with soybeans in alternate six month growing 
seasons. Wheat acreage planted and harvested is highly 
dependent on soybean area harvested and therefore on 
soybean prices. For every one percent increase in the 
price of soybeans there was a .72 percent increase in wheat 
production in the following year <Table XLII, p. 110). 
Since the mill price helps determine the level of 
wheat consumption and is also a pol icy variable, the model 
sought to explain changes in the mill price. Producer 
price and per capita income were found to be the two main 
determinants of the mill price. When producers are highly 
subsidized, there is less funding for the consumer subsidy 
so the mill price is higher. When per capita income is 
high and the country is prosperous it can afford higher 
subsidies to consumers. Also tax revenues are expected to 
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be positively correlated with per capita income. The model 
shows . that for each one per·cen t i ncrea-:.e in the producer· 
price, the consumer price increased by .25 percent. For 
each one percent increase in per capita income, the 
consumer price decreased by .92 percent. 
Since the producer wheat price is also a pol icy 
variable and helps determine the mill wheat price, the 
model sought to explain what determines the producer wheat 
price. It found that the producer wheat price is set by 
the Brazil ian Government in response to the price of 
soybeans, lagged one year, the value of wheat imports, 
lagged one year, and the value of CCC credit for wheat 
purchases from the U.S., lagged one year. These 
elasticities were .34, .21 and .08, respective])-. I t i -:. 
hypothesized that, since wheat production is highly 
affected by so>'bean production, that the Br·az i 1 ian 
Government would have to maintain wheat prices at least at 
parity with soybean prices in order to maintain wheat 
production at parity with soybean production. Otherwise 
farmers would substitute more soybean production for less 
wheat production. This variable was lagged because soybean 
planting precedes wheat planting by six montns. 
The producer wheat price was found to be positively 
correlated with the value of Brazil ian wheat imports, EW. 
This variable reflects both the world price of wheat and 
the quantity of wheat imported. 
EW = PI.AJ x Ql (20) 
1?7 
-· 
The higher the world price, the less the amount of 
subsidy is required on producers to maintain or increase 
the producer price. Or, to put it another way, with a 
fixed amount of subsidy, an increase in the world wheat 
price would result in an increase in the producer price 
given the same quantity produced. This is because the 
producer· subsid>' is equal to Br.:..zilian pr·c"j•Jction time·:. the 
difference between the producer price and the world price. 
PS = BP x ( P* - pf.....l) ( 21 ) 
On the other hand, an increase in wheat quantity 
imported would result in pressure to increase the producer 
subsidy on wheat because of the pol icy of "import 
substitution". An increase in the producer subsidy would 
increase the producer price given the same wheat quantity 
produced and the same world wheat price. 
pol icy decisions are formulated and implemented following a 
time lapse during which pol icy makers realize what is 
happening, develop a consensus, request the pol icy change 
.:..n d i mp 1 erne n t i t • For this reason the value of wheat 
imports, EW, was lagged one year. 
Effects of the CCC program 
A principle pol icy of the U.S. government related to 
wheat exports is commodity credit for wheat sales to wheat 
impc•r·ting countrie-:. ·:.uch .:..-:. Br·azil. In a study done to 
ev.:..luate the impa.ct of -:;.uch policies •::.n Br.:..zil·'·:. v ..•he.:..t 
i mpor· t·:. (H.~ 1 l , 1980), Hall fmmd that one effect of P. L. 
Brazil spent less eon wheat imports by receiving wheat 
teo spend more teo support its own wheat farmers because of 
the savings provided by P.L 480. This resulted in more 
domestic production and future reductions in commercial 
i mpeor· t: .. P.L. 480 also competed directly with commercial 
The CCC program differs from P.L. 480 in being a 
credit sales program rather than a food aid program. 
However, the CCC program may have similar effects on 
Brazil ian domestic production and on wheat imports. By 
subsidizing the export price of U.S. wheat and delaying 
repa;.·ment, the CCC pr·eogram helps Brazil to subsidize 
Brazil ian wheat producers. The wheat purchasing credits 
help justify Br.=r.z i 1 ian pel] i c i es ~oJh i ch i ncr·e.~.·:.e incentive·:. 
tc• Br·azilian r • .oJheat pr·oducer·: .. This r·e:.ult-:. in s.c•me of the 
same effects on domestic production as P.L. 480 such as 
increased domestic production and reduced demand for 
non-subsidized imports. 
The results of the current study show that the CCC 
program had the effect of slightly dampening consumer 
demand for wheat through its positive effect on producer 
prices. The model shows that increases in producer prices 
have a positive impact on consumer prices. As the consumer 
price increases, less wheat is consumed. In the model the 
value of CCC credits to Brazil was divided by Brazil's 
population so that this variable would be on a per capita 
basis since the other variables were on a per capita basis. 
It was found that for each one percent increase in CCC 
program expenditures per capita to Bra.z i 1, l.agged one yea.r, 
there was a .01 percent decrease in demand for wheat 
products in Brazil. As previously discussed, there is a 
lag time for pol icy implementation. In this case there is 
a lag between U.S. pol icy regarding CCC credit amounts and 
Brazil ian pol icy regarding producer wheat prices. 
reason the CCC regressor was lagged one year. The effect 
of the CCC program on current year producer prices and 
hence on wheat consumption was not statistically 
significant. 
Elasticity Results, Demand for 
Imports and Market Share 
The elasticity results tend to measure long term 
responses since the data are yearly observations. Dem.and 
for imports is sensitive to per capita income in Brazil as 
well as on exchange rates. Per capita income influences 
quantity demanded directly through the income effect and 
indirectly through its effect on consumer wheat prices. 
Market share among Argentina, Canada and the United States 
is sensitive to own- and cross-price elasticities as well 
as the cruzeiro/dol Jar exchange rate. Table XLI shows the 
income, price and exchange rate elasticities for the U.S. 
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and Ar-gentina fr-om the str-uctur-al for·m of the wheat tr-ade 
mode 1 . Table XLI I shows the- e- 1 ast i city r-e-su 1 ts for· 
Canadian wheat sales to Br-azil using the r-educed for-m 
because Canadian sales wer-e not dir-ectly estimated~ These 
r-esults show that U.S. and Canadian wheat sales to Br-azil 
wer-e highly r-esponsive to per- capita income in Br-azil with 
elasticities of 1.34 and 1.94, r-espectively. Ar-gentine 
wheat sales to Br-azil had a negative income elasticity for-
per- capita income in Br-azil. However-, none of the 
elasticities for- the Ar-gentine equation wer-e statistically 
significant at the p=.05 significance level. 
Own-pr-ice elasticities wer-e estimated for- U.S. and 
Ar-gentine wheat sales to Br-azil. These r-esults wer-e 
statistically significant at the p=.05 level for- U.S. sales 
but not for- Ar-gentine sales. Table XLI shows that U.S. 
sales had an own-pr-ice elasticity of -1 .54. This means 
that as the pr-ice of U.S. wheat to Br-az i 1 increased by one 
percent, U.S. sales declined by 1.54 percent. Cross-price 
elasticities were significant at the p=.05 significance 
level for- U.S. wheat sales to Br-azil but not for Argentine 
sales. Table XLI shows that U.S. sales had a cross-price 
elasticity of 1.43 for Argentine wheat prices. This means 
that as the price of Ar-gentine wheat increased by one 
percent, U.S. sa 1 es to Br·az i 1 incr-eased b;.· 1 . 43 percent. 
In addition, Canadian wheat sales to Brazil had a 
cr-oss-pr-ice elasticity for- U.S. whe-at prices of 4.64, 
estimated from the reduced form model. 
1 31 
The real cruzeiro/dollar exchange rate had a negative 
elasticity for U.S. wheat sales to Brazi I, -.35, and a 
positive elas.ticih' for· Argentine sale·:., .47 (T.:..ble /LI>. 
However, neither of these elasticities was statistically 
significant at the p=.05 significance level. In a.dd i t i on , 
Canadian wheat sales to Brazil had a positive elasticity 
for the cruzeiro/dollar exchange rate, .31, derived from 
the r·educed fo:or·m mo:odel <Table XLII). 
This mo:odel fo:or Brazil ian wheat impo:orts sho:ows that 
changes. in per· capita incc•me in Br·azil .:o.re centr·al tc• 
explaining wheat impo:ort demand and may also:o affect market 
share among Argentina, Canada and the U.S. Per· c.:o.p i t.:o. 
i n c o:ome '"Ia s h i gh 1 y s i gn i f i cant stat i s t i c.:._ 1 1 y i n ex pI .:.. i n i n g 
per capita wheat co:onsumption in Brazil because of its 
do:ouble affect on consumption, through the income effect, 
and through the price affect. The model shows that per 
capita income had a positive influence on U.S. and Canadian 
wheat sales but a negative influence on Argentine wheat 
sales. The CCC program had negative impacts on wheat sales 
to Brazil as a result of its positive effect on domestic 
producer and consumer wheat prices. Its impact on wheat 
sales was 1 ikely greater on Argentina and Canada than on 
the U.S. For example, a one percent increase in 
allocations on CCC credit teo Brazi 1 would result in a -.09 
percent decrease in Canadian wheat sales to Brazil. 
Implications to Pol icy MaKers 
The res.ults. s.how that international tr·ade analy·:.is 
must consider the simultaneous interactions of economic 
events in several countries. Since the pol icy maKers in 
the various countries wi 11 have different, if not 
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con f 1 i c t i n g, goa 1 s, the imp 1 i cat i on s. of any an a l>'s i s w i 1 1 
depend on the perspective of the pol icy maKer. For 
example, a current goal of Brazi 1 ian pol icy maker·s. i-:. tc• 
reduce imports and expand exports. This study strongly 
suggests that price subsidies for soybean producers are 
more effective in increasing domestic wheat production and 
thus reducing wheat imports than are direct producer price 
subsidies for wheat production. Wheat producers in Brazil 
are more influenced by soybean prices than by wheat prices. 
This is because soybeans and wheat are grown on the same 
land by the same farmers. These farmers produce soybeans 
as their main cash crop and grow the wheat in the 
off-season. As the price of soybeans increases and land 
planted in soybeans increases, more wheat will also be 
grown. Since the price of soybeans is set more than s1x 
months prior to planting the wheat crop, the farmers are 
responding to the lagged price of soybeans rather than to 
the current price. 
Brazil could also greatly reduce wheat imports by 
removing subsidies on the mill price since, for every one 
percent increase in the price of wheat products to 
consumers, there is approximately a one percent decline in 
consumption. However, there may be other pol icy 
considerations such as political stabi 1 ity and social 
well-being that would prohibit raising prices to consumers. 
U.S. pol icy goals are the opposite of Brazil's because 
of the current grain surplus. U.S. pol icy makers would 
1 iKe to encourage Brazil's wheat imports, maintain the 
traditionally large share of the Brazil ian wheat marKet and 
reduce some of the volatility of wheat exports to Brazil 
The study suggests that credit programs such as the 
Commodity Cr·edi t Pr·c•gram ar·e nc•t succe~-~-ful becau~.e, if 
an;,··th i ng, they encc•urage Braz i 1 ian production .:..nd 
discourage consumption. 
U.S. wheat sales are sensitive to changes in U.S. 
wheat prices and the wheat prices of competing wheat 
exporting countries. The relatively high U.S. price 
elasticities suggest that in the event of a price war in 
which the three exporters aggressively lowered their own 
wheat prices to increase marKet share, the U.S. and Canada 
would tend to increase marKet share relative to Argentina 
because of their higher price elasticities of wheat sales 
to Br·a.z i 1 . For example, a one percent decrease in price 
among the three exporting countries would result in U.S. 
sales increasing by 1.54 percent compared to a loss of -.09 
percent in Argentine sales. It m.:l.;>' be that U.S. pol i c::··· 
maKers should also concentrate on non-price, non-credit 
vari.:..ble~ .. The U.S. is a lar·ge, r·el i.:..ble supplier· ..... lith .:;.. 
large proportion of its wheat production in hard red winter 
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wheat. Brazil ian mills seek hard red winter wheat to mix 
with the soft Brazil ian variety for staple bread products. 
Argentine pol icy makers are faced with highly volatile 
wheat imports from their geographical neighbor. They would 
prefer to sel 1 wheat to Brazil than to more distant wheat 
importing countries because of the lower freight charges. 
Argentina may benefit when the Brazil ian cruzeiro is weak 
relative to the dollar. A one percent increase in the 
cruzeiro/dollar exchange rate resulted, on average, in a 
.47 percent increase in Argentine wheat sales to Brazil. 
Political factors are more of an influence in the case of 
Argentina than for either the U.S. or Canada. As a result 
of these vulnerabilities, Argentina has attempted to 
diversify wheat sales by selling on a more global basis in 
recent years even though it means greater transportation 
costs. It was difficult to find a good fit for the data 
concerning Argentine wheat sales to Brazil. One reason for 
this may be the effect of hyperinflation in Argentina on 
price variables which makes it more difficult to 
consistently translate Argentine pesos into U.S. dollars. 
Canada enjoys by far the most stable share of the 
Brazi 1 ian wheat market and receives the highest average 
price for its wheat. Between 1965 and 1985 Canada received 
$168 per metric ton versus $162 for the U.S. and $150 for 
Arqentina. It is largely cushioned from fluctuations in 
Brazil ian import demand by its five-year purchase 
agreements. These agreements set an upper and lower 1 imi t 
1 :~:5 
on Canadian wheat sales to Brazil. Canada has an advantage 
c••Jer· the U.S. in ha•.J i ng .:.. n.:.. tiona 1 gr·a in board th.:.. t can 
negotiate for all grain producers in Canada and more easily 
negotiate long term agreements. However, Canadian wheat 
sales to Brazil are vulnerable to U.S. wheat prices. The 
cross-price elasticity was an average of 4.64 between 1965 
and 1985. This could mean a nearly five percent decrease 
in Canadian wheat sales following a U.S. price decrease of 
one percent. Canada is affected more than Argentina or the 
U.S. by changes in Brazil ian per capita income with an 
income elasticity of 1.94 percent. Canada now has its own 
version of the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation Program. 
It is 1 ikely that this program helps to boost Canadian 
wheat sales in the short run and reduce those of the U.S. 
and Argentina, but 1 il<e the U.S. pr·clgr.am, it is not 
a long run benefit to sales because of its possible 
positi•Je impact on Brazilian producer· and cc•nsumer· tJ.Jheat 
pr i ceo': .. 
Anothe-r implication of this study is that soybean 
prices may be used to predict Brazil ian wheat imports the 
following year because of their positive effect on domestic 
wheat production. For example, a one percent increase 
(decrea':-e) in ·:.oybean pr·ice':. r·e':.t.Jlted in.:. .. 72 percent 
incr·ea':.e (decrea':.e) in Br.azili.:..n v.Jhea.t pr·c .. juction. 
1 J~. 
L i m i t .:.. t i on s 
As with most econometric models, it is impossible to 
captur·e all poss.ible effects., especial];.·· in an 
in terna t i c•na 1 tr·.cr.de mode 1 1..<.1 i th m.cr.n>' in terdependt-n t 
commodities, foreign exchange ratt-s, and macroeconomic 
v.cr.r i .:..b 1 es .. For many variables, data are not Kt-pt in 
equivalent time units for different countries. For 
example, much U.S. data is on a fiscal year basis which 
does not necessarily coincide with the calendar year data 
or seasonal year data of other countries. In Br· az i 1 , the 
wheat harvest is at a different time of yt-ar than the 
soybean harvest so a one-year Jag may comt- closer than 
current yt-ar data in estimating cross-price effects but may 
·:.till be imper·fect. In many cases, data series from 
different sources may differ and the researcher must select 
the series that seems most reliable. In thi·:. ·:.tudy, 
choices oftt-n ha.d to be made beh-.1een or·iginal Br·.:..zili.:..n 
data sources and sources such as The Food and Agriculture 
Organization CFAO) or The World BanK. The original 
Brazil ian sources seemed more appropriate. In -::.orne c .:c. -:.e :. , 
different sources had to be spliced together to produce a 
complete time series. Data used in estimating this model 
may be found in the Appendix. 
Some of the variables did not have data for the full 
21 >···e.:..r·=·· For example, the CCC program replaced the 
earlier P.L. 480 program so data for the CCC program were 
available for only eight years. Canada had no wheat 
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exports to Brazil for the first five years of the study. 
Because Brazil and Argentina have experienced 
hyperinflation in recent years, it is more difficult to 
accurately convert time series into consistent price units. 
The point in time within the year in which the currency is 
converted can maKe a large difference. 
Suggestions for Further Study 
The model has been useful in focusing on a :.ingle 
marKet for wheat as opposed to a regional or global wheat 
model. The particular· factors and pol icy difference<;:. that 
would help pol icy makers tailor programs to different 
countries were re•Jea 1 ed. Ho•.AJeuer, it cannot cap t•Jre the 
larger scope of a regional or world model. The two 
approaches complement each other and should both be used in 
analyzing pol icy choices. It would be •Jseful to comp.3.r·e 
Braz i 1 to other wheat importing countries tc• see if a 
different set of pol icy decisions would be warranted given 
the national differences in wheat import markets. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE XLII 
BRAZILIAN I..JHEAT IMPORTS AND SHARE TO t1AJOR EXPORTERS 
Y!?ar· Tot a 1 u.s. Canada Ar·g!?n tina 
in thousands of metric tons 
1965 1 ,876 4""'? ,_ a 1 '313 
1966 2,381 1,235 e 1,024 
1967 2,429 1,069 a 8a2 
1968 2,614 1,056 0 1 '0 16 
1969 2,346 882 a 1 '033 
1970 1 '958 635 302 1 '021 
1971 1 , 71 a 942 4tH 205 
1972 1,797 454 315 969 
1973 2,945 1 ,544 408 993 
1974 2,399 1 '981 1 ,257 62 
1975 2,098 1 '656 334 45 
1976 3,428 1 '599 1,044 724 
1977 2,624 6a1 893 881 
1978 4,335 2,965 1 ,276 73 
1979 3,654 1 '528 352 1 '480 
1980 4,755 1 ,807 1 '962 986 
1981 4,360 3,362 8ta 50 
1982 4,224 2,711 1 '236 216 
1983 4' 182 2,617 1 ,489 B 
1984 4,868 2,558 800 800 
1985 3,860 2,217 749 793 
Sour·ce: Banco Do Brasil, S.A., Cacex 
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TABLE )(Li I I 
DOLLARS PAl D BY BRAZIL TO ~1A.JOR WHEAT E)<PORTERS 
Year Total u.s. Canada Argentina 
1965 135.899 34.270 i3 95.208 
1966 167.771 87.996 9 71.577 
1967 178.107 78.471 0 59.403 
1968 181.678 75.308 a 70.373 
1969 134.758 49.022 0 60.217 
1970 193.839 33.150 17.913 52.776 
1 S'71 106.831 58.196 26.442 12.599 
1972 121.918 32.847 20.922 64.697 
1973 335.560 208.258 34. 9$'5 92.144 
1974 468.395 213.731 244.342 10.322 
1975 330.858 261 .271 50.569 6.936 
1976 594.526 233.396 164.381 98. 161 
1977 264.727 65.930 91.797 82.476 
1978 541.335 359.152 170.538 8.618 
1979 546.657 233.846 67.476 205.598 
1980 889.785 320.533 397.565 171.687 
1981 831.892 628.984 173.651 8.675 
1982 761.953 460.913 253.548 39.105 
1983 726.610 422.696 293.161 0 
1984 755.914 397.888 252.882 104.244 
1985 
* 
567.503 341.941 110.612 102.547 
Source: Banco Do Brasil, S .A., Cacex 
* 
Jan/Nov 
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TABLE XLIV 
WHEAT PRICE PAID BY BRAZIL TO t1AJOR EXPORTERS * 
Yt>ar u.s. Canada Argt>n tina Over a 11 
1965 72.55 np 72.51 72.43 
1966 71 .18 np 69.88 7!L47 
1967 73.49 np 74.97 73.33 
1968 71.33 np 69.25 69.49 
1969 55.59 np 58.31 57.44 
1970 52.29 59.39 51.70 53.04 
1971 61.77 66.92 61.31 62.45 
1972 72.27 66.42 66.78 67.85 
1973 134.88 85.76 92.81 113.92 
1974 197.74 194.42 167.71 195.23 
1975 157.79 151.35 155.37 157.71 
1976 145.86 157.59 135.62 147.17 
1977 188.24 192.82 93.57 199.88 
1978 121.14 133.61 123.92 124.88 
1979 153.96 191.88 138.94 149.58 
1989 177.37 292.67 174.07 187.12 
1981 187.99 214.37 173.59 1913.89 
1982 179.02 205.10 180.88 180.39 
1983 161.59 196.83 np 173.74 
1984 155.56 167.53 139.25 155.11 
1985 153.81 147.72 129.39 147.02 
Source: Banco Do Brasil, S.A., Cacex 
* 
Calculated by dividing amount paid to exporter by 
number of tons purchased. 
TABLE XL'J 
UNIT '..JALUE OF ARGENTINE 
WHEAT 
Year Index of Unit 
'..)alues 
in U.S. dollars 1980=100 
1$'65 :::o .8 
1966 3iL5 
1967 32.t. 
1968 31.5 
1969 32.5 
1970 30.0 
1971 32.8 
1972 36.7 
1973 53.6 
1974 106.5 
1975 94.2 
1976 75.3 
1977 52.$' 
1978 64.9 
1979 78.0 
1983 130.3 
1981 111 . 7 
1982 91.9 
1983 79.1 
1984 73.4 
1985 67.5 
Source: International 
Financial 
Statistics 
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TABLE XL~Jl 
BRAZ I LlAN WHEAT It1PORTS AND SHARE TO ~1A,JOR EXPORTERS 
Year Tot a 1 u.s. PL480 Canada Argentina Other 
thousands of metric tons 
1965 1 '992 279 259 a 1 '292 90 
1966 2,467 785 422 0 1, 060 200 
1967 2,433 650 498 a 653 6:35 
1968 2,417 470 448 a 1, 064 435 
1969 2,337 435 450 3 1 , 000 422 
197!3 1 ,680 518 100 300 762 a 
1971 1 '727 539 287 403 359 168 
1972 2,749 1 '189 a 389 1 '280 60 
1973 2,062 1 , 136 a 408 526 a 
1974 2' 165 785 a 1, 300 80 0 
1975 3,970 1 1988 a 838 249 53 
1976 3,163 1 ,238 a 818 1 , 055 6a 
1977 2,844 1 ,673 3 655 "C""' ,.;.._t._l 161 
1978 4,200 2,254 0 1 '221 441 284 
15'79 3,783 1 ,255 8 553 1 ,972 a 
198a 4,599 2,799 0 1, 8a8 a 0 
1981 4,ae8 2,658 a 935 205 130 
1982 4,195 2,720 0 1 ,253 0 135 
1983 4,291 2,376 a 1 '588 415 0 
1984 4,503 2,541 0 1,500 462 0 
1985 3,468 1 '683 a 1, aae 685 100 
Source: Tomas.ini, CNPT/Et18RAPA 
TABLE XLVI I 
EXPORTS TO BRAZIL UNDER CCC 
EXPORT CREDIT PROGRAMS, 
FISCAL YEARS 1965-1985 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1978 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1989 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
thousands of U.S. $ 
Value 
0 
B 
0 
15,793 
e 
B 
0 
B 
e 
0 
0 
a 
e 
B 
14,344 
32,926 
197,935 
283,244 
336,015 
356,369 
443,435 
Source: Foreign Agricultural 
Service memorandum, 
November 1986 
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TABLE XL'v'I I I 
CRUZEIRO/DOLLAR E)<CHANGE RATE AND BRAZILIAN WHEAT PRJ CES 
Year Exchange 
Rate 
Producer 
Price 
Average 
FOB 
Import 
Price 
cruzeiro/ dollar·s. per metric ton 
dollar 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1979 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1989 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
** 
3.713 
4.258 
4.813 
5.579 
6.122 
7.435 
8.649 
8.674 
11.723 
15.327 
19.965 
33.567 
61.574 
93.374 * 
179.229 * 
573.27B * 
1841.500 * 
6205.1 B0 * 
** 
103.23 
105.68 
101.81 
97.98 
98.09 
100.87 
162.04 
192.53 
181.69 
296.82 
297.86 
160.87 
192.29 
Source: Tomasini, CNPT/Et1PRAPA 
*Federal Reserve Bulletin 
59.64 
55.39 
62.53 
57.96 
56.97 
60.78 
62.68 
78.70 
137.42 
192.72 
155.35 
132.70 
107.01 
125.32 
162.67 
184.64 
176.% 
164.26 
157.37 
151 .61 
141.04 
** Some of the data in this column were not 
av a i 1 ab 1 e 
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TABLE XLIX 
BRAZILIAN POPULATION AND WHEAT CONSUMPTION 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
. 1985 
Source: 
Consumption 
1000 metric 
tons 
4,200 
4,422 
4,850 
5,694 
5,694 
6,072 
6,802 
6,098 
6,935 
5,987 
6,327 
6,2136 
Population Per capita 
Con sump t i on 
thousand:. K i 1 ograms 
per >'ear 
104,243 40 
107,145 41 
11 e, 123 44 
113,208 56 
116,393 49 
119,679 51 
123,032 55 
126,439 48 
129,920 46 
133,473 45 
137,095 46 
149,797 44 
IBGE, SUNAB, Banco Do Brasil, S.A. - CTRIN 
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TABLE L 
PRODUCER PRICE FOR RICE AND INDEX OF FERTILIZER PRICES 
Year-
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1979 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1 $'79 
Br- az i 1 i an 
Pr-oducer- Price 
for Rice 
1970-1978 
dollars per- MT 
* 
63.8 
79.6 
97.8 
102.1 
145.9 
220.2 
147.4 
131.6 
187.3 
Index of Prices 
Paid for Fer-t i 1 i zer-
Sao Paulo, Selected 
Years 
1966=190 
100 
157 
259 
342 
850 
583 
612 
1 '101 
1 '455 
2,719 
Sour-ce: Brazil -A Review of Agr-icultural 
Policies The World Bank 
* Some of the data in this column wer·t-
not a.va i 1 able 
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TABLE LI 
BRAZILIAN WHEAT AREA, PRODUCTION, YIELD AND PRICES 
Year Braz i 1 ian Brazil ian Yield 1 Producer Consumer 
Wheat Wheat Price 2 Price 2 
Area Production 
Harvested 1 
in thousands metric kg/ha cruzeiros per 
of hectares tons metric ton 
1962 258,221 255,404 989 43 
** 1963 302' 122 97,811 324 72 
1964 300,542 213,691 711 149 
1965 354,680 221,576 625 210 
1966 385,928 298,523 775 265 
1967 561,987 364,879 649 317 
1968 845,693 693,598 829 383 
1969 1,299,518 1,146,319 882 450 
1970 1,861,284 1,734,972 932 499 419 
1971 2,088,215 2,038,632 1 ,815 547 484 
1972 2,340,431 693,399 296 690 556 
1973 1 '694' 385 1,934,439 1,206 750 612 
1974 2,212,643 2,848,948 1,287 1,480 734 
1975 3,11 a, 830 1,582,587 509 1 ,678 734 
1976 3,528,789 3,937,864 863 2' 130 968 * 
1977 3,020,831 2,012,842 666 3,170 1 ,202 
1978 2,794,365 2,700,707 966 4' 150 1 '391 
1979 4,184,144 2,881 '186 702 5,488 1 '391 
1988 3,318,501 2,702,138 814 11 '840 2,998 * 
1981 2,063,747 2,226,447 1 ,879 28,580 13,255 
* 1982 2,968,010 1,882,337 689 
** 1983 1 '890 '145 2' 188,677 1,154 
1984 1,938,843 1 '935 '411 998 
1985 2,680,352 4,268,997 1 ,639 
Sources: 1 CTRIN/Banco Do Brasi 1 
2 DETRIG/SUNAB 
* Yearly average 
**Data unavailable 
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TABLE LI I 
BRAZILIAN WHEAT PRODUCT I ON, It1PORTS, RESER~)ES AND CONSLit1PT I ON 
Y€-ar f...Jh€'a t lJhea t Reserve Cc•nsump- Cons.ump t ion 
Production Imports Storage tion per cap i t a 
in thousands of metric tons Kg/yr 
1965 221.6 1 '90 1 • 6 30.7 2,376 28.42 
1966 2'7'8. 5 2,467.3 29.1 2,447 29.56 
1967 364.9 2,433.0 47.7 2,665 31 .1 7 
1968 693.6 2,417.0 71.9 2,866 32.71 
1969 1 '146. 3 2,236.6 117.2 2,908 32.25 
1970 1 '735. 0 1 '930 . 1 166.2 3,039 32.70 
1971 1 J 946.0 1 , 527. e 225.0 3,207 33.63 
1972 692.8 2,000.0 152.5 3,578 34.40 
1973 2,031.3 3,011.1 218.5 3,746 37.11 
1974 2,858.5 2, 165. a 325.0 4,200 40.42 
1975 1,659.0 2,300.0 431.9 4,422 43.35 
1976 1 '536. 9 3,527.3 485.0 5,052 4t .. 12 
Source: Fecotr· i go - DETEC/DIECO, CTRIN 
Year 
1983 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Sour·ce: 
TABLE LII I 
PRODUCER WHEAT PRICES IN BRAZIL 
Braz i 1 ian 
Wheat 
Imports 
iBBB r1T 
4,755 
4,368 
4,224 
4' 182 
4,868 
Et1BRAPA 
Year Producer Pri~e 
198!V1981 
1981./1982 
1982/1983 
1983./1984 
1984/1985 
dollars per 
metric ton 
196 
228 
273 
204 
224 
Source: World Wheat Statistics 
1985, International 
Wheat Council 
TABLE Ll~) 
BRAZILIAN l,.JHEAT It1PORTS 
Per·cen tage ~)alue in 
of total u.s. 
imports dollars 
'I 
" 
m i 11 ions 
6.62 893 
6.81 832 
6.96 762 
7.63 727 
~·. B2 755 
153 
•,)a 1 ue of l...)hea t 
Imports as a 
Percentage of 
Total Impc•rt~. 
'I 
!o 
3.88 
3.77 
3,93 
4.71 
5.43 
Year 
1988 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
TABLE L~J 
BRAZ 1 LIAN L~HEAT AREA AND PRODUCT I ON 
Y~ar I..Jh~a t ar~a harv~sted l,~h~a t Production 
1880 h~ctares 1088 metric tons 
1984 1 '741 1 '956 
1985 2,658 4,247 
Sourc~: Instituto Brasileiro d~ Geografia e 
Esta.tistica 
TABLE LVI 
BRAZILIAN !,<)HEAT PRODUCT I ON, IMPORTS AND PRICES 
Domestic Imports Farm Average Cost at Mill 
Production 
m i 11 i ern metric tons 
2.74 4.76 
2.22 4.36 
1.88 4.14 
2.19 3.60 
1.83 4. 20 
2.87 
* 
Prices Import mill Price 
Price 
u.s. dcrll ars per metric ton 
247 248 272 43 
205 242 226 107 
262 222 288 131 
170 182 195 104 
185 177 213 11 7 
245 180 265 101 
Source: World BanK (telephone conversation with John Joyce) 
* Data unavailable 
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TABLE UJI I 
PRICES FOR RICE, SUGAR AND FERTILIZERS 
Ye-ar· Rice Pr i c e- Price of Sugar Price of 
l,~holesale Brazil Superphosphate 
Ne1,v Orleans u.s. Gulf Por· tE. 
dollars./MT cents/lb do 11 ar !:./MT 
1965 182.98 3.39 47.25 
1966 182.98 3.64 47.25 
1967 187.39 3.64 47.30 
1968 191.80 4.49 37.50 
1969 187.39 4.75 39.60 
1979 189.69 5.1 a 42.50 
1971 191 . sa 5.5a 43.66 
1972 216.05 7.22 67.50 
1973 396.83 8.96 163.130 
1974 555.56 25.38 3a8.00 
1975 418.87 29.18 235.36 
1976 3a8.64 11.52 91.53 
1977 332.89 8.24 '7'7 I 92 
1978 399.93 7.70 98.04 
1979 381 .4a 8.79 14:::.34 
1980 496.94 21.79 178.04 
1981 565.48 16.92 16a.87 
1982 366.70 9.42 140.34 
1983 378.46 9.46 134.34 
1984 379.74 9.17 131 .25 
1985 382.53 6 7':.• ...... 121 . 38 
Source: I n tern at i on a 1 Financial Statistics, The International 
t1one tary Fund 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
'1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Source: 
Monetary 
TABLE L1J I I I 
BRAZIL'S POPULATION, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, 
FOREIGN DEBT AND SOYBEAN PRICE INDEX 
Braz i l·'s Brazil's Brazil·'s 
Population Foreign Foreign 
E:<change Debt 
Reser•.Je~. 
m i 11 ions m i 11 ion~. of b i 11 ions of 
dollars cruzeiros 
81.01 421 0 
82.93 368 a 
85.24 142 a 
87.62 2a0 a 
90.07 599 2 
95.52 962 4 
95.17 1450 6 
97.85 3836 15 
99.92 6030 18 
102.40 4874 29 
104.94 3653 43 
107.54 6101 70 
110.21 6787 110 
112.94 11406 240 
115.74 8342 586 
121 . 29 5042 1099 
124.02 5888 2681 
126.81 3641 5225 
129.66 4355 28349 
132.58 11507 1a7395 
135.65 10604 360302 
So>·bean 
Index of 
Unit 
Value 
Expor· ts 
1980=100 
38 
42 
38 
38 
37 
37 
45 
48 
109 
84 
81 
85 
108 
101 
111 
100 
110 
97 
94 
114 
86 
International Financial Statistics, The International 
Fund 
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Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1979 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Source: 
TABLE LIX 
CRUZEIRO/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE, BRAZIL·' S 
CPI AND BRAZIL'S NATIONAL INCOME 
Cruzeiro/ Consumer National 
Dollar Price Income 
Exchange Index 
Rate 
1980=100 b i 11 ions of 
cruzeiros 
1.90 1.4 42 
2.22 2.0 60 
2.66 2.7 81 
3.40 3.2 115 
4.07 4.9 153 
4.59 4.9 184 
5.29 5.9 245 
5.93 6.8 324 
6.13 7.7 454 
6.79 9.8 665 
8.13 12.7 944 
19.67 18.9 1518 
14.14 25.8 2323 
18.07 35.8 3498 
26.95 54.7 5845 
52.71 109.0 12125 
93.12 205.6 23346 
179.51 407.0 48225 
577.04 984.9 120268 
1848.03 2922.5 386968 
6208.08 9556.0 1298248 
International Financial Statistics, 
The International Monetary Fund 
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Y~ar 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Sources: 
TABLE LX 
PRICES FOR t~HEAT AND RICE IN BRAZIL 
Aver· age 
Import 
Price 1 
* 
72.43 
7lL47 
73.33 
69.49 
57.44 
53.04 
62.45 
67.85 
113.92 
195.23 
157.71 
147.17 
130.88 
124.88 
149.58 
187.12 
193.80 
181L 39 
173.74 
155. 11 
147.92 
Consum~r 
Price of 
IAheat 2 
*** 
2159 
2100 
1918 
2089 
2345 
1938 
1883 
1523 
1180 
1089 
1292 
1019 
766 
625 
Consumer 
Price 
Wheat 
*** 
85 
78 
59 
42 
186 
131 
185 
115 
125 
101 
of 
3 
Banco Do Brasil, S.A., Cacex 
2 The World Bank 
Columns 
T~IIO and 
Thr·H 
Combin~d 
** 
85 
77 
7'"-' 
•w 
86 
88 
86 
92 
85 
71 
71 
85 
78 
55' 
42 
186 
131 
185 ~ 
115 
125 
101 
Consum~r· 
Price 
for· Ric~ 
*** 
286 
261 
411 
583 
333 
318 
428 
368 
519 
426 
594 
383 
3 t~l~phon~ conu~rsation with John Joyc~ of 
The World Bank 
* Amount paid to exporter divided by number of tons bought 
158 
~. 
£ 
**Years 1967 to 1977 •,o,~ere calculated from column two using CPI and 
cruz~iro figures on previous page and converting, first to price in 
curr~nt y~ar cruzeiros using CPI figures, and th~n to current year 
U.S. dollars using curr~nt y~ar ~xchange rate. 
*** Some of the column data •.vere not a1Ja i 1 able 
TABLE L)(l 
WHEAT SUBSIDIES RECEIVED BY ldHEAT PRODUCERS 
AND CONSUMERS, 1968-1979 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1979 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Producer Subsidy Consumer Subsidy 
mill ions of 1977 Cruzeiros 
322 
581 
1025 
1476 
72 
-415 
-1473 
344 
758 
2145 
25 
1084 
263 
462 
-492 
-962 
1735 
3989 
6269 
7933 
6936 
2542 
11290 
12178 
Source: Renata Zandonadi, Observacoes Sabre o 
Subsidio do Trigo Consumido no Brasil, 
CFP, Brasilia, 1979 
159 
TABLE LXI I 
GSM-102 AUTHORIZED GUARANTEES AND PERCENT OF 
VALUE OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND 
AMOUNT OFFERED TO BRAZIL 
F i sea 1 Authorized As percentage of 
Year Guarantees u.s. agricultural 
Exports 
bill ions of dollars ., 
" 
1981 1.5 3.4 
1982 
1983 4.8 13.5 
1984 4.0 
1985 5.0 
Source: Paul Harte <Master's Thesis) 
TABLE LXI I I 
GSM-102 GUARANTEES OFFERED TO BRAZIL 
Period 
10/1/82-6/30/83 
10/1/83-6/30/84 
Amount 
rn i 11 ions of U.S. 
dollars 
315 
460 
Source: Paul Harte <Master's Thesis) 
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TABLE LXgJ 
BRAZIL: INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC GROI,HH 
Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Gros:. Dome:.tic 
Product 
Agriculture 
percentage change 
5.6 3.4 
9.0 4.2 
4.7 9.6 
6.0 -1.7 
6.7 5.0 
7.9 6.3 
-1.9 6.4 
0.0 -2.5 
-3.9 2.1 
Source: Banco Central Annual Reports 
161 
TABLE LXV 
YEARLY PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN BRAZILIAN 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Sour·ce: 
Consumer Price Index 
Percentage change 
21.0 
18.8 
14.4 
13.7 
33.5 
31.3 
44.8 
43.1 
38.2 
76.8 
86.3 
108.5 
191 • 8 
177.9 
Institute Brasileiro de Geografia 
e Estatistica <IBGE) and USDA-FAS 
Agricultural Situation and Outlook, 
1983-Braz i 1 
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TABLE LXVI 
',)ALUE OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE, U.S. AND BRAZ 1 L, 1975-1983 
Year- u.s. Major u.s. I....Jhea t 
Agr-icultur-al Tr-opical Agr-icultural and 
Impor-ts. fr-om Products Exports. to Cor-n 
Braz i 1 
* 
Br az i 1 
m i 11 ions of 'I m i 11 ions of 'I 
·'• 
,, 
u.s. dollar-s u.s. dollar·s. 
1975 772 81 323 85 
1976 963 80 255 88 
1977 1 ,384 84 111 67 
1978 1 '537 80 534 90 
1979 1 '513 3 77 536 79 
1980 2,1319 86 680 90 
1981 1 , s·135 75 710 s·e 
1982 1,438 62 526 82 
1983 1 ,656 65 479 88 
* 
CoHee, cocoa and sugar 
Sources: USDA-FAS, Brazil Situation and Out 1 ooK , 
No. Br4603 
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TABLE LX~) I I 
BRAZILIAN 1.\IHEAT AREA HARVESTED, YIELD AND PRODUCT I ON 
Year- t~hea t Area Yield Production 
Har-1Jested 
1900 hectar-es kg/hectar-e 1000 metric tons 
1965 767 760 585 
1966 717 860 615 
1967 831 763 629 
1968 970 880 01:;{. u"-''-• 
1969 1497 989 1374 
1970 1895 970 1844 
1971 2269 886 2011 
1972 2328 424 983 
1973 1820 1865 1938 
1974 2471 1157 2859 
1975 2931 610 1788 
1976 3548 909 3226 
1977 3153 655 2066 
1978 2831 956 2677 
1979 3831 763 2924 
1980 3122 865 2702 
1981 1920 1151 2209 
1982 2825 644 1820 
1983 1879 1190 2237 
1984 1742 1139 1983 
1985 2658 1598 4247 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Production YearbooK, years 
1965-1968 
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TABLE LXVI I I 
ARGENTINE WHEAT AREA HARVESTED, YIELD AND PRODUCTION 
YE-ar· t~hea t APe a Yield Production 
Hapvested 
1000 hectal'es Kg/hectare 1000 metric tons 
1965 4601 1320 6079 
1966 5214 1200 6247 
1967 5812 1260 7320 
1968 5837 980 5740 
1969 5191 1350 7020 
19713 3332 12813 42513 
1971 4315 1316 5680 
1972 4965 1591 791313 
1973 3981 1633 6500 
1974 4233 1410 5970 
1975 5271 1626 8570 
1976 6386 1723 110130 
1977 39113 1355 5300 
1978 4685 1729 81130 
1979 4564 1709 7800 
1980 5023 1549 7780 
1981 5790 1364 7900 
1 $'82 7200 2014 14500 
1983 6880 1788 12300 
1984 5901 2237 13200 
1985 5296 1605 8500 
Soupce: Food and Agl'icultul'e Organization of the Lin i ted 
Nations, FAO Production Year· booK, years. 
1965-1985 
TABLE LXIX 
UNITED STATES WHEAT AREA HARVESTED, YIELD AND PRODUCT! ON 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1 $'84 
1985 
I.<Jhea t Area 
HarlJested 
1000 hectares 
20356 
20180 
23783 
22363 
19253 
17863 
19293 
19135 
21802 
26552 
28381 
28640 
26895 
23043 
25333 
28727 
32784 
31 5'05 
24843 
27085 
26197 
Yield 
kg/hectare 
1790 
1770 
1740 
1920 
2060 
2090 
2282 
2197 
2136 
1841 
2057 
2336 
2061 
2123 
2331 
2249 
2323 
2396 
2651 
2607 
2519 
Production 
1000 metric tons 
35805 
35699 
41432 
42898 
39740 
37291 
44030 
42047 
46577 
48885 
57765 
58307 
55420 
48922 
58289 
64619 
76170 
76443 
65858 
70618 
65992 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Production Yearbook, years 
1965-1985 
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TABLE LXX 
CANADIAN I...JHEAT AREA HARVESTED 1 YIELD AND PRODUCT I ON 
Year Wheat Area Yield Pr·oduc t ion 
Harvested 
11390 hectares kg/hectare 1909 metric tons 
1965 11453 1549 17674 
1966 12916 1870 22516 
1967 12189 1329 16137 
1968 11987 1499 17686 
1969 19194 1849 18623 
1979 5952 17913 9923 
1971 7854 1835 14412 
1972 8649 1689 14514 
1973 113929 17138 17112 
1974 8934 1488 13295 
1975 9487 18139 17978 
1976 11252 2996 23587 
1977 19114 1964 19862 
1978 113584 1998 21146 
1979 1135913 1699 17746 
1989 11998 1738 19292 
1981 12427 1996 248132 
1982 12591 2194 27620 
1983 13697 1935 265135 
1984 13158 1611 21199 
1985 13688 1746 23900 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAD Production Yearbook, years 
1965-1985 
168 
TABLE LX::<I 
BRAZILIAN SOYBEAN AREA HARVESTED, YIELD AND PRODUCTION 
Year- Soybean Ar-l.?a Yield Pr-oduction 
HarlJested 
1000 hectar-es Kg/hectare 1000 metr-ic tons 
1965 432 1210 523 
1966 491 1210 595 
1967 612 11713 716 
1968 722 91!3 654 
1969 9136 1170 1057 
19713 1319 1140 1509 
1971 1589 1396 2218 
1972 2274 1612 3666 
1973 3300 1526 5035 
1974 5143 1531 7876 
1975 5824 1699 9892 
1976 6416 1750 11227 
1977 7070 1770 12513 
1978 7778 1226 9535 
1979 7321 1360 9959 
198!3 8774 1727 15156 
1981 8485 1765 14978 
1 1'82 8202 1562 12810 
1983 8137 1792 14582 
1984 9421 1650 15541 
1985 10153 1800 18278 
Sour-ce: Food and Agr-iculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Production YearbooK, Yl.?ars 
1965-1985 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
TABLE U<XI I 
BRAZILIAN ltJHEAT IMPORTS 
Quantity of Wheat 
Imports 
1000 metric tons 
1,889 
2,420 
2,480 
2,638 
2,373 
1 '994 
1,739 
1 '811 
3,015 
2,406 
2' 106 
3,435 
2,626 
4,334 
3,658 
4,758 
4,363 
4,225 
4' 182 
4,869 
4,041 
1
-Jalue of !,~heat 
Imports 
10,000 U.S. dollars 
13,697 
17,218 
18,465 
18,418 
16,386 
13' 089 
12,722 
14,267 
30' 189 
52,391 
33,223 
54,870 
29,564 
63,319 
63,100 
105,196 
96,303 
85,234 
80,488 
84,574 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Trade Yearbc•oK, ;tears 
1965-1985 
Year-
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
TABLE LXXI I I 
ARGENTINE ~~HEAT EXPORTS 
Quantity of Wheat 
Exports 
1000 metric tons 
6,676 
5,078 
2,064 
2,439 
2,462 
2,415 
987 
1 '784 
3' 167 
1 ,834 
1 '920 
3,264 
5,970 
1 '835 
4,364 
4,538 
3,788 
3,837 
10,232 
7,406 
9,618 
\.)alue of IAiheat 
Exports 
10,000 U.S. dollars 
37,363 
28' 104 
12,229 
14,1316 
14,392 
13,234 
5,868 
11 '750 
24,600 
31 '811 
32,382 
44,562 
57,528 
19,420 
61,856 
B2,453 
70 '140 
68,250 
148,084 
98,570 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Tr-ade Year-booK, years 
1965-1985 
1 70 
Year· 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
TABLE LXXI'..) 
UNITED STATES t~HEAT EXPORTS 
Quantity of Wheat 
E:<por ts 
1000 metric tons 
19,655 
24,593 
18,811 
17,887 
13,746 
19,085 
17,536 
22,612 
38,445 
26,047 
38,294 
27,552 
25,224 
35,503 
34,703 
36,862 
45' 107 
41 '621 
41 '091 
43,616 
24,810 
~.Ja 1 u~ of tvhea t 
Exports 
10,000 U.S. dollars 
118,539 
153,577 
120! 723 
118,069 
83,058 
111,214 
108,954 
145,551 
415,111 
458,891 
529,305 
404,0$'6 
288,257 
453,222 
549' 157 
658,731 
807,346 
686,950 
651,264 
669,785 
Sourc~: Food and Agricultur~ Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Trade Yearbook, years 
1965-1985 
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TABLE LXXI..) 
CANADIAN WHEAT EXPORTS 
Year Quantity of Wheat Value of IJ.!heat 
Exports Exports 
1900 metric tons 10,000 U.S. dollars 
1965 12,729 84' 121 
1966 15,649 196,150 
1967 10,393 74,385 
1968 9,954 68,920 
1969 7,339 52,239 
1979 11 '494 71 ,695 
1971 13,616 87,754 
1972 14,463 97' 182 
1973 12,891 126,535 
1974 19,699 215,153 
1975 11 '648 296,179 
1976 11 '338 187,538 
1977 14,934 182,794 
1978 15,329 180,961 
1979 12,471 198,167 
1980 17,376 317,499 
1981 16,212 328,029 
1982 19,643 356,827 
1983 22,228 385,431 
1984 21,623 375,356 
1985 16,983 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, FAO Trade Yearbook, years 
1965-1985 
TABLE LXXVI 
MARITIME FREIGHT RATES FOR WHEAT TO ROTTERDAM 
Year From Argentina From Canada Fr·om the 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972./73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
CRiver Plate) CSt. Lawrence U.S. * 
Pc·r· t s.) 
u.s. dollars per metric ton 
13.94 4.59 5.08 
12.23 4.34 4.89 
113.32 3.53 3.57 
10. 10 4.00 4.34 
7.32 5~35 ,.., ,...,.,. ,:; .w.._• 
9.77 5.17 5.84 
10.05 4.84 5.27 
6.135 2.55 2.74 
12.46 6.26 6. 77 
26.81 12.92 14.30 
19.64 6.66 7.46 
14.08 4.74 5.30 
16.66 C': ,...,..-, ..J • .l.L.. 5. 7'0 
16. 16 5.64 6.38 
23.26 9.14 9.93 
29.77 15.63 16.85 
32.44 16.59 18.52 
28.44 11 . 50 11.52 
17.42 9.04 10.23 
14.88 9.67 11.75 
18.53 10. 71 12.62 
* Atlantic or Gulf Ports, t..<Jhichever vJas lo•J.Jest 
Sour·ce: Food and Agriculture Organization CFAO), 
"Trade YearbooK", Cp.23). 
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